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Chapter I. The Complexity of Oriental Politics .
There is nothing in the history of modern international
politics that is of such moment as are the events which have trans-
pired in China, in the last decade. If the amount that has been
written on the subject can be taken as an index of popular inter-
est it is a matter of ready inference that the vital importance,
to the world, of the "awalcening of China", and her future devel-
opment is generally felt. But while the question is an absorb-
ing one, any attempt that is made to discuss the problems that
turn about Oriental politics must be made with an appreciation
of the difficulties, involved in an understanding of the situa-
tion, for it is one of unusual complexity.
In the first place, there have been the difficulties
that are always involved in the contact of different races. Eng-
land has experienced them in India, we are facing them in the
United States in our "negro problem", and, this fact of mere rac-
ial differences has also made the development of intercourse with
Oriental nations a constant struggle between conflicting ideals.
It is not necessarily true as so many popular writers have held
that there is a wide gulf between Oriental and Occidental mind tha
is incapable of being bridged, or that the Chinese must forever
remain an enigma to us. More careful students do not thus con-
sider them, but there are, nevertheless, fundamental differences
in civilizations, habits of thought and standards of life.
Those qualities v/hich make form, ceremonial detail, and "face"
so much to the Oriental, seem to the Occidental to be of little
1 A. H. Fmith - Chinese Characteristics.
Chas. Denby - China and her People - etc., etc.

2value. As a result the Chinese consider the westerners "bar-
barious" and v^estern civilization to be of a low order. The
ordinary rules of diplomacy, therefore, have not been applicable
and the task of foreign diplomats in China has been a hard one.-'-
The situation has been further complicated in that the
very fact which has turned the attention of the v/orld to China -
her corniTiercial possibilities - has also brought a conflict of in-
terests among the powers, as they have striven for national ad-
vantage. Hot only has the east been ranged against the west
but the western nations have been placed one against the other.
It is well understood that diplomacy is now largely commercial.
Its greatest aim, since the ind^^strial development of Europe and
America has been to satisfy the imperative demand for markets
2
for the goods produced. Uaturally, therefore, the nations have
looked to China for her resources are beyond computation. She
has a soil well adapted to the growth of ceTeals and a climate
healthful to foreigners. This with the vast coal fields and
untpuched mineral wealth which is in immediate proximity must make
China in the future the indies trial center of the world. She has
a population estimated as being nearly 400,000,000, a people
hardy, industrious and frugal whose efficiency in competition with
our own ?/orkmen, we, in America, have had good evidence. Her
weakness is not irremediable. It has been due to the ineffective
^ J. W. Foster - American Diplomacy in the Orient,
^ A. T. Mai^han - E. Amer. Rev., 171 : 609.
^ Statesman's Year Book, 1902, p. 495.

political system which is capable of. and is undergoing gradual
reorganization."^ Though the commerce of China doubled "between the
years 1889 when it totaled 207.832,187 taels and 1899 when it
reached 460,533.288^
,
yet the latter figure only means a per
capita trade of less than $1.00. If we compare this with that
of Japan who with more limited resources has increased her per
capita trade in the last three decades from $1 to |7 or consider
that the trade of the United States amounts to $25 per capita
we see China's tremendous capability from a commercial standpoint
when her government has become more stable, the wants of this
great population have increased as they must, and when the vast
4
resources are exploited. With the completion of the Panama
canal in sight the prediction, tMt was made in 1868 by Senator
Seward that "the Pacific ocean, its shores, islands and the coasts
washed by its waves will in the future be the principle stage on
which the events of the world will be played out"^, seems today
almost a platitude. The nations have well understood the value
of the stake and there has ensued a diplomatic struggle that is
unprecedented. Writing in April, 1900, one of the foremost writ-
ers on Oriental politics said; "If a careful consideration of the
powers engaged in the Chinese struggle, their policies and ten-
1 John BarHett - Political Possibilities in China. Harpers W.
1900, p. 619.
2
Statesman's Year Book, 1889, p. 419.
^Statesman's Year Book, 1902, p. 502.
harper's Weekly, 1900. p. 745.
^Quoted by F. Crispi, Horth Amer. Rev.. 171 : 700.

4dencies is of the greatest necessity, it is not less a study of
the most absorbing interest, for a drama is about to be enacted,
the like of which the world has never seen. It dwarfs the con-
quests of Alexander, compared with this titanic conqiiest; the
exploits of Ilapoleon seem a passing diversion and previous meet-
ings between Orient and Occident seem the merest frontier skir-
mishes"
.
In the year this was written an important edisode in
this 'drama 'was enacted in the Boxer uprising of 1900. It is
the purpose of this tnesis to give an account of the outbreak
and the negotiations between the powers and China in the settle-
ment of the international questions arising as a result of it.
In view of the difficulties in the situation, which have been
briefly outlined, theaccount will be confined as far as possible
to the action taken and when reference is made to the motives
prompting these actions, the liability to error is acknowledged.
The material has been taken chiefly from the British State Papers
Archives Diplomatique, The London Times and the United States
Foreign Relations. The last named has really formed the basis
of the narrative not only because tne American attitude is of
the greatest interest, but also because of the fullness of the
reports tliere given, some of which have been rather freely para-
phrased.
Paul Reinsch - World politics, pp. 88, 89.

5Chapter II. The Situation in 1900 .
I The Position of the Powers.
To understand the situation in 1900 it is necessary to
review briefly the events leading up to the outbreak, particul-
arly those following the Chinese-Japanese were of 1894, which re-
ally marked the beginning of the struggle of the powers for com-
mercial advantage, which has been referred to. Of primary im-
portance was the development of the idea of territorial control.
As a direct result of this was Japan acquired by the
treaty of Shimonoseki the island of Formosa. By this same treaty
China also ceded to Japan the Liao-tung peninsula, which she held
at the close of the war, but this was vieY/ed with disfavor by
Russia as it would wreck her plans for the acquisition of an
ice- free port on the Pacific and so with the support of France
and Germany Russia informed Japan that she must keep off the
mainland. Japan could not withstand such pressure and agreed
to cede the territory back to China in consideration of an in-
crease in the amount of the war indemnity.-^
The relation of Russia to China is somewhat different
from that of any of the other European powers because of her
geographical situation, being the only one of these lying contig-
uous. Being in imperative need of an eastern sea-port her pol-
icy has been territorial rather than directly commercial and her
method has therefore been a permanent colonization and a gradual
encroachment from the north. It is generally admitted that
Russia is peculiarly adapted to Oriental politics. Being semi-
Chas. Denby - China, Vol. II, p. 145 - 147

6Oriental herself she has understood the necessary combination of
a display of power and the more subtle method of official cor-
ruption and consequently her influence at Peking has been pre-
dominant.-^ In view of her "friendly" action in withholding
from Japan the territory acquired by conquest Russia, secured per-
mission to construct the Siberian trunk railway over a thousand
miles of Chinese territory to Vladivostock, thus avoiding the
long detour which otherwise would have been necessary. This
grant by implication at least, would carry with it the right of
placing Cossack guards along the line. According to a secret
agreement, which though denied at St. Petersburg, is believed to
have been drav/n up by Count Cassani, Russia was to be given ex-
clusive privileges in Manchuria and eventually a lease on Kiao
Chou Bay and the use of Port Arthur. Russia's policy, there-
fore, was to wait the completion of the Siberian railway before
making any further move, but her plans were upset by Germany,
who also had designs on China, though from more purely comrercial
, . 2
motives.
In 1897, two German missionaries were murdered by a
mob in a riot, vi^iich occurred in the province of Shantung. This
opportunity was eagerly seized by Germany and her war vessels im-
mediately seized Kiao-Chou and troops were sent on shore. In
addition to demands for a large indemnity for the murder, punish-
ment for the guilty parties and guar8.nties against future out-
rages, Germany asked for preference in railway and mining pri-
Russias spread, Ind. 52 : 3021. Interview with Li Rung Chang,
London Times, 1900, pp. 235 - 236. . "World Politics",
2 Quart. Rev., Jan.. 1900. (ReiEBch. t.. pn^ pp-.

7vileges in the entire province of Shantung, and a lease of Klao-
Chou and territory inland to the distance of 100 li., on the
ground that the German government came to the assistance of
China in securing the evacuation of the Liao-Tung peninsula by
Japan for which she had never been recompensed; further as Eng-
land, France, and Russia had taken maritime ports on the east
and as Germany had no port as a rendezvous for her vessels and
for a coaling station her position was not equal to the other
great powers. The Chinese government finally consented to this
proposition and Germany secured this territory on a ninty-nine
year lease "upon the same conditions as the settlements at the
concessions and the ports, the rent to be paid annually, that
the territory should be self-governing, i.e., under Germany but
still belong to China". Should Germany wish to hand over Kiao
Chou to China at some future time China agreed to pay Germany
the money she had expended on the place|and China would select
another suitable port for Germany. By the terms of the conven-
tion Chinese war and merchant vessels could enter and leave Eiao
Chou at pleasure and no dues were to be levied on Chinese naval
and m-erchant vessels on entering or leaving port. The Chinese
liken stations were also to be retained.^
By accepted principles of international law China was
liable for the death of the two missionaries by reason of the
treaty provision guaranteeing protection of foreigners, but
the demands of Germany were too excessive to receive justifica-
tion on this ground and they must be regarded as a political move
which China was powerless to withstand.
iFor. Rel. 1898 - 1899, p. 187 - 189, 1900, p. 383.
^Moore Digest Int, Law. YT. Plftfi . 10P.P..
/
8In the memorial presented by the Tsungli Yamen (The
Chinese foreign office) setting forth the terms of the convention,
something of the apprehension of the Chinese is seen in the words:
"Foreign powers should not he allowed to raediate in the matter
as it is certainly known that foreign powers are not sincere in
their purpose to come to China's assistance in this present emer-
gency. It is in appearance only. China has suffered a great
deal and there is just a possibility that the foreign pov/ers in
their contest with each other are merely making China a battle-
field, which renders it most difficult for her to do anything".^
When this convention became knov/n Russia was moved to
action and immediately demanded and secured on the pretext "to
assist China in protecting Manchuria against the aggressions of
other Powers" (by a convention signed March E7 , 1898) a twenty-
five year lease on Port Arthur and Ta-lien wan with the surround-
ing territory for 160 li. (53 Eng. miles) from north to south
and 70 li, (23 Eng. miles) from east to west. As is the case
with Kiao Chou, Chinese vessels of war and merchant vessels
2
could enter and leave Port Arthur at their pleasure.
England from the time of the first treaties, had always
stood for equal privileges in China and had always given the
other powers the benefits of the concessions she had gained.
This was undoubtedly due, to some extent, to the fact that the
"open door" policy was adapted to British interests and her com-
For. Rel., 1898-99, p. 189.
^ For. Rel., 1898-99, p. 182-187. Text of Treaty, For. Rel.
1900, p. 383.

9merce was able to stand competition. low, hov/ever, when Russia
secured Port Arthur, England concluded negotiations for Wei-hai-wei
on the Gulf of Pechili opposite Port Arthur, and a strip ten miles
wide along the coast line to "be held as long as Port Arthur should
remain in the possession of Russia. On June 9th another conven-
tion was reported leasing to Great Britain, Mirs Bay, Deep Bay
and the adjacent islands around Hong Kong. At Germany's request
England made formal recognition of Germany's prior rights in
Shantung and declared that she had no intention of injuring
or contesting her interests there. There was considerable crit-
icism of the policy of Great Britain expressed in England. It was
asserted that had England firmly resisted Russlas seizure of
Port Arthur instead of taking Wei-hai-wei or had not acquiesced
in the coup d'etat of 1898, the ascendency of her nortnern rival
would have been prevented and England would not have yielded the
first place in Oriental politics, as was the case, for Li Ilung
Chang was undoubtedly right in saying that Russia was the power
China really feared.-^
England and Russia came to an agroemient in 1899 b7/
which England was not to seek railroad or other concessions north
of the Great V/all and Russia on the other hand, undertook not to
seek for these advantages in the Yangtse region.
France, also, had followed the example of the other
powers and gained a ninty-nine year lease on Kwangchow Bay on the
2
southeastern coast.
^ London ?imes, 1901, p. 235. 19th Century, July, 1900.
^ For. Rel. 1898-99, p. 191.
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Italy, in February, 1899, attempted to get a concession
in Ghekiang "but the F.mpress ijowager having assumed control, Italy
met with a sumnary refusal though she was supported by Eritish
influence
.
^
By informal agreements there were also created wide
"spheres of interest" about these concessions in which China
promised not to alienate the territory to other than the power
holding the concession. Thus, by 1900, thirteen out of the
eighteen provinces of China were marked out in this way as
"spheres of influence", numerous mining and railroad concessions
given and a large amount of foreign capital invested.
The term "sphere of interest" or "hinterland " is a com-
paratively new one in international law and so has not acquired a
very definite meaning. Halls definition in regard to ICuropean
claims in Africa is fairly applicable. "It indicates the re-
gions which geographically are adjacent to, or politically group
themselves naturally with possessions or protectorates, but which
have not actually been so reduced into control that the minimum
of the powers which are applied in a protectorate can be exer-
cised with tolerable regularity. It represents an understanding
which enables a state to reserve to itself a right of excluding
other European powers from territories that are of Importance to
it politically or as affording means of I'uture expansion to its
existing dominions or protectorates or strategically as prevent-
ing civilized neighbors from occupying a dominant military posl-
1 London Times, 1899, pp. 131, 147, 163.
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tion. jurisdiction is assiffiaed, no internal or external
power is taken out of ^fch-e hands of the tribal chief; no definite
responsibility consequently is incurred.
Any agreement in regard to such "spheres of interest"
such as the Anglo- German and the Anglo-Russian conventions have
only an immediate legal effect upon the powers signing it^ and
the United States has refused to acknowledge that the Suropean
nations have superior rights in their respective spheres of
influence. As is stated by Reinsch - "It must be emphasized
that they do not necessarily involve any immediate or future pol-
itical control, but, leaving the sovereignty of China otherwise
undisturbed, simply demand from her that non interference shall
be insisted upon and that no exclusive advantages shall be grant-
ed to other foreign powers. Should the partition of China be-
come an acturality, however, the spheres thus delimited will be
insisted upon by the powers interested as a basis of partition."
notwithstanding the immense political difficulties that
would devolve upon any power which would attempt to exercise or
assume actual sovereignty over Chinese territory"^ many were led
by the 3uropean aggressions in China to believe that the Empire
was on the point of breaking up and that the partition of China
among the powers was inevitable^.
^ Hall - International Law, pp. 134, 135.
^ Lawrence Principles International Law, p. 165.
Reinsch - World Politics, p. 113 - 114.
^ Robert Hart - Fortnightly, 75 : 198, etc.
5 D. C. Boulger - E. Amer. Rev. I'^l : 171. Fortnightly 74 : 198.
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The United States felt that it was necessary to protect
her conmercial interests in China and endeavored to secure from
the powers the formal guarantee that their respective "spheres of
interest" would remain free to international trade. On September
6, 1899, Mr, Hay submitted to the interested nat ions .through the
American represontativo abroad, similar notes stating that while
the government of the United States would in no way commit itself
to a recognition of exclusive rights of any power within or con-
trol over any portion of the Chinese Empire under such agreements
as had within the last year been made, it could not conceal its
apprehension, that under existing conditions there was a possi-
bility even a probability of complications arising between the
treaty powers which might imperil the rights secured to the United
States by our treaties with China. He, therefore, asked each to
make a declaration to the effect that they, First, would in no
way interfere with any treaty port or any vested interest within
any so-called "sphere of interest" it might have in China; Second,
that the Chinese treaty tariff of the time being should apply to
all merchandise landed or shipped to all such ports as were within
said "sphere of interest" funless they be free ports) no matter
to what nationality they belonged and that duties so leviable
should be levied by the Chinese government. Third, That it would
levy no higher harbor dues on vessels of another nationality fre-
quenting any port in such "sphere" than should be levied on ves-
sels of its own nationality, and no higher railroad charges over
lines built, controlled or operated within its sphere on merchan-
dise belonging to citizens or subjects of other nationalities
transported through such "sphere" than should be levied on similar

13
merchandise belonging to its own nationals transported over equal
distances .
However reluctant some of the powers addressed may have
been to definitely commit themselves to this proposition all of
them substantially acceded to it. Lord Salisbury wrote on Nov-
ember 30 that Great Britain would be prepared to make a declara-
tion in the sense desired "in regard to Wei-hai-wei and all ter-
ritory in China which may hereafter be acquired by Great Britain
by lease or otherwise and all spheres of interest now held or that
may hereafter be held by her in China provided that a similar de-
claration be made by the other powers concerned". M. Delcasse
replied on December 16th that France desired "that the whole of
China and, with the natural reservation that all the powers inter-
ested give an assurance of their willingness to act likewise, is
ready to apply in the territories which are leased to it, equal
treatment of the citizens and subjects of all nations especially
in the matter of customs duties and navigation dues as well as
2
transportation tariffs on railroads" •
Count von Bulow stated in note of February 17, 1900,
that, "the Imperial Government has from the beginning not only
assisted but also practically carried out to the fullest extent
in its Chinese possessions equality of all treatment of all nat-
ions with regard to trade, navigation and commerce. The Imperial
Government entertains no thought of departing in the future from
this principle which at once excludes any prejudicial or disad-
vantageous commercial treatment of the United States of America
For. Rel. 1899-1900, pp. 131-133.
2 For. Rel. 1899-1900. p. 128.

14
so long as it is not forced to do so on account of reciprocity "by
a divergence from it by other governments. If, therefore, the
other powers interested in the industrial development of the
Chinese Empire are willing to recognize the same principles this
can only he desired by the Imperial Government which in this case
upon being approached will gladly be ready to participate with the
United States of America and the other powers in an agreement made
on these lines, by which the same rights are reciprocally secured"^
Italy signified her acceptance of the proposition Jan-
uary 7, 1900^ and on December S6 , 1899, Viscount Siuzo . foreign
minister for Japan stated that the Imperial Grovernment would have
no hesitation to give their assent to"so just and fair a proposal
of the United States provided that all the other powers concerned
accept the sarae"^. Russia made reply December 30 saying that
"as to tho ports now opened or hereafter to be opened to foreign
commerce by the Chinese Government and which lie beyond the terri-
tory leased to Russia the settlement of the question of customs
dues belongs to China herself and the Imperial Government has no
intention whatever of claiming and privileges for its own subjects
to the exclusion of other foreigners". Russia made the reserva-
tion, however, tliat Talienwan might be separated from the other
portions of the territory leased to Russia by a customs limit in
which case the "customs duties would be levied in the zone subject
^ For. Rel. 1899-1900, p. 131.
^
" " " p. 138.
^ " " " p. 139.
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to the tariff upon all foreign merchandise without distinction
as to nationality",-^
On March 20, 1900 Mr. Hay sent a circular letter to the
American representatives abroad saying that the interested powers
had accepted the proposals of the United States and the Government
would consider the assent given as "final and definitive".
This action of the United States discouraged the spread
of the spheres of interest as without special privileges they lose
much of their value, hut while the proposals of the United States
placed commercial interests on a slightly firmer basis it offered
no solution to the deeper problem of political control which still
remained unsettled.
^ For. Rel. 1899-1900, p. 141 - 142
2 n n « p. 142.
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II GovernTnental Gharigea .
The years 1894 to 1900 also witnessed some important
changes in the organization of the Chinese government. The weak-
ness of the Empire was so conclusivelj^ shown in the war with
Japan that while a large number of the people did not know that
there had been a war or else thought that China had been victor-
ious yet there was a pronounced feeling among the more enlight-
ened that China must adopt western methods-^. The reform party
became more active and the Emperor Kwang Su was interested in
the movement and under the influence of Kang Yeu 7/ei planned
an extensive program of reform. Young Manchus were to study
foreign languages and travel abroad; a university was to be
established at Peking for western sciences; temples were to be
converted into schools; a Translation Board was to translate
books of western learning into Chinese; a Patent Office was to
be established to encourage invention; the essay system of exam-
ination for public office which had been in vogue 500 years was to
be replaced by examinations in modern science; sinecures were to
be abolished in Peking and in the provinces and other sweeping
changes were to be made including the practically universal right
to raemoralize the throne. The last measure was the immediate
cause of the Emperor's downfall. Some of the officials who had
Arthur Brown - Kew Forces in Old China, p. 189, et. seq.
China and Powers, Cent. Review, Aug., 1900.
W. A. Martin - The Seige in Peking, Chap. II, etc.
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been punished iDy the Smperor for refusing to transmit certain
memorials to him, appealed to the Empress Dowager and she sup-
ported by the reactionary party seized the person of the Emperor
and compelled him to issue a decree, September 21, 1898, making
the Empress co-regent^. The reform measures, with the exception
E
of some relating to education, were repealed by successive edicts
and a number of the reform officers were executed . On December
13th the Empress Dowager held a reception for the wives of the
4
diplomatic representatives of the powers which all attended .
The British press thought that a mistake had been made in thus
5
recognizing the success of this coup d'etat * The Empress
Dowager was now in control but on January 24, 1900. the Emperor was
forced to issue another edict proclaiming the adoption of P'u
Chu'un the 9 year old son of Prince Tuan as son and heir apparent
of the Emperor's predecessor . The reason assigned was the
Emperor's ill health. This act removed him still farther from
power and made him virtually a figure head with the Empress, the
real ruler. Immediately following the coup d'etat she had begun
to increase China's military strength, importing great quantities
of munitions of v/ar and drilling the troops. This had been car-
ried to such a point by the early part of 1899 that the Government
^ For. Rel. 1898-1899, p. 218.
2 V If p. 219.
3 It Tt p. 220 221.
225.
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felt aTble to refuse Italy's demandsfora concession. In Nov-
ember of this year secret edicts was sent the viceroys and gov-
ernors of the maritime and Yangtse provinces urging cooperation
in resisting concessions and stating that they were granted full
power and liberty to resist by force of arras all aggressions upon
their several jurisdictions, proclaiming a state of war if nec-
essary without first asking for instructions from Peking, for
this loss of time might be fatal to their security and might en-
able the "enemy" to make good his footing. The officials were
to be responsible for any repetition of the indecision that had
been displayed in Shantung ^, Another edict also showed her
warlike attitude. It said in part addressing the officials "Our
Empire is now laboring under great difficulties which are daily
becoming more serious. The various powers cast upon us looks of
tiger-like ferocity, hustling each other in their endeavors to be
the first to seize upon our innermost territories. They think
that China, having neither army nor troops would never venture to
go to war with them. They fail to understand, however, that
there are certain things which this Empire can never consent to,
and that if hardly pressed upon, we have no alternative but to
rely upon the justice of our cause, the knowledge of which in
our breasts strengthens our resolves and steels us to present a
united front against our aggressors. . . , With such a country
as ours with her vast areas, her immense natural resources and
her hundreds of millions of inhabitants, if only each and all
For. Eel.
,
1900, p. 85.
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of you would prove his loyalty to Ms Emperor and love of country,
what, indeed, is there to fear from any invader? Let no one
think of making peace but let each strive to preserve from dis-
true t ion and spoliation his ancestral homes and graves from the
ruthless hands of the invader" "^^
The attitude of the Chinese government as here illus-
trated is the most significant and important fact in the whole
situation and should never he lost sight of when subsequent events
are considered.
For. Relations, 1900, p. 85.
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Chapter III Causes and Events of the Uprisinf^ .
It is impossible to attribute to any one cause this
movement which was the result of the operation of numerous forces'^
There was the constant friction between Oriental and Occidental
which has induced similar though less serious outbreaks since the
earliest intercourse. There was the irritation due to the pre-
sence of the missionary, which carried with it the assertion of
the inferiority of the Chinese religion particularly in regard to
ancestor worship. This same feeling was engendered by the
principle of extra-territoriality which (while a necessary measure
from the western point of view) made the foreigners a privileged
class, and the privileges were at times abused. There was also
the superstitious nature of the Chinese which attributed the
2floods and famines to the violation of Feng Shin by the foreign
mines and the desecration of the cemeteries by the foreign rail-
ways. Then too, the introduction of cotton fabrics through the
native weavers out of employment and the railroat^s deprived the
native carriers of a livelihood. The liken tax imposed after
the Chinese - Japanese war was also offensive. All these were
contributing causes but the essential element in this outbreak
which was not present in the earlier disturbances was the strong
national feeling that had been developed by the territorial ag-
gressions of the powers. This brought into focus the hatred
^ See Chas. Denby - China, p. 174, et. seq.
G. B. Smyth - North Amer. Rev.
,
^ Chinese Superstition - Harper's Weekly, December 15, 1900.
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of foreigners that had "been stimulated "by other causes; and al-
though we may condemn the atrocities of which the Chinese were
guilty there can be no doubt that they had some just cause for
resentment. IJo people would willingly consider the partition
of their land by foreign powers yet the discussions current in
Europe and America to this effect were freely circulated in Chinai
The strong reactionary attitude of the Court and the Empress
Dowager was also favorable for the uprising and it is hardly
possible that without official tolerance, if not assistance
it could have gone to such lengths as it ultimately did.
In October, 1898, there had been several attacks made
on foreigners in Peking and the general situation in China was so
critical that legation guards were called to Peking from the coast
by the ministers stationed at the capital - a measure which the
TsungLiYamen consented to with great reluctance. The presence
of the foreign guards inspired the Chinese Government to take
unusual precautionary measures and the danger at Peking never
became immediate. It was, however , deemed advisable to retain
the guards throughout the winter and they stayed until the
2
spring of 1899 .
By the fall of this year the long continued drought
made a large number of the people idle and discontented and con-
ditions were ripe for the uprising that has become so famous.
It originated in Shantung among the members of a secret so-
ciety which were termed "Boxers" from the Anglicization of their
1 Arthur Brown - Hew Forces in Old China, p. 174.
^ For. Rel. 1898-1899, p. 225 - 244.
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name I-Ho-Chan or Fist of Righteous Harmony and also "Big Sword
Society"-^.
It is impossible to trace the origin of this society
definitely from the scanty and conflicting accounts we have but
it seems to have been an outgrowth of the ancient society which
successively took the names V/ai Kiang, V/aberLily, Triad, etc.
It was originally formed as an anti-Manchu society and though
repeatedly denounced and prohibited by imperial edicts had con-
tinued to flourish and now following the German activities in
Shantung proclaimed the patriotic doctrine of extemiination of
all foreigners. Its rites were based on hypnotism and all ini-
tiates, having faith, were rendered invulnerable to all weapons.
The movement spread rapidly as secret societies are very common
in China and every man belongs to several, so that the doctrine
was readily transmitted from one to another. It was encouraged
by the Governor of Shantujig who was strongly anti- foreign and
soon had a membership of several million".
W. A. Martin says, "Their designation of Brothers of the Long
Sword is due to the patronage afforded them by Yu Hsein a
Manchu Governor who desiring them to oppose the Germans in
their railway enterprise found the fittest instruments
among those fanatical Boxers. He distributed among them a
number of long swords which they desired and which
gave them their name.
See accounts by Geo. Smith - Ho. Am. Rev. 171 : 182. W. A. Liar-
tin - Seige of Peking, Chap. IV. Stephen Bousal, R. of R.
EE : 174.
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In Octoter they assembled in the neighborhood of Ch'ih
Ping V(rith the avowed purpose of driving out foreigners. Aid was
requested "by tne missionaries and soldiers were sent meeting the
Boxers in a conflict October 18 in which about fifty of the Boxers
were killed and the rest dispersed. In the affair it happened
that a number of the villagers were injured and the Governor Yu
Hein arrested the officer who was in command of tne troops and
memorialized the Throne for his impeachment because he made the
"mistake" of killing others than Boxers. They were naturally
encouraged by this and soon rallied again and began abusing the
native Christians and threatening the missionaries who appealed
to the ministers at Peking, The Tsungli Ya.-nen, upon demands for
the protection of the missionaries replied that they had given
preemptory orders to the Governor to disperse the Boxers and pro-
tect the people^. Instead of doing this Yu Hein ordered his
soldiers not to fight and his culpability was so clear that on
December 5th Mr. Conger the American minister in a note to the
Tsungli Yajien suggested the necessity of his removal. This was
done and on December 6th Yuan Shih Kai who had a good reputation
2for ability and courage was appointed in his place.
On the 1st of January, 1900, an English missionary Mr.
Brooks, was murdered in Shantung . An imperial edict was is-
sued expressing regret and ordering the punisliment of the delin-
quent officials but shortly after (January 11) another decree
For. Rel. 1900, p. 77 - 84.
2 " " " p. 86-87.
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was issued which qualified and lessened the effect of the former
one by distinguishing between good and bad societies'^. It was
felt that this v/ould be interpreted favorably by the Boxers and
the German minister marie a verbal protest to the Tsungli Yamen
to that effect.
This result was soon seen in Shangtung and southern
Chihli and the number of Boxers increased daily. The attitude of
the Court was further shown by the conferring of honors upon Yu
Hien, the forroer anti- foreign governor of Shantung*^. The situa-
tion was growing serious, new attacks on native converts being
3
constantly reported , Protests had brought small results so
the French, German, British and American ministers decided to
send identic notes to the Tsungli Ya.nen demanding an imperial de-
cree to be published and promulgated "ordering by name the com-
plete suppression and abolition of the "Fist of Righteous Harmony"
and the "Big Sword" societies and stating that to belong to either
of these societies or harbor any of its members was a criminal
4
offense against the laws of China" , These notes were sent
January 27 and Kr. longer not receiving any reply wrote again on
February 6th and on February 21st . On the25th of February the
ministers received word from the Tsungli Ya.nen that a decree had
been issued directing the viceroy of Chihli and the Governor of
For. Rel. 1900, p. 88.
pp. 78, 79, 8E, 83, 90, 98.
p. 93.
p. 96.
p. 105.
3 „
2 n
4 t,
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Shantung to issue proclamations prohibiting the societies-^.
This did not comply with the demands of the ministers and the
proclamation which was issued by the viceroy of Chihli , while an
excellent one did not mention the "Big Sword" society nor was it
given the publicity of the Peking Gazette as was the offensive
decree of January 11. The British, German, French, American
and also the Italian ministers called in a body on the Tsungli
Yamen and each reiterated the demand that the decree should be
published in the Peking Gazette and that it should name both
societies, so that it might become generally known and counteract
2
the ill effects of the former decree . But the Tsungli Yamen,
probably fearing tnat to accede to a demand which tbe ministers
were known to have made would cause them to "lose face" with their
people and also because the former governor Yu Hien was eitner
directly or in collusion with the society, made various excuses
but refused to comply with the wishes of the ministers . Believ-
ing in the necessity of this step the ministers on March 9th
again sent identic notes insisting tiiat the proposed action be
taken and stating that if it were not done tbey would advise
their governments to take such measures as would insure the pro-
tection of their nationals^.
In the meantime the Boxers v/ere constantly organizing,
drilling and spreading. The irritation in Shantung was in-
creased by the activity of the Germans in undertaking the build-
For. Rel. 1900. p. 105.
" " p. 103.
" "p. 107.
"p. 103.
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ing of certain railroad lines and the development of certain
mining districts in the interior of the province. The mission-
aries were confined to their houses and their work practically
abandoned, although as yet no missions had been actually at-
tacked. The ministers advised their governments that if the
Tsungli YaiTien did not respond to their oft repeated request,
a naval demonstration "bj the powers in the Bay of Chihli would
in their opinion, be advisable, and, Mr. Conger said, that if,
as a last resort, a marine guard were sent by each power to Pe-
king on the plea of protecting the legations, there would be
little doubt of ready compliance as nothing would chagrin or gr
grieve them more than for the word to go forth that they could
not preserve order or protection at their imperial capital and
they would do anything rather than have this happen again"^,
Mr. Hay, in reply, informed Mr. Conger that the Deiartment would
detail a ship for independent protection of American citizens and
interests in China. Mr. Conger's actions were approved though
the Department would have preferred that in place of the identic
notes which were sent to the Tsungli Yamen separate representa-
tion had been made;Mr. Hay stating that the "position of the
United States in regard to China makes it expedient, that, vdiile
circumstances might sometimes require that it act on lines simi-
lar to those other treaty powers follow it should do so singly
and without the cooperation of other powers^.
^ For. Eel., 1900. p. 103.
^ " " "p. 111.
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Still more evidence of the reactionary sentiments of
the Empress Dowager appeared in the imperial edict of March 9th
which prescribed punishment for five of the reform officials of
Kamlin, the Imperial College of Literature, whose chief offense
was their association with foreigners in their authorized schemes
for the development of China-^. Also Yu Hien ex- Governor of
2
Shantung was transferred to the Governorship of Shansi , which
was considered a high office. The ministers resented his ap-
pointment to a position where there were so many mjissionaries
in his jurisdiction, and several of them entered protests against
3
his appointment .
Conditions were temporarily bettered "by the presence of
two British men-of-war; one French, tv/o Italian and one American
(the Wheeling) which had arrived off the Talni Bar, and two
German war ships which were lying at Kioa chou. The murderers
of Mr. Brooks had been punished and proclamations had been issued
both against the Boxers and Big Sword Societies and on April 15,
the former demands of the ministers were complied with hy an
Imperial order published in the Peking Gazette^.
The new governor of Shantung proceeded against the Box-
ers in a stringent manner and on May 8th, Mr. Conger reported
that the situation was much improved but that the Boxers seemed
to be spreading northward through Chihli. In many places small
bands mostly boys from 15 to 20 were drilling and practicing what
^ For. Rel. 1900, p. 110.
2 It ft IT
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4 "
p. 112.
p. 109.
P« 113. 118.

28
they teniied quarterstaff , A nunter of teachers were going through
the country gathering together the idle young men at the various
villages, organizing them into companies and instructing them in
the rites of the society. There were at this time no known or
generally recognized leaders among them and they were as a whole
practically unorganized-^. Their activity was not directed against
Christians but against foreigners generally for natives who had
been associated with foreigners). Many false reports were cir-
culated and placards posted whichaccused the foreigners of all
sorts of evil practices such as poisoning wells, preventing rain-
fall and causing poverty, disease and death and which urged the
people to rise and kill .
As has been stated it was evident that the Government
either strongly sympathised with the Boxers or was afraid of them.
Many of them were in the army and they all Y/hether in the army or
not, claimed to be patriotically in favor of the existing djmasty.
So the Government was afraid that if they should be treated too
harshly a revolution might result against which it was not in a
position to make good defense. The Dynasty in power was not
popular south of Chihli and with the existing police troubles
found considerable cause for anxiety^.
There were several conflicts between Boxers and Catholics
nearPaoting fu seventy- five miles southwest of Peking in which
about seventy Boxers were killed. Hostile booklets were sold
1 For. Rel. 1900, p. 120 - 125.
^ " " " p. 122.
3 " " " p, 122.
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on the Peking streets until seized at Mr. Conger's solicitation-'-
and on the 6th of May a stone was throv/n into the Presbyterian
mission and offensive placards posted near it^. On the 8th and
12th of May while the British and Chinese commissioners were de-
marking the boundary of the British leased territory of Wei-hai-Wei
they were attacked by natives, several of the British and about
30 of the Chinese being killed . The Boxers continued to spread
throughout Chihli and came nearer to Peking. On the 12th of May
they attacked a Catholic mission fifty miles from Peking and des-
troyed it killing 61 Christians and reports of many other sim-
ilar outrages came from the missionaries at other points^. The
ministers at Peking continued to press the matter of protection w
with the Chinese government and on May El the diplom.atic body
passed resolutions which they sent to the Tsungli Yamen demanding
more immediate and effective measures than had yet been employed^.
The Tsungli Yamen had declared to Mr. Conger on the 18th that the
movement had not been thus far looked upon as serious but that
the Government was nov; aware of the gravity of the situation and
the Boxers would be suppressed. They asked Mr. Conger to tele-
graph his government to that effect, but he very properly replied
that restored order would be the only possible proof and if this
were not attained he threatened to send for marine guards^.
^ For. Rel. 1900, p. 123.
p. 123, 124.
p. 126.
p. 127.
p. 129.
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His request for permission to snnmon these if it became necessary
was promptly granted by the Department of State-^. TThe situation
grew rapidly worse and though the Chinese government apparently
tried now to suppress the movement and published the prohibitory
2
decree that had been asked in the note of the diplomatic corps
of May 21 action had been too long delayed and the disturbances
developed into open rebellion.
Notwithstanding the protests of the Tsungli Ya^en, who
declared them unnecessary, guards were sent for and on May 31,
75 Russians, 76 English, 75 French, 25 Japanese, 40 Italians, and
50 Americans entered the city • More outrages were occurring
outside the city. Work on the railroads stopped. The Boxers
now not only persecuted native Christians but began to attack
foreigners and Mr. Conger wrote on June 4th that there was good
ground for belief that not withstanding the Imperial decrees
against the Boxers they were secretly called patriots and the
soldiers ordered not to fire upon them. It was also believed that
in case of a general contest a large part of the soldiers would
join the Boxers in which case the Government would be powerless
to protect either itself or foreigners. The situation was a
critical one and he said at this time that there was a possibi-
lity that the legations might be beseiged in Peking, in which
case he asked that instructions be given the American Admiral
to take measures warranted^ to relieve Peking. On the 5th he
telegraphed that more ships were needed at Taku ^.
1 For, Eel. 1900. p. 1321 ^ For. Rel. 1900, p. 140
2 " II It 0^33 5 ,T ti „
^
" " "p. 132, 137, 138.
^ For. Rel. 1900, p. 142.
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In reply to his request for instructions in regard to
acting with his colleagues Mr. Hay instructed him to act inde-
pendently in protection of American interests when practical
and concurrently with the representatives of the other powers
if necessity arose and said: "We have no policy in China except
to protect with energy American interests and especially Amer-
ican citizens and the legations. There must he nothing done
which would commit us to future action incompatible with your
standing instructions. There must be no alliances"^.
He was instructed that he might join in a demand for
an audience with the Bmperor and to state to the Throne "that
unless the Boxer war is immediately suppressed and order restored
the foreign powers will be compelled themselves to take meas-
ures to that end". The Boxers began to pour into Peking in
great numbers and by June 11 all the communications with the
coast had been severed and the famous seige of Peking had be-
gun2.
The Situation in South East Chihli^
The situation at Tientsin was similar to that at the
capital. A pretext of activity against the Boxers was made by
the Chinese troops, but no real protection was afforded and by
May E7th the situation was so alarming that Mr. Ragsdale , the
American counsel at Tientsin sent a message to Admiral Kempff at
Taku, asking for a force of marines. In response, 100 marines
For. Rel. 1900, p. 143.
^
" " "p. 144.
A. H. Smith
- China in Convulsion, Chap. XXIV.
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under Captain McCalla were promptly dispatched to Tientsin, fifty
of them being forwarded on June 31st to Peking, with the other
guards, that the ministers there had solicited. The various for-
eign nations had present at Tientsin by June 8th about 1500
troops. Such urgent requests for relief were coming from Peking
that the consular body decided that a relief expedition should be
forwarded at once. The Russians and French had opposed this
step but Captain McCalla declared that he would start if he had
to go alone, and then they concluded to concur in the action.
A demand was made upon the viceroy for transportation for the
800 men who were to be sent. He consented to their going but
orders were sent out at the same time from Peking to destroy the
railroad. As the troops from 'Tientsin were preparing to start
on the morning of June 10th they were reinforced by the arrival
of a body of troops from Taku under Admiral Seymour, who took
command of the expedition, the strength of which was something
over 2,000 men. They arrived at the station, 25 miles from
Tientsin without any trouble, but here they found the rails torn
up and it was impossible to repair the track as rapidly as it
was destroyed by the large forces of Boxers, who subjected the
allies to constant attack. On the 19th the track was cut in
the rear and nothing definite was heard from them till June 25th
when they were relieved by troops sent out from Tientsin. The
expedition had, with great difficulty, pushed its way to Lang
Fang about 40 miles from Pekin but here it found itself confronted
with a large detachment of the Imperial army. This was entirely
unexpected and while one attack was repulsed, it was so clearly
evident that the allied force was not strong enough to break
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through to Pekin that it was decided (June 18th) to withdraw.
The retreat was rendered difficult by the presence of the wounded
men who had to be carried, so that the expedition was unable to
reach Tientsin again but took the position at the Siku arsenal
9 miles distant, which was held against all attacks, until relief
came. Upon leaving the place several million dollars worth of
munitions of war which had been accumulated by the Chinese were
destroyed"^.
Capture of the Taku Forts ,
In the meantime the presence of large bodies of Chinese
troops between Tientsin and Taku cutting off communication with
the former, the placing of torpedoes in the Pei ho river and the
other warlike preparations of the Chinese led the Admirals of
the fleet, that had gathered at Taku, to confer together and on
June 16th they decided that the circumstances demanded that an
ultimatum be sent to the Chinese leaders, calling for the dis-
bandment of their troops and the Chinese were, therefore, given
notice, that if this was not done by 2 A. M. of the following day
the united squadron would destroy the Taku forts. About an
hour before the expiration of the limit set, the forts opened fire
on the fleet and an engagement ensued. The Chinese showed un-
expected powers of resistance and the fight lasted over six hours,
but the forts were finally captured. The American commander,
^ London Times, 1900, p. 4E1.
Heport of J. W. Ragsdale, counsel at Tientsin. For. Eel. 1900,
p. E68 - 273 - Current numbers of the London Times.
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Admiral Serapff , took no part in this engagement as he did not
think this action was in accordance with his instructions to act
conjointly with the other powers only in protection of American
interests^ He, however, joined in all subsequent actions.
There has "been some discussion as to whether the capture of the
Taku forts by the i30wers did not, really, comprise an act of
war on their part, but these governments never so recognized it.
It was undoubtedly a necessary expedient, though the Chinese gov-
ernment entered quite a strong protest against it. In an edict,
June 21st, the policies of foreign governments in their relation
to China v/as assailed. It said: "for the last thirty years they
have taken advantage of Chinese forebearanee to encroach on
Chinese territory and trample on the Chinese people and to de-
mand China's wealth. Every concession made by China increased
their reliance on violence. They oppressed peaceful citizens
and insulted the gods and holy men, exciting the most burning
indignation among the people, hence the burning of chapels
the patriotic braves. The Throne was anxious to avoid war and
issued edicts enjoining protection of the legations and pity to
the converts. . . , But these people knew no gratitude and in-
creased their pressure. A dispatch was yesterday sent by Du
Maylord calling on us to deliver up the Taku forts into their
keeping otherwise they would be taken "bj force. These threats
showed their aggressions.
. . . With tears we announced war
in the ancestral shrines. Better to do our utmost and enter on
A. H. Smith - China in Convulsion, Chapt. XXIV.
London Times. 1900, pp. 391, 501.
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the struggle, rather than seek some means of self-preservation
involving eternal (iisgraoe. All our officers are of one mind
and these have assembled without warning, several thousand pa-
triotic soldiers, even children carrying spears in the service
of the country. . , . Hot to speak of the righteousness of our
cause, our provinces number more than twenty, our people over
400,000,000, and it will not be difficult to vindicate the dig-
nity of our country-^^l
Fighting at Tientsin .
On the day following the capture of the Taku forts a
seige of the foreign city of Tientsin was begun and there were
several sharp engagements between the Chinese and allied troops
who now numbered about 2,500. A relief force of 1,700 finally
succeeded in reaching Tientsin from Taku, but, though this opened
up communications to the east, it did not relieve the foreign
settlements from attack, for the Chinese were strongly situated
on the other sides. They continued to shell the foreign camp
with their heavy artillery making its position decidedly precar-
ious and some action was, therefore, imperative. On the 9th
of June the camps of the Chinese were attacked and on the 14th
an assault was made upon the native city, which was taken after
hard fighting in which the Russians took a notable part. The
Chinese fled and a provisional goveriiment was established by the
military commanders^.
For. Rel., 1900, pp. 168 - 169.
^ London Times, 1900, pp. 437, 452, 485.
A. H. Smith - China in Convulsion, Chap. XXIY.
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For a period of nearly three weeks there was very little
decisive action. The experience of Admiral Seymour's expedition
led to the "belief that a large force wonld he needed in any at-
tempt to relieve Peking, it "being thought that at least 5,000
soldiers should be left at Tientsin and 50,000 were needed for
the advance. All the powers took steps to increase their
forces as soon as possible. Japan was in the best position to
furnish troops and the United States held that she should be al-
lowed to furnish all the soldiers needful for the relief, which
Japan was quite willing to do^^. Some of the powers immediately
agreed to this, but there was also some expression given to the
feeling that Japan should not be allowed to do this on the ground
that it would result in her gaining an undue influence, or possi-
2
bly a retention of Chinese territory . This imputation of her
3
motives was naturally resented in Japan and the more general
feeling was that such a question should not be raised when the
ministers were in danger. But the military arrangements, nev-
ertheless, involved considerable deliberation and occasioned no
little delay. During this time there had been almost no com-
munications with Peking. Reports and messages were constantly
coming in by native carriers who claimed to bring them from the
legations but their genuineness was always questionable and in
most cases they were palpable falsehoods invented to gain the
rewards offered for news^. Uor were there direct communica-
1 London Times, 1900, p. 438. 3
^^^^^^ ^.^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^
2 " " supplement, July 13, 1900.
4 The German Emperor made an offer of 1,000 taels for authentic
news of the legations. See For. Rel. 1900, p. 3E7.
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tions between Peking and Shanghai after the 14th of June, though
messages sent "by Yung Lu, commander of the Chinese army, through th
governor of Shantung gave some news of the legations. But there
was doubt as to their correctness as the whole matter of communi-
cations with Peking was uncertain and unreliable-^. On July 16th
the ITorth China IJews published an alleged message from the Gov-
ernor of Shantung, which it claimed to have brought from a sub-
official in the telegraph office. It reported the capture of
the legations and the massacre of all the ministers , This was
telegraphed to all the news associations and it appeared together
with obituaries of the ministers in the papers of Europe and the
United States^. On July 18th, the first authentic news, from
the beseiged legations, was received in a telegram from Mr. Con-
ger, the delivery of which was secured through the kind offices
of Mr. 7fu Ting Fang, the Chinese minister at Washington. It
read: "For one month we have been beseiged in the British lega-
tion under continued shot and shell from Chinese troops. Quick
4
relief only can prevent general massacre" . Even tliis message
was received with incredulity in Europe, although the United
5States accepted it as genuine •
Throughout the month of July various Boxer outrages
were taking place in Shantung, wherever foreigners or native con-
verts were situated. On July 28th the massacre of foreigners
and native Christians at Pao-ting Fu was reported^.
1 For. Hel. 1900, p. 257. ^ pgr. Rel. 1900. p. 156.
2 For. Rel. 1900, p. 258. 5 For. Rel. 1900, p. 282.
^ London Times, July 20, 1900. ^ London Times, 1900, p. 486.
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Relief of Peking^.
On the first day of August it was decided that the re-
lief of Peking should be attempted immediately, although the
force available was not as large as had been thought necessary
and despite the unpropitious weather which made the difficulties
of transportation very great.
The advance was begun August 4, with about 20,000 men
and the allied army steadily pushed forward, driving the Chinese
from the positions, which they successively occupied, until it
was in the immediate vicinity of Peking and then on August 14
after a short respite the city was attacked simultaneously at
several points and the legations relieved. The Japanese troops
received especial commendation for their efficient service on
the expedition.
The Seige in Peking^.
The story of the seige of Peking, which had been in
progress, has been repeatedly told and it is not within the scope
of this paper to refer, in detail, to the many interesting inci-
dents and heroic acts performed, but this episode is important
in the revelation it gives of the attitude of the Chinese Gov-
ernment ,
The Americans gathered on June 9th in the Methodist
A. H. Smith - China in Convulsion, Chap. XXIV.
London Times, pp. 433 - 434; Supplement, October 5th.
Dr. Martin - The Seige in Peking. A. H. Smith - China in Con-
vulsion, Chap. XX - XXIII. London Times, 1900, pp. 661, 662,
675 to 679.
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compound, which was the easiest to defend and two days later, Mr.
Conger telegraphed Admiral Kempff that a movement in foiee should ti
made on Peking. The Tsungli Yamen was excited and the govern-
ment helpless. Edicts were issued June 6th and 8th ordering
the Boxers to disperse and threatening them with punishment if
they did not obey, but they had no effect and it is doubtful if
they were meant seriously. The presence of the Boxers streng-
thened the anti- foreign element in the cabinet and on June 10th
four new members were appointed to the Tsungli Ya^nen, all of
whom were bitterly opposed to foreigners'^.
Prince Tuan, father of the heir apparent, leader of
the reactionaries, and a patron of the Boxers, was made President
and so would be virtually in control, although Prince Ching, who
was more friendly was not entirely superceded.
On June 11th the chancellor of the Japanese legation,
Mr. SUgiyama, was attacked by soldiers at one of the gates,
dragged off his cart and murdered. An edict was published ex-
pressing regret at the occurrence and ordering punishment for
the criminals'^, but it has been claimed that secret edicts of a
very different nature were circulated at the same time. When
the Tsungli Yaiaen learned of the demand made by the admirals of
the foreign fleet for the surrender of the Taku forts, they ad-
dressed the ministers in a note saying that this act showed the
intention on the part of the powers to break off friendly rela-
tions. The note stated that the "Boxer banditti" had risen in
Peking and had caused great excitement, so that China would find
For. Rel. 1900, p. 147. ^ For. Rel. 1900, pp. 145, 153.
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it a very difficult matter to give complete protection. The
ministers were, therefore, asked to leave for Tientsin within
twenty- four hours. An escort of troops would he furnished and
the local officials would be notified to allow thorn to pass"^.
The ministers feared that it would be fatal to leave
the legations but felt that an immediate refusal would be unwise,
so they inquired what safeguards would be provided and stated
that on account of the women and children, it would be impossible
to leave on such short notice. They asked for a conference with
g
Prince Ching the next morning (June 20) at nine o'clock , The
ministers met the following morning at the French legation ready
to precede in a body to the Tsungli Yamen as soon as they were
notified that Prince Ching would be there.
Hot receiving any word by 9 o'clock. Baron von Ketteler,
the German minister, vstoo had personally notified the Yamen that
he was coming there on business started out but before reaching
his destination was shot by a Chinese officer^ fwho afterwards
stated that he acted under orders^).
The Chinese government could not have been unaware of
the magnitude of this crime against the law of nations in con-
niving at the death of the representative of another state, for
the rights of legation are clearly stated in 7/heaton's treatise
on International law, which had been translated into Chinese by
Dr. Martin, who was, himself, now undergoing the seige in the
legations.
For. Eel. 1900, p. 175. 3 For. Rel. 1900. p. 162.
"
"
" p. 176. 4 London Times, 1900, p. 597.
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The Tsungli Yamen made no mention of the murder at this
time and although they still charged the trouble on the mob,
bandits and bad Boxers, their complicity is seen in the Imperial
edicts which were published in the Peking Gazette. These decrees
were, some of them, seemingly contradictory, due to the fact that
there was a minority in the cabinet who disapproved of the anti-
foreign movement and also to the fact that the conciliatory
edicts were issued for effect and were, it is said, accompanied
by secret edicts nullifying them. On June 24th, 1200 bags of
rice wer-e given for general distribution among the Boxers-'- and
by another edict of the same day they were organized by the ap-
pointment of Prince Chuang and Kang I. to take general command
of them with subordinate officials, who were also appointed.
The edict said in part, "all the members of I Ho T'uan are ex-
erting their utmost energies and the Imperial family must not
fall behind in harboring revenge against our enemies"^. On the
next day the Empress Dowager made a gift of 100,000 taels to the
"corps of the Boxers". They had been commended for their ser-
vices at Tientsin in the middle of June and by edict of June 27
ordered "to arrange their forces to intercept the foreign troops
and prevent their creeping northward. Let them also recover
the forts at Talni"
. An edict of July 1st deprecated cases of
robbery and murder by characters feigning to belong to the Boxers,
saying that; All cases of gangs collecting to comnit murder for
For. Rel. 1900, p. 169.
For, Rel. 1900, p. 169.
For. Rel. 1900, p. 170.
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motives of vengeance would te dealt with under the laws governing
brigandage. There would be no mercy shown to leaders of future
disorders-^.
On July 2nd the converts were urged to repent of their
former errors and not "invite their own destruction". The vi-
ceroys were commanded to issue the notification that "All those
among the converts who repent of their former errors and give
themselves up accordingly shall be ignored". The edict further
stated: "As hostilities have now broken out between China and the
foreign countries, the missionaries of every nationality must all
be driven away at once to their own countries, so that they may
not linger here and make trouble"^.
From the time of the murder of Baron von Ketteler, until
July 14th the legations had no communication with the Tsungli
Ya^Tien. The Methodist compound was abandoned by the Americans
and all except a few guards for each legation gathered in the
British compound under the general command of Sir Claud McDonald.
During this period from June 20th until July 17th Mr.
Conger states that there was scarcely an hour during which there
was not firing upon some part of the lines and into some of the
legations varying from a single shot to a general and continuous
attack along the whole line. He states that these attacks were
made by men wearing the uniform of Chinese soldiers and that
their barricades were mounted with flags of imperial officers.
Mr. Conger points out that further proof of the guilt of the
For. Rel. 1900, p. 170.
" p. 171.
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government is given in the fact that when the Chinese government
wanted to communicate with the legations they could stop the fir-
ing and come through their lines at will"*".
On July 14th a note was received hy the ministers signed
by "Prince Ching and others" renewing the request that the minis-
ters should retire from Peking and the next noon was set as the
limit of the time in which a reply should he sent. The edict
added "If no reply is received by the time fixed even our affec-
tion will not enable us to save you"^.
The ministers, fearing ambush, communicated their re-
fusal, to which Prince Ching replied that China would continue
to exert all her efforts to keep order and asked that the lega-
tion guards should not fire at pleasure on the militia, thus
3
creating resentment. Sir Claud McDonald denied, of course,
that the guards had fired except in self-defense and sent a copy
of the orders which had been issued to that effect."^ On July
17th Prince Ching stated that the feeling among the people had
grown so strong that only the destruction of the legations would
satisfy it. They, therefore, declared that the ministers should
temporarily retire to Tientsin and if they decided to remain the
5
court would not accept the responsibility. Sir Claud McDonald
pointed out in his reply that as the foreign envoys came to Pe-
king in reliance on the protection of the Chinese Court it was
impossible for the latter to free itself of its responsibility.
1 For. Rel. 1900, p. 161-167. ^ For.Rel. pp. 179, 180.
^
" " "p. 177. ^ " " 1900, p. 181.
^
" " " p. 178.
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He said, too, that their departure would mean that friendly rela-
tions with the powers of the world were severed and it would then
take a long time to establish peace. He again spoke of the
difficulties of such a step and for several days the correspond-
ence was largely taken up with the question of arrangements,
though the ministers had no intention of going. On August E an
Imperial decree appointed Jung Lu to conduct the ministers to
Tientsin and on August 5th the Tsungli Yamen said that the various
governments had expressed the desire that a guard be given the
envoys out of Peking. The ministers, however, stated that they
must communicate directly with their governments for instructions,
with the object of again delaying settlement of the question.
The success of the powers at Tientsin toward the middle
of July considerably lessened the confidence of the government
and the attitude was not so hostile. From July 17th there was a
slight armistice in which the firing was not so severe. An
edict of July 18th expressed regret for the murder of the German
minister, which had occurred the month previous and ordered the
2
foreigners in the provinces to be protected. On July E5th the
ministers were told they might communicate with their governments
"en clair" simply stating that all was well, but they refused to
do so.^
The Chinese made several attempts to induce the minis-
ters to surrender the native converts stating that there was no
need for doubt or fear and it would be more convenient for the
ministers if the converts returned to their homes as they were
accused of causing the trouble.^ The ministers, however, had no
^ For. Rel. 1900, p. 181;^1'73; ^p. 183; ^ pp. 183, 185.
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thought of turning the native Christians out to almost certain
death and did not regard the request.
The advance of the relief expedition again "brought a
renewal of the attack which was pressed witn great vigor and it
is probable that the legations could not have held out another day
when the relief coluirin entered the city, August 14th, The court
remained in Peking until the allies made the attack, when it fled
westward "on a tour", first putting to death several of the re-
form councilors. The foreign troops took possession of the city
and soon had it entirely under control.
The Situation in the Southern Provinces .
It is significant of the decentralized form of govern-
ment which the Empire has that the Boxer uprising was almost en-
tirely confined to the northern provinces. By an amicable agree-
ment of June S6th with the consular body at Shanghai the viceroys
of lankin and Hanko v guaranteed to maintain order in the Yangtse
valley, the consular body on the other hand guaranteeing non-in-
terference on the part of the foreign ships at Taku.-^ In ful-
fillment of this agreement these Chinese officials were very ac-
tive in their endeavors to prevent any trouble. The viceroj'-
of Eankin, Liu Kun-yi had held his position for 35 years. He had
gone to the capital in March at the command of the Empress Dow-
ager and he then told her that her reactionary policy meant the
For. Rel.
,
1900, p. 249.
London Times, 1900, pp. 423 and 438
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ruin of China. In spite of this and of his active antagonism
of Prince Tuan and other reactionary leaders, he was too strong
to te dismissed and so was allowed to return to Eankin. While
in Peking he helped arrange the league of the viceroys of cen-
tral and southern China and the Liberals at Peking to resist the
anti-foreign faction at the palace."^
The action of the viceroys of JIankin and Hankow was
followed "by similar action by the viceroys south of the Yangtse
region.
On June 20th Prince Tuan, who was then in control is-
sued an edict ordering all viceroys to fight the foreigners but
the viceroys of south and central China decided to ignore it.
For a short time the Governor of Che Kiang was uncertain what
to do having already put out Tuan's edict among the officials
but on July 5th he telegraphed Mr. Goodnow the American counsel
at Shanghai that he would thoroughly protect all the foreigners
in his district.^ The governor of Shantung was in a difficult
position as the outbreak had first occurred in his province and
he was also nearer the government at Peking. In the early part
of July he was ordered to take an army of drilled men to Uankin
and supersede Liu as viceroy and superintendent of southern trade
and to carry out Prince Tuan's edict to fight the foreigners.
He was threatened with punishment if he disobeyed. He, never-
theless, offered, finally, to protect foreigners in his province
if the powers would agree not to attack him.^ Toward the middle
1 For. Rel. 1900. pp. 252, 253
2 n " "p. 253.
^ For. Rel. 1900, p. 253.
4 " " "p. 253.
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of July the governors of Honan and Shansi issued proclamations
favoring the Boxers,"^ Immediately the viceroy of Hankow ordered
the governors of Hupek and Hganhwei lying south to prepare to
repel any invasions, and precautionary measures were promptly
taken'. ^
British troops were sent to be landed at Shanghai with
the explanation that they v/ere to "be used to assist the viceroy
in preserving order. The consuls of the other powers declared
that if the British government landed troops their governments
would do likewise. The viceroys with Li Hung Chang protested,
also, on the grounds that the landing of troops would provoke dis-
order. The troops were, therefore, not landed at this time
although later an agreement was reached so that "both British and
French forces were sent ashore at this point.
As the relief expedition approached the capital the
southern viceroys v/ere in constant expectation of edicts de-
grading them for their disobedience to orders. They asked that
the powers guarantee that the persons of the Emperor and Empress
Dowager v/ould be respected, of which assurance was readily given
4them. There were a few sporadic outbreaks in the south but they
were quickly suppressed and, in general, order was strictly main-
tained.
For. Rel. 1900, p. 254.
2 For. Rel. 1900, pp. E55, 254.
^ London Times, pp. 518, 534.
^ For. Rel. 1900, p. 265.
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The Outbreak in Manchuria.
On the other hand the Russians who were located in
Manchuria had considerable trouble. Their activity in the con-
struction of the Siberian railway incensed the people and made
them very susceptible to the Boxer propaganda which spread rapid-
ly among them. Before the rest of Europe apprehended any danger
from the Boxer movement Russia decided to take military precau-
tions to insure greater safety for the property of the Siberian
railroad and the persons employed on it. In the latter part of
June the Boxers began to burn bridges and stations and to tear
up the track. A large force of Russian soldiers was therefore
mobilized and the Cossack guards reinforced. Toward the middle
of July the Boxers invaded Manchuria in great numbers and July
16th they bombarded Blagoveshchensk. The following day Aigun,
a Chinese city on the south side of the Amur, declared war on
Russia, The Chinese attacked the Russians wherever they would
be found and those at Harbin were beseiged.-^
The Russian Governor General declared the province to
be in a state of war July H7th. An active campaign was inaugu-
rated by Russia and large detachments moved against the Chinese
from the north, and also from the east and south but it was not
until the end of September that the entire province was brought
2
under control.
With the exception of the disorders in Manchuria the
force of the Boxer uprising was broken by the capture of Peking.
The imperial soldiers now turned against their former allies and
showed them little mercy.
1 London Times, 1900, pp. 423, 438, 453.
^ London Times, 1900, pp. 470, 501, 519. 535, 568, 598. 629.
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Early in August Germany suggested that the international
forces he placed under the command of Field Marshal Count von
Waldersee."^ The ottier powers acquiesced in this hut he did not
arrive in China to take command until after the relief of Peking.
The greater part of the allied forces remained in China durirg the
progress of the negotiations between the powers and China hut the
only military events of any importance that occurred were the
" punitive" expeditions made. The most notable of these was made
in October to Pao-ting Fu where a number of foreigners and native
converts had been killed. An inquiry was made as to the com-
2plicity of the local officials and several of them were executed.
The United States took no part in these expeditions and their
wisdom has been seriously questioned.
For. Eel. 1900, pp. 330, 331.
London Times, 1900, pp. 663, 692, 693.
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Chapter IV General negotiations Eetv/een China and the Powers .
Even before the relief of Peking some steps were taken
looking toward a settlement of the difficulty. On July 3 the
United States declared her attitude and policy in China in a cir-
cular note of that date. It is of sufficient importance to re-
produce in full. It read: "In this critical posture of affairs
in China it is deemed appropriate to define the attitude of the
United States, as far as present circumstances permit this to be
done. We adhere to the policy initiated by us in 1857 of peace
with the Chinese nation, of furtherance of lawful commerce, and
of protection of lives and property of our citizens "by all means
guaranteed under extra-territorial treaty rights and by the law
of nations. If wrong be done to our citizens we propose to
hold the responsible authors to the uttermost accountability.
We regard the condition at Peking as one of virtual anarchy,
whereby power and responsibility are practically devolved upon
the local provincial authorities. So long as tney are not in
overt collusion with rebellion and use their power to protect
human life and property we regard them as representing the Chin-
ese people with whom we seek to remain in peace and friendship.
The purpose of the President is, as it has been heretofore, to
act concurrently with the other powers; first in opening uj) com-
munication with Peking and rescuing the American officials, mis-
sionaries, and other Americans who are in danger; secondly, in
affording all possible protection everywhere in China to Ameri-
can life and property; thirdly, in guarding and protecting all
legitimate American interests; and fourthly, in aiding to prevent

51
a spread of the disorders to the other provinces of the Empire
and a recurrence of such disasters. It is, of course, too early
to forecast the means of obtaining this last result; hut the pol-
icy of the governinent of the United States is to seek a solution
which may hring ahout permanent safety and peace to China, pre-
serve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all
rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international
law and safeguard for the world the principles of equal and im-
partial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire"."^
It has been noted that in this communication Mr. Hay
speaks of the ''territorial and administrative entity" of China
instead of her integrity which was formerly spoken of, as European
aggressions had at this time rendered China's integrity non-exist-
ent. This note in conjunction with the note of September 1899,
did much to allay the fears for a partition of the Empire which
had been again brought forv/ard. Substantially the same stand
was taken by the other powers. M. Delcasse in a speech made
in the French Chamber, July 3rd said: "France, as mistress of
Indo-China has no interest in provoking or desiring the break
up of China which is, perhaps without sufficient reflection,
spoken of. • . . France is certainly anxious for the maintenance
of the equilibrium in the far East. She will see that it is
not broken to her detriment but she cherishes no secret designs".^
Count von Bulow declared, July 12th, in a statement to
the several federated governments of Germany in regard to Chin-
1 Rockbell's Report, p. 12.
2 For. Rel. 1900, p. 313.
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ese affairs: "The end for which we are striving is the restoration
of safety to the persons, property and activity of German subjects
in China, the rescue of foreigners shut up in Peking, the revival
and assurance of order under an organized Chinese government and
expiation and indemnity for the crimes committed. We desire no
partition of China; we are striving for no special advantages.
The Imperial Government is fully convinced that the maintenance
of the understanding among the powers is the preliminary require-
ment for the restoration of peace and order in China and will, for
its part, continue to consider this as of first importance."-^
In an interview with Mr. Ghoate on July 5th the British
foreign minister. Lord Salisbury'-, expressed himself most emphati-
2
cally as concurring in the declared policy of the United States.
The sentiment in Japan was in accordance with the note while
the minister for Italy said her course would depend largely upon
that of other powers.'^
On the 11th of July the Emperor of China appealed to
Japan to use her good offices with a view to effecting an amicable
settlement of the affair, on the grounds of the common interests
of the two countries, and on July 19th the Emperor sent similar
notes to the Queen of England, the Emperor of Germany, the Czar
of Russia and the Presidents of France and the United States,
saying in each case that in her difficulties, China could rely
only upon that special pov/er for aid in settling the matter.^
For. Rel. 1900. p. 328. ^ por. Rel. 1900, p. 357.
2 " " " p. 345. ^ For. Rel, 1900, p. 167.
^ London Times. 1900, p. 423.
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The President of the United States urged the Emperor to
give reassurance of the welfare of the ministers, to put them in
free communioation with their respective governments and to cooper-
ate with the relief expedition. If these things were done it was
the belief of the Grovernment that no obstacles would be found to
exist on the part of the powers to an amicable settlement of all
the questions arising out of the recent troubles.^
On July 19th the fate of Mr. Conger being uncertain the
President of the United States appointed Mr. W. W. Rockhill com-
missioner of the United States to China, his special duty being
to promptly and fully inform the Department on all subjects com-
ing to his knowledge bearing on the general condition of affairs
in China and particularly on all points affecting the interests
of the United States. As regarded the policy of the United
States in China he was to be guided by the circular note of July
3, supplemented by the President's letter to the Emperor July
23rd.
^
-An Imperial edict of August 7th appointed li Hung Chang
fwho had been in July made viceroy of Chihli) envoy plenipotenti-
ary with instructions to propose at once by telegraph to the gov-
ernments of the several pov/ers concerned, for the immediate cessa-
tion of hostile demonstrations pending negotiations, which he was
thereby authorized to conduct for China "for the settlement of
whatever questions that may have t o be dealt with".
As the legations were at this time still in their dan-
gerous position in Peking there was little ground for general
^ Rockhill' s Report, p. 13. ^ Rockhill' s Report, p. 14.
2 For. Rel. 1900. pp. 156, 157.
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negotiations but Hr. Adee
,
Acting Secretary of State, indicated
in his reply to this edict, sent him by Mr. Wu, that the United
States was ready to enter into an agreement between the powers
and the Chinese Government for a cessation of hostile demonstra-
tions on condition that a sufficient body of the forces compris-
ing the relief expedition should be permitted to enter Peking,
unmolested, and to escort the foreign ministers and residents
back to Tientsin, this movement being provided for and secured by
such arrangements and disposition of troops as should be consid-
ered satisfactory by the generals commanding the forces compris-
ing the relief column.-'- This reply was communicated to the
governments concerned and instructions were sent to GeneralChaffee
on August 14th that in case the Chinese authorities should com-
municate with him for the purpose of delivering the ministers
and persons under their protection, under arrangements that he
considered safe, he was authorized to make and carry out ar-
rangements in concert with the other powers without referring to
2Washington. From informal communications with representatives
of the other governments all asserted similar attitudes. On
August 13th Russia proposed to send an international detachment
under a white flag as far as the city walls of Peking to effect
4
a peaceful bringing back of the foreign envoys. The attacks
upon the legations did not cease, hov/ever, so that these plans
were not feasible and the advance to Peking was not arrested.
The foreign troops having entered Peking Li Hung Chang
stated by cablegram August 19th that as it was the declaration
1 Rockhill's Report, p. 15. ^ For. Rel. 1900, pp. 333, 369.
2 For. Rel. 1900. p. 288. 4 n n "p. 339.
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of all the powers that the expedition of the allied troops was
solely for the rescue of the ministers at Peking and this being
accomplished it was proper that hostilities should cease and neg-
otiations should Gommense."^ He asked that an envoy be given
full power to treat with China. Two days later in a cablegram
received by Mr. Wu he further said that the Boxer rebels in
Peking having been dispersed further military operations on the
part of the powers was to be deplored. He urged Ilinister Wu to
confer with the Secretary of State "upon the subject of the with-
drawal of troops and the appointment of plenipotentiary to nego-
tiate the settlement of all other questions so as to preserve
amicable relations."
Mr, Adee responded that though the ministers had been
rescued without the aid of the Chinese government the United
States welcomed any overture for a truce and would appoint a plen-
ipotentiary to join with the representatives of the other simi-
larly interested powers to attain the ends declared in the cir-
cular to the powers of July 3, as soon as security was estab-
lished in the Chinese capital, and the Chinese government showed
its ability and willingness to make on its part an effective
suspension of hostilities in Peking and elsewhere in China.
Japan's reply to a like proposal was substantially the same as
that of the United States.^ Italy did not respond to Li's re-
quest as the government considered his suggestions premature as
his authority to negotiate was not yet defined. The Italian
Rockhill's Report, p. 16. 3 pop, Hel. 1900. pp. 363. 364.
2 For, Rel. 1900. p. 289.
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government thought the "basis of negotiations should first he
settled between the Powers,'^ The British government replied to
the request to name an envoy that she cared little who represented
China if he were properly accredited but was not satisfied at
this time (August 27th) that Li was plenipotentiary or authorized
2by competent authority to negotiate. This was also the position
rz 4taken by Germany and France • The Russian Government approved
le Hung Chang's appointment but thought he should be required to
exhibit quite satisfactory full powers from a de-facto govern-
ment before beginning negotiations.^
Toward the end of August Russia made a statement to the
powers in regard to her purposes in China, She affirmed that
she had no designs of territorial acquisition in China, that
equally with the other powers then operating there, Russia had
sought the safety of legations at Peking and to help the Chinese
Government to repress the trouble; that, incidentally to neces-
sary measures on Russian border Russia had occupied Niuchuang for
military purposes, and, as soon as order was reestablished,
would retire therefrom if the action of the other powers was no
obstacle thereto, that the purpose for which the various govern-
ments had cooperated for the relief of the legations had been
accomplished, that taking the position that as the Chinese Gov-
ernmenthas left Peking there was no need for her representatives
to remain Russia had directed the Russian minister to retire with
his official personnel from China; that the Russian troops would
^ For. Rel. 1900, p. 357. ^ For. Rel. 1900, p. 321.
^
" " " p. 347, 348. 5 „ TT "p. 371.
3 „ ,T „ 334^
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likewise be withdrawn; and that when the Government of China
should regain the reins of government and afford an authority
with which the other pov/ers could deal and would express desire
to enter in negotiations, the Kussian Government would name its
representative. Hope was expressed tiiat the other powers would
suhscrihe to this."^ There were many charges made at this time
that Russia was trying to pose with China as her friend as after
the Chinese-Japanese war with ulterior ends in view. Russia
justified these proposals for the withdrawal of the troops to
Tientsin on the grounds that, first, the purpose of the relief
expedition had been accomplished so that there was no need for
her representative to remain; secondly, that war had not been
declared on China "but the continued occupation of the capital
of the Chinese Empire by the military powers after the rescue of
the legations would constitute an act of war"; thirdly, that as
a matter of policy such a step would facilitate negotiations as
it would induce the court to return to the capital ;and , finally
it was maintained that terms negotiated from Tientsin would have
more valid force than would terms wrested from China under the
compulsion of the presence of armed forces within the capital.^
This plan was supported by France, the minister of
foreign affairs stating that she would adopt like measures. He
declared that "the three objects of France were to rescue her
legations and citizens, secure indemnity for the past and obtain
guarantee for the future." As Peking had been relieved, he
^ Rockhill's Report, p. 19.
^ For. Rel. 1900, pp. 372, 374.
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declared, "the first having been effected France expects to keep
troops at Tientsin till the other two objects are accomplished"."^
The United States replied to the Russian proposals August E8th.
After noting with satisfaction the reiterated statement of Russia
disclaiming territorial designs on China and declaring these
sentiments to he in accord with those of the United States, Ilr.
Ader dismissed the question of a withdrawal of troops from Pe-
king to Tientsin. He agreed that the immediate object for
which the military forces of the powers had been cooperating had
been realized in the relief of the legations but there still re-
mained the other purposes ishich all the powers had in common,
enumerated in the note of July 3. Mr. Adee expressed the opin-
ion that these purposes could best be obtained by a joint occupa-
tion of Peking under a definite understanding between the powers
until a Chinese Government should have been reestablished and
should be in a position to enter into new treaties with adequate
provision for reparation and guarantees of future protection,
Vifith the establishment and recognition of such authority the
United States would wish to withdraw its military forces from
Peking and remit to the process of peaceful negotiations, her
just demands. Mr. Adee said that a continued occupation of Pe-
king would be ineffective to produce the desired results unless
all the powers united therein with entire harmony of purpose.
As any power that determined to withdraw its troops from Peking
would necessarily proceed thereafter to protect its interests in
China by its own methods this would make a general withdrawal ex-
For. Rel. 1900, p. 316.
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pedient. The United States would, therefore, give instructions
to the commander of the American forces in China to withdraw the
troops from Peking after due conference with the other commanders
as to the time and manner of withdrawal."^
The proposals of the Russian government were not favor-
ably received in England. The British ambassador at St. Peters-
burg was instructed to acquaint the Russian foreign office that
Her Majesty's Government had received communications from their
officers in the Far East in a somewhat imperfect fora and without
forecasting the course it would be expedient to pursue in the
future, it was thought that the time had not yet arrived when it
would be expedient to withdraw British forces from Peking.^
Germany also considered such a step to be of doubtful
wisdom. It was suggested "that an early evacuation of Peking
would be construed by the Chinese as a sign of weakness and
consequently instead of being conducive to tranquility might
rather serve the purpose of increasing the courage of the parties
hostile to foreigners and bringing about new atrocities". It
was urged that it was not compatible with the defense by the
powers of the cause of civilization to leave the Chinese Chris-
tians to the fate which undoubtedly awaited them in case the in-
ternational troops were withdrawn. In view of the German com-
mercial and missionary interests the Imperial Government v/ould
only feel at liberty to assume responsibility for the result of
a withdrawal of troops from Peking in case for military reasons,
such a measure should be of imperative necessity.
3
1 Rockhill's Report, p. 20 ^For. Rel. 1900, p. 334.
2 For. Rel. 1900, p. 348.
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Italy believed with the United States that under the
present circimstances the purposes iJtiich all the powers had in
view would be better subserved by prolonging still for some time
the international occupation of Peking, as "a sudden and not
sufficiently explained withdrawal of troops from Peking might be
interpreted by the Chinese Government and people as a sign of
weakness and might revive the fanaticism of the rebels".-^
This was the view of Mr. Conger in Peking who reported
that the military occupation of Peking was absolutely essential
to successful negotiations and should continue until these were
completed, as restoration of order in that province or of Chinese
authority in Peking was for the time being impossible. Ee had
stated, however, that one third of the force which numbered some
20,000 would be sufficient and a reduction would be necessary
to prevent famine for he said, that military occupation by so
many powers was creating irreparable devastation and bringing
terrible punishment on innocent people and if long continued
would arouse among the people such hatred as would render the
situation very difficult and induce uprisings against all for-
p
eigners m the peaceable provinces.
Russia in accord with her declared intentions had
withdrawn the greater part of her troops from Peking by September
12 and the legations retired to Tientsin September 29th^ but
the other troops for the most part remained.
^ For. Rel. 1900, p. 358. ^ ^or. Rel. 1900, p. SOO,
2 " " " p. 200. 199. 4 tr ,t „
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In the meantime little had been done toward the settle-
ment of the difficulties, as the powers of negotiation was of
necessity, a slow one. liVhen the foreign troops entered Peking
the Court fled and no representatives of the Chinese government
remained. Toward the end of August, several members of the
Tsungli Yanen were reported to be in the oity but they did not
make themselves known. Prince Chung called on Mr. Conger
September 6th and said that an edict appointed him and Earl Li
with full power to settle matters. The latter was expected in
2
a few days. On September 16th Mr. Conger wrote that a whole
month had elapsed since the arrival of the relief expedition
and the flight of the Imperial Court and apparently no progress
had been made toward a reestablishment of Chinese authority
there or negotiations for a settlement. Prince Ching was still
waiting the arrival of Li Hung Chang. Most of the foreign min-
isters there were without instructions. At a meeting of the
diplomatic corps it was suggested that if the Emperor and Empress
Dov/ager could be induced to return to Peking negotiations might
be greatly facilitated. It was suggested that each minister
should write an informal note to Prince Ching suggesting their
return. Prince Ching and other ministers of Peking therefore
sent a memorial to the Emperor requesting his return'^ but no
reply was received until October 21st when an Imperial edict
stated the reasons for the Emperor's flight and said that when
the negotiations were carried out the court would return.^
^ For. Rel. 1900, p. 198. ^ For. Rel. 1900, p. 202.
^ " " " p. 200. 5 -t M „ 220^
^ " " " p. 200, 201.
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The appointment of Li Hung Chang as Chinese plenipoten-
tiary which had first been announced by Imperial edict of August
12th was reaffirmed by similar edicts of August 24th and E7th.^
On September 8th Prince Ching cabled Mr, Wu at Washington that he
had received an edict appointing him plenipotentiary with full
discretionary pov/ers, in conjunction with Li to negotiate peace.
He asked that instructions be telegraphed to the United States
minister at Peking to open negotiations.^
This being delivered by Mr. Wu to the Secretary of
State, the latter replied that the "Government of the United States
accepts the plenipotentiary authority of Earl Li Hung Chang and
Prince Ching as prima facie sufficient for the preliminary nego-
tiations looking forward to the return of the Imperial Governi:ient
and the resumption of its authority at Peking and toward the neg-
otiation of a complete settlement by the duly appointed plenipo-
tentiaries of the Powers and of China". To this end the United
States minister in Peking would be authorized "to enter into
relations with Earl Li and Prince Ching as the immediate repre-
sentatives of the Chinese Emperor".^ Russia took the same view
as to the credentials of these envoys.^ The GeriTianSand Italian^
Governments were still doubtful as to the authenticity of their
authority. Upon the advice of Japan Liu Kun Yi and Chang Chih-tun^
1 For. Pel. 1900, p. 285, R.R.p.21.4 For. Rel. 1900. pp. 375, 376.
^ ^* ^' ^ "
" " pp. 336, 337.
^R. R. p. 22. 6 " . „ 35Q^
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the viceroys of ITarLkin and Wuchang were appointed to act with Earl
Li and Prince Ching,-^
On September 18th Germany stated that she considered as
a preliminary condition for entering into diplomatic negotiations
with the Chinese Government, a surrender of such persons as were
determined on as being the first and real perpetrators of the
crimes committed in Peking against international law and therefore
proposed to the interested cabinets that they reqiiest their re-
presentatives in Peking to designate the principle Chinese per-
sonages whose guilt in the instigation or execution of the crimes
was beyond all doubt.
^
Germany's position was warmly comFiended by the English
press but the United States replied that while the Government of
the United States had, from the outset .proclaimed its purpose to
hold to the uttermost accountability the responsible authors of
any wrongs done in China to citizens of the United States, yet,
it was thoiight that no punitive measures could be so effective
by way of reparation, for wrongs suffered and as deterrent exam-
ples for the future as the degradation and punishment of the re-
sponsible authors by the Supreme Imperial authority itself; and
it only seemed just to China that she should be afforded, in the
first instance, an opportunity to do this and thus rehabilitate
herself before the world. So the Government of the United
States was not disposed, as a preliminary condition, to entering
For. Rel. 1900, p. 204.
Rockhill's Report, pp. 23 and 24.
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into diplomatic negotiations with the Chinese Groverncient to join
in a demand that said government surrender to the pov/ers such
persons as, according to the determination of the powers them-
selves, might he held to he the first and real perpetrators of
those wrongs,"^
Japan also said that grave difficulties were antici-
pated in giving practical effect to the proposals of the German
Government to insist upon the delivery of the responsible persons
and further exchange of views on this point was necessary and
Russia thought that the crimes against international law in China
had better be punished by the Chinese themselves and that such
punishment was essentially a subject to be discussed in the neg-
otiations and should not be regarded as a necessary preliminary
to such negotiations.^ Mr. Conger expressed the opinion that
if it were to be insisted on as preliminary to all, no negotia-
tions would be possible."^
The Chinese Government evidently felt it to be politic
to show some intent of punishing the guilty parties and on Sept-
ember 25th an Imperial edict was issued which provided for the
removal from office of four of the principle offenders and ordered
that Prince Tuan should be deprived of office and be handed over
to the Imperial Clan Court which should "consult and decide on a
severe penalty" and that the other four should be handed over to
the board of censors for punishment.^
1 Rockhill's Report, p. E4 and 25. ^ Rockhill's Report, p. 37.
^ For. Eel. 1900, p. 365. 5 Rockhill's Report, p. 25.
^
" " "p. 376.
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On receipt of this edict the German Government submitted
a note to the powers stating that Germany considered this as the
first step in the direction of peace and order in China and pro-
posed that the powers instruct their representatives to report
whether this edict provided punishment for the real criminals,
whether the penalties prescribed were in accordance with the grav-
ity of the crimes committed, and as to what control the powers
should assume in the carrying out of these punishments
.
This being referred to Mr. Conger, he said that the
punishments so far named were grossly inadequate. Titles of
nobility could easily be restored and he remarked that it was
not uncommon for a Chinese officer to be degraded and soon after
to be reinstated or promoted to a higher place. He also stated
that some of the most important offenders as Yu Hsien former
Governor of Shantung ard General Tuang Fu-hsiang were not men-
tioned in the decree. Mr. Conger thought the question of punish-
ment was most important, but it could well be left until after
o
preliminary negotiations were begun.
In regard to conditions in Peking, Mr. Conger wrote
under date of September E7th; "that better order was being estab-
lished particularly in the portions of the city under the juris-
diction of the Americans and Japanese; the Chinese were return-
ing to their homes, opening their shops, etc., but each army was
acting independently and controlling in its own way the section
over which it had charge. Outside the city the Chinese soldiers
1 Hockhill's Report, p. 25 and 26.
2 Rockhill's Report, p. 39.
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and Boxers were as active as ever. Scouts and reconnoitering
parties were meeting them or being fired upon from ambush almost
daily".
^
On October 2 Mr. Giers, the Russian minister, who had
retired to Tientsin returned to Peking to join in the negotiations?
The first definite step toward the settlement was made
by France in a circular note to the powers October 4th. It sub-
mitted six proposals "as a basis for negotiations to be entered
upon after the usual ratification of the full powers".
The plan included:
1. The punishment of the principle guilty parties who might
be designated by the representatives of the powers at
Peking.
2. The continuance of the interdiction against the importa-
tion of arms.
3. Equitable indemnities for the governments, corporations
and private individuals.
4. The organization in Peking of a permanent guard for the
legations.
5. The dismantling of the forts at Taku.
6. The military occupation of two or three points on the road
from Tientsin to Peking which road would thus always be
open to the legations to pass to the sea or to the forces
which might go from the sea to the capital".^
The United States agreed to this note with a few reser-
vations, particularly, in regard to the performance of the fourth
1 Rockhills's Report, p. 36. 3 Rockhill's Report, p. 26.
^For. Rel. 1900, p. 377.
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and sixth clauses and approved the Russian suggestion that in case
of protracted divergence of views on the question of indemnity
the matter might be commended to the consideration of the Inter-
national Court of Arbitration at the Hague. Russia approved the
plans with the suggestion noted above^ and Lord Salisbury tele-
graphed the British minister that all the governments had agreed
to them. These plans formed the groundwork of subsequent neg-
otiations.
Li Hung Chang arrived in Peking October 11th and report-
ed he would soon be ready to negotiate.^ On October 16th Prince
Ching and Earl Li submitted a draft for a general preliminary
treaty, together with a request for a meeting with the foreign
ministers. By this note China acknowledged her great fault, ad-
mitted her liability to pay an indemnity. It stipulated that
each power should designate how matters of future trade and in-
ternational relations should be dealt with, i.e., whether old
treaties should be retained or new conventions entered into.
These matters being settled the powers should allow the Yanen
ministers to go to the Yamen and transact business as usual.
When the items of indemnity were arranged the powers should with-
draw their troops and when negotiations began for treaties of
peace each power should first declare an armistice.^
Mr. Conger wrote October 19bh, that the German minis-
ters had not yet arrived. Sir Claud McDonald was replaced by
1 Rockhill's Report, p. 27. 4 por. Rel. 1900, p. 213.
2 For. Rel. 1900, p. 381. 5 For. Rel. 1900, p. 213.
^ Rockhill's Report, p. 40. Rockhill's Report p. 41.

68
Sir Earnest Satow but the latter had not yet taken charge and
the French minister was ill so that still further delay in com-
mencing negotiations was inevitable. He thought that it would be
useless for the foreign ministers to meet with the Chinese pleni-
potentiaries, for discussion until the powers had more fully
agreed among themselves^, an opinion, which was formally express-
ed by Japan in a note to the Secretary of State of October 20th,
which suggested that all dem.ands and proposals which were to form
the basis of negotiations with China should, prior to the open-
ing of such negotiations be submitted for collective examination
and elaboration to the representatives of the powers at Peking,
The Imperial Government of Japan was convinced that as all demands
and proposals would thus receive the united support of the powers
concerned the actual negotiations would, by this means, be greatly
facilitated. This was the most logical method of procedure
and it was uniformly adherred to so the acceptance of the cred-
entials of the Chinese plenipotentiaries was not of immediate
importance. There was some difference of opinion among the min-
isters in regard to what the preliminary treaty should comprehend.
The American representative held that a convention, the most pre-
liminary possible, should be made -ahich v/ould include simply the
restoration of order, the reestablishment of a potential govern-
ment, agreement to negotiate, how and where, guarantees of pun-
ishment, indemnities and future protection of all foreign rights
and interests, to be followed by due appointment of plenipoten-
tiaries who shall make as nearly as could be done a general final
settlement. However, most of the representatives thought, at
iFor. Rel.l900,p. 214. Rockhill's Hep. 40. ^For.Rel. 1900, p. 370.

69
this time, that the very first negotiations should include and
settle, as much as possible, and that the rest should he set-
tled by separate negotiations by the powers with China.
By an agreement between Germany and Great Britain,
signed October 16th, an understanding was reached in regard to
their mutual policy in China, The two powers agreed to exert
their influence toward a maintenance of the "open door" policy in
the ports of China for the nationals of all countries, and that
they would direct their policy toward maintaining, also, undim-
inished the territorial conditions of the Chinese Empire. In
case another power should make use of the complications in China
to obtain territorial advantages, the two contracting parties re-
served the right to come to a preliminary understanding as to the
eventual steps to be taken for the protection of their own inter-
ests in China. This agreement was communicated to the other
powers who were asked to subscribe to the principles recorded
therein, and it was universally indorsed by them. It had no
direct bearing on the negotiations, but indirectly as showing
the attitude of Germany and England, it doubtless had some little
influence in restraining any agitation for the partition of
China.
^
On October E5th Mr. Rockhill, who had been investigating
the situation in the provinces since his arrival in China, was
instructed to proceed to Peking and aid Mr. ^onger with "counsel
and advice", his stay being left to his discretion. Mr. Rock-
1 For. Rel., 1900, p. 215. ^ Rockhill's Report, pp. 31-32.
Rocltthill's Report, p. 4o.
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hill was directed to pay special attention, in the final settle-
ment, to the "open door", the protection of American missionaries,
the establishment of a minister for foreign affairs instead of
the Tsungli Yamen, the punishment of guilty persons and post-
humous honors for Ching Yiu Euan (a reform minister who had been
executed by the Empress).
^
On October 26th the foreign ministers met to formally
begin the discussion of terms of a settlement to be presented to
the Chinese plenipotentaries . Each had been instructed that all
the powers had agreed substantially or in principle with the
French propositions, and as the question of punishment was the
first of these it was first taken up. After much discussion
it was unanimously decided that the punishment of death should be
demanded for eleven officials, who, it was agreed by all the
foreign ministers and the Chinese Government, were chiefly re-
sponsible for the crimes committed, the manner of their death not
being fixed.
It was deemed impractical to make the Chinese Govern-
ment indemnify the native Christians for v/rongs to their persons
and property by the Boxer movement as it would open up an almost
endless field for investigation, but it was finally agreed that
indemnity should be demanded for the losses of all Chinese who
were, during the trouble, in the employ of foreigners.
^
^ For. Rel. 1900, pp. 219. 220. ^ Rockhill's Report, n. 43 and •
. For. Rel. 1900, p. 2E1.
^Rockhill's Report, p. 45.
3 Such claims would receive their justification in the clause of
the treaties with China which stipulated that the Chinese Chris-
tians would not be deseriminated against on account of their re-
ligion. Treaty of 1858, Article IXIX.
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On the 31st of October Mr. Conger made the following
proposal: "For a further guarantee against future trouhle an Im-
perial edict shall be issued and published everywhere in the Empire
making all vicero:/al
,
provincial and local officials responsible
for order in their respective jurisdictions and whenever anti-
foreign disturbances or any other treaty infractions occur therein
and Which are not forthwith suppressed and the guilty persons
punished, they, the said officials, shall be immediately removed
and forever prohibited from holding any office or receiving any
official honor". It had been the experience, of the past, that
there was little trouble in securing the removal of minor officials
but the removal, except in rare cases, of those of high grades
had been impossible. Or as in the case of Yu Hsein the former
governor of Shantung, the official upon removal,was soon promoted
to a higher position."^
In regard to the punishment of the eleven persons deter-
mined upon, Mr. Hay thought it advisable that before subr:itting
the proposed ultimatum to the Chinese government this should be
asked what punisliment it intended to inflict on the guilty offi-
cials. The representatives unanimously held, however, that such
a step would greatly weaken the case and jeopardize the negotia-
tions.^
At this time f November 5) the foreign ministers had unan-
imously agreed upon the following stipulations. First, The pro-
hibition, at the discretion of the powers of the im.portation of
arms. Second, The suppression for two years of civil arid military
examinations in criminal districts and the decreeing of death pun-
Rockhill's Report, p. 45. ^ For. Rel, 1900. p. 224.

ishment for future nembers of Boxer organizations. Third .
That indemnities for governments, societies, individual foreign-
ers, and Chinese employed by foreigners. Fourth , That the lega-
tions should have the right to put the legation quarters in a
state of defense and to establish permanent guards and to occupy
certain points to assure free communication between the capital
and the sea. Fifth , The distruction of Taku and other forts which
might interfere with such communication. Sixth , The suhstitution
for the Tsungli ya:r!en of a minister for foreign affairs. Sev-
enth
,
Court ceremonials similar to those in European countries
should be adopted.'^
At the next meeting (November 6) the ministers all agree^:.
that provisions for suitable reparation for the murder of Baron
von Ketteler should be m.ade in the general treaty. All except
the Russian and French m.inisters agreed also to the three stipu-
lations; that the Chinese Government should undertake to nego-
tiate thereafter on lines v/hich it might seem convenient for the
foreign ministers to propose, for the requisite amendment of
commercial treaties and other subjects relating to comjr.erce and
navigation, that the Chinese Government should undertake such
financial measures to guarantee the payment of an indemnity and
interest on Government loans as might be indicated by the foreign
powers; and that the Imperial decree proposed by Mr. Conger, Oct-
ober 31st, placing responsibility on the officials for future
E
disturbances should be issued.
1 For. Rel. 1900, p. 2E4.
^ " " " p. E25.
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The meetings of the diplomatic corps were held twice
a week and as all the measures had to be referred to the various
governments for their approval, progress was rendered slow. The
seven proposed conditions agreed to "by the ministers on l^ovem.her
1st were indorsed by the JJepartment of State though the dismantl-
ing of the Taku forts viras thought preferable to their distruc-
tion. Mr. Hay informed Mr. Conger that if the Powers could not
agree on the first condition adopted ]?ovember 6th the United
States woiild reserve the right to negotiate in that sense with
China independently, but eoincidently with the powers entertain-
ing the same view. The third condition adopted at this time was
held to devolve responsibility too completely on the local author-
ities as the primary responsibility of the Chinese government
should be emplasized so that the suggested accountability and
provision for punishment of delinquent local authorities would be
"merely one phase of the enforcement of the supreme obligation -
to repress punishment and make adequate reparation for treaty
infraction"."^
In the instructions submitted to Mr. Conger, November
16th, he was directed to try and arrange, before the negotiations
closed, that Peking should be made a treaty post and that the
Chinese minister for foreign affairs should be required to speak
some foreign language. A lump sura was favored for the indemni-
ty, to be subsequently distributed among the powers, possibly
by arbitration. The suggestion for post humous honors to the
friendly Chinese statesmen was repeated and it was also thought
For. Rel, 1900, p. E25
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advisable to provide against arbitrary executions without trial
of high officers of state. Mr. Conger was instriicted to "keep
alv/ays in viev/ and to urge in conference the consideration that
impossible temis must not be asked which would only result in the
defeat of the purposes aimed at"."*"
Mr. Conger pointed out in his reply to these instructions
that if the requirement that the foreign minister be able to speak
some foreign language were insisted on it would probably limit
the choice to a very small number of mostly young men and pre-
clude the selection of the stronger, better men of China. He
stated that he would urge the question of Peking as a treaty post,
the lump sum form of pasnr.ent for the indemnity and the post humous
honors but thought, from conferences with his colleagues, that
these questions would have to be deferred to a later period of
the negotiations. He felt thbt the preliminary demands should
be as general and as simple as possible in order to avoid asking
impossible terms which might defeat the purposes aimed at. He
was afraid that if the death of all the strong men surrounding
the court were included in the initial demand on punishment the
execution would be impossible as there would be no one to perform
the work. He, therefore, had suggested the omission of the names
of General Tung Fu hsiang from the first demand for this purpose,
but his colleagues, in view of the leading nart this man with his
troops performed in the whole anti-foreign movement insisted that
his mane should be on the first list and if the impossibility of
compliance was m.ade evident some different arrangements could be
made as the negotiations progressed.^
^ For. Rel. 1900, p. 226. ^ For. Rel. 1900, p. 229.
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At this time fJIoveniber 20th) all the points that had been
reported had been agreed to in principle except the one which
required China to adopt such financial measures as the pov/ers
might indicate to guarantee the pasrment of the indemnity and the
interest on the public loan."*" The Russian minister still con-
tinued the opposition he had shown when it was first urged on
Soverober 6th while the German and English ministers had instruc-
tions not to sign the note without it. In view of the im.port-
ance of a speedy termination of the negotiations, trade being at
a standstill, the expense of the armies adding greatly to China's
liabilities and there being also the danger that unexpected inter-
nal disturbances might arise to complicate matters, Mr. Hay tele-
graphed on November 23 that while the United States considered
this provision an important one she did not wish to embarass the
general negotiations by insisting on its insertion in the general
convention.^
It was not necessary to mal:e this concession, hov/ever,
as an unanimous agreement was reached the next day (November 24)
to all the demands which have been enumerated and the ministers
only awaited their instructions to sign tnem as tney should be
formulated in a joint note.
During the progress of the negotiations it had been
found rather difficult for the ten ministers to agree upon all
points so some concessions had to be made bjr each. Mr. Conger
had urged that there should be no names mentioned in connection
^ For. Rel. 1900, p. 229. ^ For. Rel. 1900, p. 233.
^ " " " p. 232.
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with the death penalty at this time and later the omission of the
name of Tung Fu-hsiang that he might punish the others. He also
urged the dismantling instead of the razing of the Taku forts
hut he was almost alone on all these propositions and to have
insisted on them would have delayed the negotiations indefinitely
so he yielded on these points. The agreement of the Russian
minister to the clause he had heen opposing was obtained "by em-
ploying the words "measures acceptable to" instead of "indicated
by" the foreign powers."^
The question now arose whether the note should be pre-
sented in the form of identic or a joint note. Although in pre-
vious instances the United States had objected to joint action
o
with European powervS it was considered to be the most effective
form as this was a question of world wide importance and the need
of unanimity was apparent. This was also the view of the other
governments interested.
The note was submitted to the United States Ilovember
26 th. The text as finally adopted was as follows:
Text of Joint Eote.
During the months of May, June, July and August of
the present year, serious disturbances broke out in the northern
provinces of China and crimes unheard of in human history, crimes
against the laws of nations, against the laws of humanity and
against civilization were committed under particularly odious
circumstances. The principle of these crimes were the follow-
ing:-
^ For. Rel. 1900, p. 233.
^ For. Rel, 1900, p.
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1. On the EOth of June, H. E. Baron von Ketteler, minister
of Germany proceeding to the Tsungli Yamen was murdered while in
the exercise of his functions by soldiers of the regular array
acting under orders from their chiefs.
2. The same day the foreign legations were attacked and
besieged, these attacks being continued without interruption until
the 14th of August, on Miich date the army of foreign troops put
an end to them. These (attacks) were made by regular troops
who joined the Boxers and who obeyed orders of the court emanat-
ing from the Imperial palace. At the same tiFie the Chinese
Government was declaring officially them its representatives
near the pov/ers that it giiaranteed the safety of the legations.
5. A member of the legation of Japan in the discharge of
an official mission was killed by regulars at the gates of the
city. In Peking and in several provinces foreigners were as-
sinated, tortured and were attacked by Boxers and regular troops
and only owed their salvation to their determined resistance.
Their establisliments were pillaged and destroyed,
4. Foreign cemeteries, particularly in Peking have been
desecrated, the tombs opened and the remains scattered.
These events led the foreign powers to send their
troops to China to protect the lives of their representatives
and their nationals and to restore order. In their march on
Peking the allied forces met with the resistance of the Chinese
armies and had to overcome it by force.
China having recognized its responsibility expressed
its regrets and manifested the desire to see an end put to the
situation created by the disorders referred to, the powers have
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resolved to accede to its request on the irrevoca"ble conditions
enumerated below which thej deem indespensihle to expiate the
crimes committed and prevent their recurrence.
I
A Dispatch to Berlin of an extraordinary mission, led by
an Imperial prince to express the regrets of his Majesty, the Em-
peror of China, and of the Chinese Government for the murder of
his excellency the late Baron von Ketteler, German minister.
B Erection on the place where the murder was committed of
a commemorative monument suitable to the rank of the deceased
bearing an inscription in the Latin, German and Chinese languages
expressing regrets of the Emperor of China for the murder.
II
A The severest punishment in proportion to their crimes for
the persons designated in the Imperial decree of September 25,
1900, and for those whom the representatives of the powers shall
subsequently designate."^
B Suspension of all official examinations for five years in
all the towns in which foreignerB have been massacred or have
been subjected to cruel treatment.
Ill
Honorable reparation shall be made by the Chinese Gov-
ernment to the Japanese government for the murder of Mr. Sugiyaraa,
chancellor of the Japanese legation.^
1 As originally presented to the powers this clause had stipulated
the death penalty for ei^t of the prominent offenders.
2 This demand was not included in the first draft of the note
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IV
An expiatory monument shall "be erected "by the Imperial
Chinese Government in each of the foreign or international ceme-
teries which have heen desecrated and on which the graves have
been destroyed.
V
Maintenance under conditions to "be settled between the
powers of the prohibition of the importation of arms as well as
of materials used exclusively for the manufacturing of arms and
ammunition,
VI
Equitable indemnities for governments, societies and
individuals as well as for Chinese ^lo have suffered during the
late events in person or in property in consequence of their
being in the service of foreigners. China shall adopt financial
measures acceptable to the powers for the purpose of guaranteeing
the payment of said indemnity and the interest and amortization
of the loans.
VII
Right for each power to maintain a permanent guard for
its legation and to put the legation quarter in a defensible
condition. Chinese shall not have the right to reside in this
quarter.
VIII
The Taku and other forts which might impede free com-
munication between Peking and the sea shall be razed.
IX
Eight of military occupation of certain points to be
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determined upon ty an understanding "between the pov/ers for keep-
ing open coninuni cation "betv/een the capital and the sea.
X
A The Chinese government shall cause to he published during
two years in all suhprefectures an Imperial decree embodying:
Perpetual prohibition, under pain of death of membership in
any ant i- foreign society. Enumeration of the punishments, which
shall have been inflicted on the guilty together with the suspen-
sion of all official examinations in the towns where foreigners ha
have been subjected to cruel treatment.
B An Imperial decree shall be issued and published every-
where in the Empire, declaring that all governor-generals, gov-
ernors and provincial or local officials shall be responsible for
order in their respective jurisdictions, ar.d that whenever fresh
anti- foreign disturbances or any other treaty infractions occur,
which are not forthwith suppressed and the guilty persons pun-
ished, they, the said officials, shall be immediately removed and
forever prohibited from holding any office or honors,
XI
The Chinese government will undertake to negotiate the
amendments to the treaties of commerce and navigation considered
useful by the powers, and upon other subjects connected with
commercial relations, with the object of facilitating them.
XII
The Chinese government shall undertake to reform the
office of foreign affairs and to modify the court ceremonial re-
lative to the reception of foreign representatives in the
manner which the powers shall indicate.
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Until the Chinese government shall have complied with the a-
hove the undersigned.fministers)can hold out no expectation that the
occupation of Peking and the Province of Chihli by the general
forces can he brought to a conclusion-^.
In regard to this note, as first submit ted,Mr. Conger was in-
structed that the President disapproved of the word" irrevocable"
as apparently equivalent to the form of an ultimatum which the pow-
ers had all opposed. He gravely questioned whether it would be pos
sible to have death sentences executed in all cases which was de-
manded by the first draft, and he also questioned the advisibility
of the clause prohibiting the importation of materials which enter
into the manufacture of the munitions of war. Mr. Conger was in-
structed to present the foregoing views to his colleagues and after
urging them, to advise the Department of the result before signing
the note.^
In compliance with the position taken by the United State
several changes were made in the text of the note although they
were agreed to by a majority of the ministers only because Mr. Con-
ger had strenuously insisted upon them and in order not to ei?danger
negotiations by further unnecessary delay. All the other ministerj^
except the British and Russian had been instructed to sign the note
as it was. The British minister had not received definite instruc-
tions by Dec. 4th and the Russian minister had been instructed to
sign only on condition that the death penalty was left out. Mr.
Conger had , therefore
, the active assistance of these two and
the Japanese minister in securing a change in regard to the demand
^ The last declaration was Added after the note had been first
submitted to the Government.
^ For. Rel. 1900, p. 235.
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for punishments. A meeting was called at Mr. Conger's stiggestion
on the 4th of December. Upon the question of substituting the
v;ords "severest punishment" for "death penalty" the German, Aus-
trian and Italian ministers voted in the negative but agreed that
when it came to signing the note they would not refuse. The
death penalty having been striken out it was thought by a major-
ity of the ministers that there could be no serious objection to
the use of the word "irrevocable" in the preamble but Kr. Conger
insisted that it go out and instead of referring to the condi-
tions as "irrevocable" they should be termed "absolutely indis-
pensible" and finally all agreed that if the United States would
not give way on this point they all would for the sake of harmon-
ious and immediate action agree to the change. But the German,
French, Italian, Spanish and Belgium ministers very much preferred
to retain the word "irrevocable" and begged Mr. Conger to ask his
G-overnrnent to yield. Their principle reason was that any
change would weaken the case and encourage the Chinese. With
the words "death penalty" striken out there was no danger in
leaving the word "irrevocable" in and they insisted that it was
not used in the sense of an ultimatum.'^
As they were only waiting for the British minister to
receive the instructions he expected at any time Mr. Conger on
December 5th asked the Department's approval and permission to
sign the note as amended. Mr. Eay telegraphed in response" Sign
2joint note as transmitted, President sends congratulations".
The negotiations, however, met with an unexpected delay
^ For. Hel. 1900, pp. E37 and 238.
2 For. Rel. 1900, p. E38.
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at the last moment when the British minister who "believed himself
authorized to sign the note and had agreed to it l>\it awaited for-
mal authorization was instructed that his government objected to
the v7ord "irrevocable" as committing the powers to possible ul-
terior operations, the scope of which was not defined and Great
Britain proposed to add to the end of the conditions the words
"Until the Chinese Government has complied with the above condi-
tions to the satisfaction of the powers the undersigned can hold
out no expectation that the occupation of Peking and the province
of Ghihli by the general forces can be brought to a conclusion"."'"
Most of the ministers construed the British amendment
as in the nature of a promise to withdraw from Peking if the
Chinese 'Government complied with the demands. Mr. Conger thought
that if the Chinese Government so understood the situation and
at once set about in compliance with the terms submitted by
the powers, the execution of nearly all the demands could either
be fully accomplished or such progress made toward that end, as
would justify the withdrawal from Peking of all the troops except
the actual legation guard and the return of the court to the cap-
ital. Only clauses YI and XI need be left for future adjustment.
These were the most important of all and could not be settled at
2
once.
There was some little discussion as the result of a
misunderstanding between Mr. Conger and the Department in regard
to the insertion of the term "irrevocable" in the preamble of the
note. On the 17th of December Mr, Hay inquired how this term
For. Rel. 1900, p. 239. ^ For. Hel. 1900, pp.239, 240.
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came to be restored in the final draft of the note as the United
States had ohjected to it from the beginning.-^ Mr. Conger ex-
plained the error by the fact that Mr. Hay^ telegram of the 5th
was translated incorrectly as "sign note as majorities". Al-
though ungrammatical this did not appear unreasonable as it seem-
ed to have direct relation to his statement in his telegram of
the 17th that "the majority of them prefer to retain the word
irrevocable". He stated it would be hard to again strike it
out, Mr. Hay telegraphed December 19th that Kr. Conger should
insist on the omission of the word. Mr. ^onger replied the fol-
lowing day that the omission could only be done, if at all, lij
opening the whole question for other and objectional changes.
Mr. Rockhill joined Mr. Conger in advising against the insist-
ance on this point. So on l^eceraber 21 the Department gave
permission to sign the note after another statement of the
views of the government
,
objection also being raised to the amend
ment proposed by Great Britain as the United States could not
engage to participate in indefinite occupation of China. The
note was signed the next day, December 22, 1900.
On December 24th the representatives of the foreign
powers met in formal session at the Spanish legation with Prince
Ching who came with his secretary and interpreter. Li Hung
Chang was unable to be present. The Joint ilote was handed to
Prince Ching by the Spanish minister, who made a few remarks.
For. Rel.1900, p. 240 For. Rel. 1900, p. 241.
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Prince Ching responded briefly and then delivered to each minis-
ter the full powers of himself and Li, which appeared to be in
proper form - duly signed with the Imperial Seal."^
On December 30, the Smperor decreed acceptance of the
demands of the powers as a whole and the preliminary stage of the
negotiations was concluded.
The negotiations were now concerned with an elaboration
of these general provisions into a final and specific treaty.
This was an involved undertaking and it was not until September
7th, 1901, that all the questions were definitely settled and
the Final Protocol signed. During this time the foreign troops
were retained in China and the capital occupied by them.
The stipulations of the preliminary treaty, which were
the basis of the Final Protocol have been classified under four
heads; first
,
measures of punishment and reparation for the crimes
committed; second , the indemnification for losses of property;
third, preventative measures against future outbreaks; and,
fourth
,
the betterment of international relations with China.
These sub;)ects will be treated topicallj^ and while
the general chronological order of the negotiations may be some-
what obscurred, as all of these questions were dealt with simul-
taneously, yet it is felt that only by this method can a clear
understanding of the discussions be conveyed.
For. Rel. 1900, p. 246.
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Chapter V. Punishment and Reparation.
I. Punishment of Officials.
The question of the treatment of the officials whose
culpability for the outrages committed had been demonstrated, a-
roused considerable divergence of opinion. There was a good deal
of discussion which did not consider at all the fundamental basis
which alone justifies the infliction of any punishment, by society
which is essentially not the idea of reparation, but its social
utility as a preventative of like occurrences in the future. By
this principle the demands urged by some of the powers which
strongly savored of the spirit of revenge were little less ex-
cusable than those which went to the other extreme and urged
undue leniency. As a preventative measiire a penalty should be
imposed with some view to the standards of the people committing
the crime, and while some of the more barbarous modes of punish-
ment have been abolished in China yet with the widespread disregard
for human life v/hich will permit a man to commit suicide on his
enemy's doorstep in order to spite him, it is clear that any inde-
cisive action by the powers in this matter could not but lead the
Chinese to feel a contempt for the magnitude of their offenses and
they would be tempted to other crimes. So the death penalty was
in some cases, a necessary demand and should not be condemned
because more civilized countries have reached a point where less
severe punishments are efficacious.
As has been said some progress had already been made
in the settlement of this question before the adoption of the pre-
liminary note. The United States had opposed the punitive ex-
pedition to Pao ting ?u and the proposals made by Germany for the
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infliction of the punisliments "by the powers themselves, holding
that China should be allowed to inflict them. Several Imperial
decrees had been issued as of September E5 and Jlovember 19, but
they were considered by the ministers to be in every way inade-
quate •
As finally adopted the joint note omitted the names of
the officials to be punished and simply said that: "The severest
punishment in proportion to their crimes for the persons design-
ated in the Imperial decree of September 25, 1900, and for those
whom the representatives of the powers shall subsequently de-
signate. "-^
The Chinese plenipotentaries stated that the punish-
ments had already been inflicted by Imperial decree, yet they
would address the Throne for more severe punishment.
Mr. Conger was convinced that the prompt and severe
punishment of a very few high responsible officials would have
vastly more effect upon the Chinese than that of hundreds of les-
ser criminals. The British minister informed the representatives
on January 2£ that his government had instructed him to insist
on the death penalty for all persons mentioned in the decree of
September Z5th^ and for Governor Yu Hsian and General Tung ?u
Hsiang. The names of Prince I, Tsai Tien and Tsai Yung were
mentioned in the decree but none of the ministers had any infor-
mation concerning them so it was not thought advisable to demand
any additional punishment for them. The Russian, Japanese and
Belgian ministers together with Mr. Conger believed it impossible i
1 Rockhill's Report, p. 59. ^ Rockhill's Report, p. 66.
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at this time to secure the death penalty for Prince Tuan, Luke
Lan, or Tung Fu-hsiang and therefore, opposed making such demands
and hoped that the British ministers instructions in this regard
were capable of modification. It was decided to demand post-
humous honors for the four pro-foreign members of the Tsungli Ya-
men who had been executed a short time before the relief expedi-
tion entered Peking. I5r. Conger tried to get Chang Yu Huan's
name included in the list but was unsuccessful.''"
A meeting of the foreign representatives with the Chin-
ese plenipotentiaries was held February 5th in order to give the
latter an opportunity to be heard on the question of punishments
as set forth in the demands.
The dogan of the diplomatic corps presented a brief
indictment of each case and an informal discussion was held. The
Chinese said it would be Impossible to execute Prince Tuan or
Duke Lan but they said they would agree to their banishment for
life to Turkestan. They said Prince Chuang would be ordered to
commit suicide and that Yu Hsien would be executed. General
Tuang Fu hsiang had already been degraded and that when it could
be accomplished he would be more severely dealt with but they
stated that he was very popular in Hansu and any attempt to deal
harshly with him would cause an uprising among the people. As
to the others they insisted that their crimes were not so great
or so well proven as those mentioned above and so some lighter
punishment should be inflicted. Reply was made that the least
Rockhill's Report, p. 69.
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of the criminals deserved death and as tliat was the severest
punishment that could be inflicted the death penalty was demand-
ed for all, including two others ^vho were added to the list.
The Chinese averred that it would be most difficult for the court
to comply with the demands and it was placing them in a most
trying position and they begged the ministers not to create un-
necessary difficulty for them. They did not, however, hesitate
to fix the main responsibility on these persons nor try to shield
the Government."^
A meeting of the ministers teas held the same afternoon
to continue the discussion. The English minister, and the Ger-
man and some others had been insisting on demanding the death
penalty for Prince Tuan and Duke Lan but the English minister
finally consented that if in any way capital punishment could be
recorded against these men, even if immediately commuted he would
agree to it. A Chinese formula was found which seemed to fit
the case and which it was believed would be accepted by the Chin-
ese court. Demand v/as made in accordance therev/ith "Prince
Tuan and Duke Lan are sentenced to imprisonment awaiting decap-
itation but if immediately after this sentence the Emperor de-
sires as an act of grace to preserve their lives, they will be
sent to Turkestan to be there imprisoned for life with no further
commutation of punishment ever to be made in their favor," The
ministers accepted for the time being the Imperial promise as to
the future punishment of General Tuang Fu-hsiang and the suicide
of Prince Chuang. The death penalty was demanded for Ying Mien,
Chao Shu chiao, Yu Hsien, Chi Hsiu and Hsu Ching-Yu and a note
^ Rockhill's Report, p. 71.
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was submitted to the Chinese plenipotentiaries to that effect,
and also request was made at this time for the post-humous
honors which have been referred to."^
As soon as the French minister could receive informa-
tion from the interior another list was to be prepared of the
provincial officials who were accomplices in or were responsi-
ble for the massacre or cruel treatment of miSvSionaries for v/hom
punishment would be der^anded.^
On ITebruary 16th the foreign ministers received from
the Chinese a note enclosing three Imperial edicts fixing addi-
tional punishment for the persons the ministers had named.
^
They were, however, very unsatisfactory to the representatives,
as they did not meet the demands made. lir. Conger said that
the decrees were apparently issued of the courts own motion
though from some things in them it was showii that the representa-
tives' note had been received. They did not record death
sentences against Prince Tuan or Duke Lan as had been requested
and as the plenipotentiaries had indicated could be done, and
the decrees in other respects were objectionable. The decree
conferring post-humous honors, which was desired, charged the
officials with crimes and simply restored the rank of which they
had been deprived by their punishment. Believing that this
evasion was not necessary the demands were repeated in another
note of February 18th,
^
^ Rockhill's Report, pp. 7E, 73; British State Papers - China
lo. 1 fl902, pp. 16, 17).
^ Rockhill's Report, p. 72.
^ Rockhill's Report, p. 88.
4 Rockhill's Report, p. 91.
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Replying to Mr. Conger's report of these actions, Mr.
Hay said that the decrees mentioned were not thought "by the
President to "be unsatisfactory. Three of the principle culprits
were dead, two of the highest rank were to he degraded and exiled
and all the rest severely punished. The President entertained
the opinion that with the fulfillment of these sentences, and
considering the material chastisement already inflicted upon the
Chinese and their cities the question of punishment should be
considered by the powers as closed. This view was again stated
on receipt of Mr. Conger's telegram of the 21st saying that a
list of local officers deserving of punishment was being made up
and Mr. Conger was instructed to make clear to his colleagues
the President's earnest desire for peace, the cessation of blood-
shed, and the resumption of normal relations."^
On February 21st an Imperial decree v/as issued which
complied as far as possible with the demands that had been made.
On February 27 the ministers considered the question of punish-
ments to be demanded for provincial officers and other persons
most responsible for the massacres and riots. The list com-
prised about 100 names against 10 of whom it was proposed that
capital punishment should be asked. The others were to becash-
iered and never to be employed again and some were also to be
punished by exile for life. The Russian minister informed his
colleagues that his government was opposed to demanding of the
Chinese further capital punishment and he could not agree to the
Rockhill's Report, p. 562.
Rockhill's Report, p. 92.
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demand prepared without explicit instructions from St. Peters-
burg. Mr. Rockhill (who had replaced Mr. Conger February 23rd,
the latter being given a leave of absence) spoke of the Presi-
dent's wish for the cessation of bloodshed as embodied in the
instructions to Mr. Conger.-^
The ministers received a note from the Chinese peace
commissioners stating that responses had been received from the
various high officers designated to see that the death sentences
had been carried out against Prince Chuang, Yung Mien, Chao Shu
chian and Yu Hsien and that these personages had either been exe-
cuted or had committed suicide, but the ministers decided, never-
theless, on March 2 to ask for an Imperial edict stating these
faets.^
On March lEth an attempt v/as made to come to an agree-
ment on the ulterior list of punishment to be submitted. The
Russian minister immediatelj' made a declaration that under fur-
ther instructions from his government he could not take any part
whatever in any further discussion concerning punishments, as he
had been ordered to declare that Russia, considered this matter
closed with the punishments already inflicted but the diplom.atic
corps v;ith the exception of the Russian minister, was unanimous
in its decision that the punishments should be asked for. The
British minister said that he had categorical instructions from,
his government to insist on tnis question and his colleagues
agreed that it should not be dropped, Mr. Rockhill restated the
Rockhill' s Report, pp. 94, 95.
2 Rockhill 's Report, p. 98; and British State Papers - China,
ITo. 1 (1902) p. 39.
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President's views of the matter "but for sake of rnaintaining unan-
imity he voted v/ith his colleagues. The ministers then awaited
the decisions of their governments to whom they had transmitted
1
the Russian statement.
The British minister again brought up the matter Marcti
2End. Prior to the meeting of the diplomatic corps the six
ministers who had persons of their nationality killed met to
revise the list of punishments previously prepared and on which
figured ten demands for capital punishment. Owing largely to
the sentiment of Russia and the United States the number of such
punishments was reduced to four and for the other six the penalty
was com.muted into that vv^hich had been inflicted on Prince Tuan
and Luke Lan. All the minor demands which figured on the first
list v/ere maintained. The revised list was submitted to the
diplomatic corps and all the representatives except the Russian
agreed to send the demand, but difficulty arose in deciding
whether it should be sent in identic or a joint note. The Brit-
ish minister who expressed himself strongly in favor of a joint
note said that in case this was not agreed upon his government
reserved the right to present the original demand for the ten
2
capital punishments if it had to do so alone.
On April 2 the list of punishments v/as sent to the Chin
ese plenipotentiaries in a joint note signed by all the represent
atives except the Russian. A second list of persons whose guilt
Rockhill's Report, p. 102.
2 Rocldiill's Report, p. 112.
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should be inquired into "by the Chinese Government was forv/arded
with the note. The total numher of punishments to "be inflicted
amounted to 96 items.
After this list was communicated to the Chinese some of
the ministers received information from their nationals in the
interior, exculpating certain of the persons whose names v/ere
found on the list and the Chinese Government also addressed proof
of the innocence of others or showed that they were not as guilty
as at first suxjposed so that in some cases the punishments were
mitigated.
2
On April E9 a decree ordered the decapitation of three
of the miost guilty officials and an investigation of the case of
the fourth, the death sentence to he promptly carried out if the
charges m.ade were proven to he true. The same decree awarded
punishment to 48 other persons. Accounts of the execution of
the officials whose death had been demanded were received from
4foreigners who were residents at the place of execution and in
accordance with the demand of the representatives Imperial edicts
declaring the punishm^ents inflicted were appended to the Final
5Protocol and published throughout the Empire.
Toward the first of July the British and American min-
isters had renewed their efforts to gain the rehabitulat ion of
Chang Yiu Hung the riatter having been dropped from March 2E
in view of certain opposition on the part of some of the miinister
^ Rockhill's Report, pp. 1E3, 193, et. seq.; and British State
Papers, China Ko. 1 (190E) pp. 89-90.
E Rockhill's Report, p. 19S. Rockhill's Report, p. 19E.
4 Rockhill's Report, p. 166 et.seg.; and British ^tate Papers,
China ilo. 1 f 1902 )p. 178 ,179 . ^ Rockhill's Rep. pp. 3E0-3E3.
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and on account of the disinclination on the part of the Chinese
plenipotentiaries. The matter was nov/ pushed and though noth-
ing was done in regard to the request and it did not form a part
of the settlement , the request was nevertheless finally granted
by an Imperial edict of December 31, 1901."^
II The Suspension of Examinations.
The joint note adopted December E4, 1900, stipulated the
"suspension of all official examinations for five years in all
the towns where foreigners have been massacred or have been sub-
jected to cruel treatment". This clause was inserted because
of the responsibility of the literati or mandarinate class in the
Boxer uprising. This class has been intensely reactionary be-
cause their interests and power lie in the maintenance of old
corrupt political systems. These officials are selected by a
series of rigid examinations. The lowest of these is the dis-
trict town examination and then for the successful competitors
come the department, circuit, provincial and finally the Imperial
examination, which is held under the supervision of the Emperor
at Peking. The test is very severe because of the great number
of aspirants for positions. The subjects treated in the examin-
ations are the Chinese classics, style and calligraphy and an al-
most exclusively a test of memory. As has been said "even the
introduction of an alphabet would at one blow take away the raison
d'etre of the prominence of thousands".^ So when Kwang Su at-
tempted to reform the system he met bitter opposition and to the
1 For. Rel. 190E, p. 41.
2 Paul Reinsch "World Politics" pp. 91-93.
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inflTience of the literati was largely due his forced abdication.
They did much to stir up feeling against the foreigners, in the
mass of the people and the foreign representatives thought their
actions should not pass unnoticed.
In pursiiance of the provision of the note, I.!r. Rockhill
submitted to the representatives on February 27, 1901 a tentative
list of the names of the localities in w2iich the examinations
were to be suspended. The list was to be added to or revised
by each legation and submitted to the Chinese.-^
In interpreting the prohibitory clause the Chinese main-
tained that it must refer to the local examinations held in the
various prefectural and district towns by the literary chancellor
of the province. It ought not fchey said, apply to the provincial
examinations as this would exclude, not only those from the towns
where foreigners had been cruelly treated but also those from the
towns throughout the province where no disorders had occurred. If
this were carried to the metropolitan examinations at Peking for
the second and third degrees then the students of all the provinces
would not be able to compete for these degrees and as a result of
disturbances in many of the cities and towns the scholars of the
Empire would all thus be cut off from entering the official career.
The residents of Peking should be debarred from competing but these
examinations should not in justice be prohibited. The Chinese also
claimed that it was the "illiterate vagabonds" who caused trouble
while the scholars were peaceable and law abiding and closely
associated with the missionaries. Therefore, the suspension of
Rockhill 's Report, p. 95.

the examinations at Peking wonld create an undesirable feeling
of enmity,"^
The dean of the diplomatic corps replied that guilt of
the literati could not be denied and interpreted the clause
strictly to include all the examinations both local and general.
It was manifestly unjust, however, to prohibit the metropolitan
examinations and a compromise was desired by somo of the minis-
ters notably the Russian, French and Japanese.^ On May S8th
the proposal was made that the metropolitan examinations might
be allowed under conditions later to be agreed upon but t?iis
was opposed by Mr. Rockhill as it would leave the whole matter
unsettled. The Russian minister then proposed that the metro-
politan examinations should be allowed only for graduates of pro-
vinces in which foreigners had not been killed or subjected to
cruel treatment but this was not supported by a majority of the
ministers and the question was again deferred.
On May E9th the list of towns where official exam-
inations should be suspended for 5 years was submitted to the
Chinese plenipotentiaries and an Imperial decree was asked de-
Glaring suspension.
The only serious obstacle in the way of a complete set-
tlement of the question was the British minister's refusal to
agree to allow the metropolitan examinations to be held and can-
^ Rockhill 's Report, p. 67. ^ Rockhill 's Report, p. 165.
^ Rockhill 's Report, p. 177 - British State Papers China ITo. 1
(1902) p. 105.
^ Rockhill 's Report, p. 219 - 220.
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dictates from provinces in which no anti- foreign trouble occiirred
to come up for them. This ohstacle was removed June 11th hy
the publication of an Imperial decree suspending all examinations
in Peking and the metropolitan prefecture.-^
On June 29th Mr. de Goloyon, dean of the diplomatic
corps informed the Chinese plenipotentiaries that the decree of
June 11th was satisfactory and asked that it be posted throughout
the whole Empire.^
The British minister Interpreted the edict which was
rather indefinite to absolutely prohibit the metropolitan exam-
inations but the other ministers were not willing to press the
subject and Mr, Rockhill stated that these examinations would
probably be held in some provincial capital during- the time Peking
was closed.
Ill The Mission to Germany.
In accordance with Article I of the Joint IJote and Im-
perial edict of June 9th appointed Tsai Feng Prince of Ch'un as
Ambassador of the Emperor and directed him in that capacity to
convey to the German Emperor the expression of the regrets of
the Emperor of China and the Chinese Government for the assassin-
ation of Baron von Ketteler, the German minister who was murdered
during the seige of Peking.
4
Prince Chun, with a suite numbering about fifty persons
left China toward the end of July and arrived at Basel on Aug-
ust 25. Here the party halted owing to difficulties that arose
in regard to the ceremonial to be observed at Prince Chun's re-
1 Rockhill 's Report, pp.245, 246. ^ Rockhill 's Report, pp. 281, 245
2 " " p. 282. 4 " n p. 319.
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ception by the Emperor. The Grerraan Government declared that the
Chinese envoys should observe the same respect toward the German
Smperor as they were obliged to show when they were received by
their own monarch and therefore, all the envoys with the excep-
tion of Prince Chun should perform the "Kowtow" which consists
in touching the ground three times with the forehead and in m.ak-
ing nine profound bows. Prince Chun should make three obei-
sances.
The Chinese envoys protested that to perform the Kow-
tow before a foreign monarch would be tantamount to recognizing
him as the suzerain of the Chinese Emperor. This, they said,
they could not do. The Emperor finally yielded the point and
Prince Chun was informed that the Emperor woiild receive him un-
attended by any other members of the penitential mission except an
interpreter. This removed all obstacles to the fulfillment of
the mission and Prince Chun left for Berlin September 2 arriving
there the next day. The audience was held at the Hew Palace
at Potsdam September 4th. On the arrival of Prince Chun at the
palace attended only by his interpreter and advanced toward the
Throne with many profound obeisances. The Emperor remained
seated and acknowledged the Prince's bows with a slight movement
of his hand. Prince Chun presented to the Emperor of Germany
a letter from the Emperor of China, elaborately embroidered on
yellow silk, expressing sorrow for the crime that had been com-
mitted. Prince Chun made a speech to the same effect and after
listening to a short reply from the Emperor he retired with the
same ceremony that he had entered.!
1 London Times, 1901, pp. 557, 573, 574.
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As soon as his mission had been accomplished Prince
Chun was no longer treated as a penitent, hut as a guest of honor
and he was accorded eYery courtesy during the remainder of his
stay in Grermany.^
lY Erection of Monument for Baron von Ketteler.
As a further evidence of the regret of the Chinese
government for the murder of Baron von Ketteler the request was
made that a commemoration monument be erected at the place where
the crime was committed and that it should bear an inscription
in the Latin, German and Chinese languages expressing the regrets
of the Emperor of China for the murder.^
In pursuance of this request work was commenced on the
25th of June, and a letter from the Chinese to the German pleni-
potentiary was annexed to the final protocol stating that in
accordance with the wish of the Emperor of Germanjr a new archway
extending across the whole width of the street would be put up.^
This monument was formally dedicated January 18, 1903,
It is a large granite pal ou built across the street. The in-
scription reads: "This monume?Tt has been erected by order of
his Ma;jesty the Emperor of China for the Imperial GerT:aan minis-
ter Baron von Ketteler who fell on this spot by heinous murder
on the 20th of June, 1900, in everlasting comnemoration of his
name, as an eternal token of the Emperor's wrath about this crime
as a warning to all".^
^London Times, 1901, pp. 589, 595. ^Rockhill's Report, pp. 319,:520
^ Joint lote. Article I, p. 86. ^For. Rel. 1903, p. 78.
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V Mission to Japan.
The final protocol stipulated that a mission similar
to the one sent to Germany should be dispatched to Japan to con-
vey the regrets of bhe Chinese Emperor and government for the
assassination of Kr. Sugiyama the chancellor of the Japanese le-
gation which occurred June 11, 1900."^ An Imperial edict of June
18 appointed la Tung, vice-President of the "Board of Revenue to
discharge this duty, which was done during the month of September.
VI Reparation for the Desecration of Cemeteries.
During the outbreak the anti-foreign feeling of the Box-
ers vented itself against the foreign cemeteries at Peking and in
the provinces and these were entered, the monuments destroyed
and in some cases the graves broken into and the remains scattered
and burned. Some reparation was due for these outrages and the
preliminary note stipulated by Article IV that "an expiatory mon-
ument shall be erected by the Imperial Chinese (rovernment in each
of the foreign or international cemeteries which have been dese-
crated and in which the graves have been destroyed".
The settlement of this matter was not a difficult one as
the Chinese plenipotentiaries readily agreed to take such action,
A commission was appointed to consider this provision and recom-
mended at the meetinfr of the representatives March 14, 19v00, that
10,000 taels be asked for each monument in each cemetery dese-
crated in Peking and 5,000 taels for each one of those in the
provinces, this sum not to prejudice claims for material losses
sustained in such cemeteries.
^
1 Rockhill's Report, p. 314. 2 Rockhill's Report, p. 105.
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This report was accepted and the Chinese notified of
the action taken. They were to transmit the money directly to
the legation of that government whose cemeteries had been dese-
crated and that legation would see to the erection of the
monument. The funds to he paid were not included in the indem-
nity. Some little correspondence ensued in regard to the loca-
tion of the cemeteries but on July 31, Mr. de Cologan informed
the Chinese plenipotentiaries that the cemeteries desecrated were
seven in number all of them situated in the neighborhood of the
capital. These were one British, 5 French, and 1 Russian for
which 10,000 taels each were due. Promptly on receipt of this
note the Chinese plenipotentiaries sent the money, 70,000 taels,
in all, and the matter was sat;isfac torily adjusted.-^
Rockhill's Report, pp. 296, 297
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Chapter VI The Question of Indemnity .
The settlement of the qijestion of the indemnity was "be-
yond doubt the most difficult problem that the representatives
had to deal with. It was universally conceded that an indemnity
should be imposed for the losses incurred from the outbreak but
the determination of amount, the claims to be allowed, the form
in which the indemnity should be paid, the methods of providing
the funds in order that just recompense might be given those who
had suffered damage and at the same time that the Chinese Govern-
ment might not be cripiled by demands above her ability to paj?-
all involved careful and extended deliberation.
China adr.iitted her liability though naturally desired
the powers to be lenient in the matter.-^ Of necessity the mat-
ter was treated in a very general way in the preliminary nego-
tiations and the joint note simply said in article VI "Equitable
indemnities for governments, societies, companies and private
individuals, as well as for Chinese who have suffered in the late
events in person or in property in consequence of their being in
the service of foreigners. China shall adopt financial measures
acceptible to the powers for the purpose of guaranteeing the pay-
ment of said indemnity and the interest and amortisation of the
2loans"
.
The question of punishment appeared to be of immediate
need of settlement so the formal discussion of the indemnity did
not begin for a time after the presentation of the joint note.
It was soon seen that the various powers held widely divergent
^ Rockhill's Report, p. 41. ^ Rockhill's Report, p. 59.
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views on the subject. The United States from the first urged
that the demands he moderate and considered the future develop-
ment of trade to he a more vital question wlille Germany on the
other hand took an uncompromising position and wished reimburse-
ment for all expenses incurred.
The question was taken up in the meeting held February
15th and Mr. Conger submitted the proposition of "the adoption of
a lump sum within the ability of China to pay and as this would
not be sufficient to meet the demands in full, each power would
have to agree to a scaling down proportionate to their claims" .-^
This did not meet with much of a response as only the
Japanese minister really favored it. The German minister insis-
ted that China was able to pay the entire amount of all demands
and that his Government would require full compensation for all
their expenditures and losses. It was understood by all that
war indemnities or expenses must be fixed by the Governments
themselves, but there was a diffe'-ence of opinion among the min-
isters as to the indemnification of legation guards which some,
especially the Italian minister, urged. It was pointed out that
it would be difficult to discriminate between the soldiers at
Peking and on the relief expedition. The United States held
that the legation guards were on the some footing as civilians
killed or wounded for which indemnity was claimed but Mr. Hay
said this point could be taken care of by each Government in dis-
tributing the indemnity.^ The ministers also asked for informa-
1 Rockhill's Report, pp. 86, 87. ^ Rockhill's Report, p. 360
2 Rockhill's Report, p. 87.
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tion from their governments as to whether there was an under-
standing between the powers as to the manner of fixing the amount
of war indemnity to be demanded of China and whether this would
be done by the governments in accordance .vith uniform rules agreed
upon between them or each reserve the right to make up separate
demands.-^ Mr. Hay replied that separate item.ized bills would be
impractical and again urge da lump sum. He suggested the refer-
ence of the matter to the Hague if the agreement for distribution
p
seemed too difficult, a suggestion first made by Russia. When
the subject was again taken up on March 12 Mr. Rockhill stated
this view of the Department. The Russian minister said he was
not aware that his GoverniTient had actually made this proposition,
that it was a mere indication and he was not prepared to say his
Government would finally accede. The British minister said
categorically that his Government did not favor the Hague tri-
bunal and the French minister did not consider the proposition
favorably, though he was willing that it should be discussed as
a possible solution in case of necessity.*^
A commission was formed consisting of the representa-
tives of Gennany, Belgium, Netherlands and the United States to
lay do^TO principles to serve as a common basis for estimating
and assessing private claims for indemnity to be presented to the
Chinese Government. It made its report to the ministers at the
meeting of March 12. It declared that it had attempted to ef-
fect a double purpose, first to insure an equitable indemnity
to those w?iO had been injured and second
,
to prevent the circuui-
1 Rockhill' s Report, p. 360. ^ Rockhill 's Report, p. 361.
^ Rockhill 's Report, p. 102.
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stances being used as pretext for illegal gain or profit. They
proposed the adoption of certain rules for the regulation of
claims. Their report v/as considered J'arch 15 and 14 and soKe
amendinents having been introduced was accepted as follows:
I damages should not be claimed except in cases which v/ere
immediate and direct consequences of the anti-foreign movement
which occurred in 1900.
II Indemnity claims might be classified under three princi-
ple headings; (a) indem.nities to governmjents ; fb) to socjeties,
companies and individuals; fc) to Chinese in the employ of for-
eigners,
III A detailed enumeration was made of the cases which con-
stitute immediate and direct consequences of the events of 1900
and also a list of those cases which should not be so construed.
(This classification was made after a careful examination of the
claims filed in the various legations.)
IV Claims for dam.ages should in every case be addressed to
the representative of the power which exercised protection over
the claimant. Claims of international character were to be
addressed to the dean of the diplomatic corps. The representa-
tives of the powers after examination of the claims preferred
by the persons under this protection should make an appropriate
estimate of the amount and should demand the sum total, without
giving either details or explanation to the Chinese Government.
V fa) Damages should be assessed as far as possible and in
conformity with tlie above mentioned principles with a view to
putting governments, societies, companies and private individuals
back in the position in which they v/ould have been if the anti-
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foreign Eovement of 1900 had not taken place. The valuation of
articles for which damages were asked should be just and reason-
able and in conformity v;ith the real expenditure which Y/ould be
necessarjr to replace thein.
Cb) The amount of the indemnities could not in any case
be augmented by interest at more than five per cent on personal
claims and seven per cent on commercial claims. Interest could
only be allowed if it represents a loss actually incurred a-^^d
which should have been proved in accordance with Article VII
given below. Itwould he calculated from the dia:j on which the
wrong entitling the compensation took place.
VI=If societies or companies or private individuals had been
required by the military authorities to furnish articles, furni-
ture, real estate, or goods belonging to them for the necessities
of common defense, the government exercising authority over the
officer or officers who nad signed such requisition or had sign-
ified to the correctness of the bills should be directly respon-
sible for their reimbursement vnth a corresponding right against
China.
Vll-Proof of dam.age suffered should be made to the satis-
faction of the representative to v/hom the claim v/as addressed
in conformity with the usages of his country. The proof that
the articles existed prior to the events which led to the claims
being presented should be furnished in each case to the satis-
faction of the representative of the power concerned. In exam.-
ination of the different claims for indemnity for the loss of
property it was desirable that the style of living and the pre-
sumable income of the claimant should be taken into account.
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VIII The commission considered that the indemnity should "be
paid in Haikwan taels.
IZ The Commission considered that the principles eniimerated
should serve as a basis for assessing all claims for compensation
without distinction."^
It was understood that Article IV did not prejudice
the final presentation of the Indemnity demand -/hich was reserved
for future consideration. This article followed in principle
the desire of the United States for a lump siim. All the minis-
ters had not received instructions in regard to the matter, at
this time, but it seemed probable that a lump sum would be asked,
although the Russian minister declared that while accepting the
principle of the report, he would, unless otherwise instructed,
present his claims separately. The representatives were of the
opinion that it was better to ascertain the total amount of the
indemnity before discussing the question of China's ability to
pay it. France, Russia and m.ost of the other powers agreed in
the principle that China should be credited v;ith the treasure
2
seized by the troops during the operations.
On March 18th the question of submitting all claims
in a lump sum was put to an infomial vote. Six of the ministers
including the French, Japanese and Russian were in favor of the
proposition but the representatives of Great Britain, Germany
and Italjr voted against it, and the question was again deferred.
May 1 was fixed by the conference, on Mr. -^^ockhill's motion, as
the latest date at which private claims coiild be filed. This
1 Rockhill's Report, p. 105,108. ^ Rockhlll's Rep. pp.104, 105.
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was later postponed to May 14 at the request of the British min-
ister.-^
It was agreed that it was essential to take up without
further delay the study of the financial resources of China for
the pajTTTient of the indemnity and on March 2E a CoEimittee was ap-
pointed consisting of the British, German and Japanese ministers
2
which should report on this suhject.
Under date of March El Mr. Hay directed Mr. Rockhill
"to endeavor regardless of the process by which the sun of the
indemnity was reached to have the total kept within the limit of
£40,000,000 and that this sum be demanded in a lump from China
v/ithout either the grounds for the claim or the proportion claimed
by each power being itemized, leaving the proportionate distribu-
tion to be settled among the pov^rers.
The Hague arbitration was to be suggested if settlement
at Peking was im.possible. Mr. Hay stated that $25,000,000 would
cover claims of every description for the United States and this
amount was subject to equitable proportionate reduction.^
Mr, Rockhill formally submitted these views to the di-
4
plomatic corps in a memorandum March E8th a^d again April 8th.
Some of the ministers at this time were strongly advocating that
China should contract a foreign loan for the payment of the in-
demnity as this would be the most rapid way of pairing it off and
they were anxious to be promptly paid for their military expenses.
1 ?Rockhill 's Report, p. 108. ^ Rockhill 's Report, p. 113.
Rockhill 's Report, p. 36.
4 British State Papers, China Ho. 1 (190E) p. 4.
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This, however, would be the most expensive method and it would
inevitably result in establishing some form of foreign inter-
national financial control, affect thereby the administrative
entity of China, and consequently conflict with the declared pol-
icy of the United States. 'This would be better served by the
suggestions of Sir E. Satow and Sir R. Hart to raise existing
revenues in conjunction with some administrative reforms."^
On April 8 it was decided that the evacuation could
not be commenced until not only the total amount of the indemnity
to be asked from China had been ascertained but the securities for
the pajnnent of the same had been given and accepted by the powers.
This made the early settlement of the question especially desir-
able as the occupation was estimates as costing the Chinese gov-
ernment some #30,000,000 per month and if the evacuation was not
begun by the middle of June it must be delayed until autumn as the
climatic conditions in summer were not such as to allow the mov-
ping of troops.
The diplomatic corps met April 25rd to consider the
propositions of the United States submitted in the memorandum.s of
March 27 and April 11th. Er. Hockhill outlined the policy of
the United States and said that as all the powers had disclaimed
motives of territorial advantage, the indemnity should be reason-
able and not one which would create financial embarassmer^t and
imperil the independence and integrity of China. The United
States thought that the limit of China's ability to pay was "£40,
000,000. The payment of this sum. would cost China ^50 , 000 ,000
1 Rockhill's Rep., pp. 113, 119. ^ Rockhill's Rep. p. 125.
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but it was thought she could jjay this, but that any additional
demand would expose foreign interests to the gravest danger. Hew
taxes would stimulate anti-foreign feeling which it was essential
to alleviate."^
It was generally felt that this proposal was premature
as the committee on indemnities had not made their report, but in
the discussion that ensued the ministers, for the most part, toolr
the view that the proposed limit was much too low, although sev-
eral thought some reduction might have to be made. The Belgium
minister thought that any reduction should apply only to govern-
mental, not private, claims. The French and German ministers
believed Chinese resources would permit the pajrment of a mucli
larger amount the latter maintaining that the entire cost of
operation could be met» The Russian and British ministers stated
tliat their rrovernmentB would accept what China was able to pay,
but coiild not count themselves to any definite sum before the
commission should report. The question was therefore deferred
until this had been heard.
In an interview April 24 the British minister told I.'r.
Rockhill that his Government thought that the indemnitj^ might be
scaled down to "fao ,000 , 000 and that a date should be fixed after
which no claims could be made tlus limiting the amount for mili-
tary purposes. His goverr.ment would propose ths.t China negotiate
a loan in the open market for a s\m\ sufficient to pay the powers
sf25.000,000 for which purpose it would give the native custom, re-
venues and the still unalienated foreign customs revenue. As to
1 Rockhill 's Report, pp. 141, 14E.
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the tine and mode of the payment of the remaining £e5 , 000 ,000
,
the powers would have to make an agreement with China. Sir.E.
Satow thought that such a proposition might he carried through
despite some opposition hut Mr. i^ockhill said that the United
States could not favor such a compromise and if the proposition
of the 5^40 ,000 ,000 limit were not accepted he would urge a suh-
mission of the question to the Hague. The British minister
feared that such reference if agreed to, would greatly?- delay the
settlement and would involve great expense to China as the eva-
cuation could not be carried out until the matter was satisfac-
torily arranged.
On May 1st the indemnitj^ commiission submitted their
2
report. It considered at length the possible miodes of payment
and the resources from which funds could be obtained. The me-
thods of payment were outlined to be:
(a) Chinese loan , not guaranteed by the powers . This
system would doubtless be ver^,' costly, the credit of the Empire
being such that it would be difficult to borrow the sum of 65,
000,000 (which appeared to be the probable amount demanded) at
reasonable rates.
fb) Loan to meet the lump sujti of the indemnities guaranteed
by all the powers . Such a loan could undoubtedly be easily
floated without too great expense and at a low rate of interest.
Its realization would allow the immediate payment of the indem-
nities and the speedj?" restoration of China to its normal state.
Financially the powers vi'ould not be gainers for they ^;x)Uld have
to borrow to pay themselves, each one having to assimie besides
1 Rockhill's Hep. pp. 143, 144. British State Papers, China
^^0. 1, (1902) pp.. 71 - 89.
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the commission previously deducted "by the "bank, the joint respon-
sibility of the total loan. It might involve control of the
revenues by the powers V7hich v/oulci create a complicated situation.
fc) Chinese Bonds . Each power would receive from China bonds
for the amount of its total indemnity. These bonds falling due
at stated intervals would bear interest, and each power could
use them as security for a national loan which each would have
to make. The lump sum. would then bo distributed among the powers
under various forms of loans and under conditions in harmony with
the credit of each, instead of floating one int ernstional loan.
Each 5tate would be at liberty to only raise the amount of its
private claims, if it were willing to accept its payment for
public expenses in installments and to choose at its convenience
the date of issue.
fd) Annuities . This system would have the disadvantage of
extending the settlement of the expenses already paid by the row-
ers over B number of ^T-ears and of leaving the way open for poli-
tical contingencies.
The Commission discussed quite fully the rovsources avail-
able. The maritime customs not required for the then existing
debt, the likens actually under foreign control, the increase
of the customs tariff to a 5 per cent effective ad valorem, the
yield of the native customs and the taxation of certain merchan-
dise at this time imported free, were held to offer good secur-
ity from the point of view of income, collection and control and
which could be applied to the service of the indemnities, with-
out incurring any injurious effect on tiie internal organization
of the Empire. There were objections to certain other resources
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such, as increasing the customs duties to 10 per cent, the salt
duty, the rice trihute and saving from economies in the admin-
istration of the Manchu pensions and other expenses. The land
tax and the liken were not considered as heing satisfactory sources
of income for this purpose. '^
The report contained no recommendations as to the method
to be suggested to China for paying the indemnity. The important
feature of the report and of the discussions of it was that it
seemed to be almost impossible for China to payst 65 , 000 , 000 with-
out raising the tariff to 10 per cent and the joint guarantee of
the loan by the powers. Russia, having small commercial inter-
ests in China was quite willing that the tariff be raised and
urged this, with a joint guarantee upon the presentation of the
report, 2 but Mr. -^ockhill stated the United States would not
join in a guarantee and refused to consider the raising of the
tariff to 10 per cent unless equivalent compensation, should be
given foreign trade, or at least the negotiations pushed on con-
currently with those for the settlement of the indemnity.^ The
British minister informed Mr. Rockhill that he was in favor of
using, to secure the loan, the foreign customs, the native cus-
toms to be put under the maritime custom.s, the salt tax and
the raising of the tariff to a 5 per cent ad valorem."^ Mr. Rock-
hill thought the last, while not objectionable, should be accom-
panied hj commercial advantages.
^ Rockhill 's Report, pp. 146-153.
^ British State Papers, China I^o. 1 (1902) pp. 57, 38.
^ Rockhill 's Report, pp. 144-145.
4
Rockhill 's Report, p. 37E.
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At the meeting May 7th the Russian and French ifxinisters
stated that it was of great importance to ascertain whether the
governments would agree to a joint guarantee. They had formal
instructions to urge this.-^ The Japanese and Austrian ministers
expressed themselves in favor of such a guarantee hut the Belgium,
German, Italian and Dutch ministers were without instructions.
Mr. Rockhill stated that the United States saw great difficulties
involved in the proposition,^ and Great Britain was opposed to it
also.^
The total amount of the claims which had been submitted
calculated to the first of July, was about 6 v ,500 ,000 or 450,000,-
000 taels. It was decided to submit this to the Chinese pleni-
potentiaries as the probable amount of tiie indemnity and ask them
what measures they proposed taking for the payment of it. This
v/as done, with the understanding that the note was not in any
sense a demand, nor did this sum. necessarily represent the final
figure but it was simply a means of elicitating a formal expres-
sion of the views of the Chinese plenipotentiaries on the subject.
In reply to this note the Chinese plenipotentiaries
proposed annual payments of 15,000,000 taels of which 10,000,000
taels were to be derived from the gabelle, 3,000,000 taels from
the native customs and £,000,000 taels from the liken, this
payment to comjnence July, 190E. They suggested that the maritime
^ Archives Diplomatique, 1901-02, Vol. I, p. 64.
^ Roclvhill's Report, p. 155.
British State Papers, China No. 1 fl902) p. 43.
^ Rockhill 's Report, pp. 155, 156.
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Customs should see that monthly pajTraonts were regularly made into
authorized hanks which should transmit their proportion to each
power. They referred to the extreme financial emharassments
which would result from the pigment of such a sum and begged that
it be reduced and also that the powers would agree to an increase
of the tariff hy one third.
Mr. Hay instructed Mr. -i^ockhlll hy dispatch of May 10th
that the aggregate sum appeared exorbitant and repeated that the
United States was v/illing to reduce hy one half its already
reasonable claims if the other powers would agree to do likewise,
V/hile these were grave objections to a guarantee the President
would agree to it subject to the action of Congress rather than
subject China to the necessity of paying so enormous a commiission.
The suggestion of reducing the total amount with compensating
commercial advantages and Mr. Hay was instructed to propose that
each power accept bonds of China without international guarantee.
The United States would accept such bonds at 3 per cent interest
without commission for its share of the indemnity.
The situation was one of extreme difficulty. It seem-
ed impossible to reach any understanding either as to the amount
or the mode of payment. The British and Japanese were the only
governments that joined the United States in the view that com-
pensating commercial advantages should be insisted on, in case
it was necessary to allow an increase in the import customs tar-
iff, Russia, France and (rcrmany were willing to see the tariff
raised to 10 per cent if by so doing they could obtain more prompt
Rockhill's Report, p. 165. ^ Rockhill's Report, p. 371.
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ly the payment of their claims and Russia was most persistent in
the desire to separate the financial from the commercial ques-
tion. The Japanese and United States m.inisters, however, thought
that the two must be treated together and that if tariff conces-
sions were made to China without securing a settlement of the com-
m.ercial questions an important leverage ^>70uld be lost anri the
powers would be subjected to years of desultory discussions with
China, before they could be adjusted."^ The Russian and French
governments were emphatic in their declarations that the only
mode of payment acceptable to their governments was a loan with
joint guarantee. The British minister's instructions were
absolutely opposed to a joint guarantee and he submitted a memo-
randum which suggested that the powers receive bonds from China
at 4 per cent interest and a sinking fund of l/2 per cent be
provided. Payment on these bonds would be made from the gabelle
native customs and the increase of receipts accruing from a duty
of 5 per cent ad valorem on imports (except rice and opium).
On May 22nd the British minister advanced the proposition he had
earlier made to Kr. Rockhill that the powers should not present
claims to China for military occupation after July 1. He did
not, however, suggest a reduction in the claims estimated to that
date, i.e. 450,000,000 taels. This last proposal was opposed
by the Austrian, Russian and German ministers who wished their
expenses paid in full. Upon Mr. -^"^ockhill ' s statement that he
would again bring up the suggestion of the United States to scale
Rockhill' 3 Report, p. 169.
^ Rockhill 's Report, pp. 170, 171.
British State Papers, China Ho. 1 fl902), p. 45.
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down the indemnity, the German minister asked for a final vote
on the subject. The American plan was rejected and it was (de-
finitely agreed to ask of China the expenses and losses actually
incurred, reserving for future determination the question of the
advisability of limiting the figure of the indemnity to the first
of July, that is to the sum of 450,000,000 taels.
In regard to the payment by the method of bonds which
the British minister's memorandum outlined the United States
representative declared his go vernmen1?s approval , but the Russian
minister still held this method undesirable and also advocated
the raising of the tariff on foreign imports to 10 per cent as
this, he said would give the best guarantees."^ All the repre-
sentatives except LIr. Rockhill were willing to accede to the 5
per cent ad valorem duty but he repeated the necessity for com-
2pensating commercial advantages.
At the meeting Kay 22, the question the British pro-
posed was again taken up a decided preference was shown for bonds
in place of a guaranteed loan. -i^'rance and Japan preferred the
guaranteed loan but Germany with Great Britain and the United
States was strongly in favor of bonds and Russia did not further
urge the views of her government. The other ministers did not
express any preference. The question of sinking fund was con-
sidered and the Indemnities Commission was asked to draw up a
number of plans of amortization with as short a period to run as
possible. The question of interest on the bonds was also dis-
British State Papers, China lo. lfl90B) pp.55, 57,58,59,61,115.
Rockhill 's Report, pp. 171, 172.
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oussed the United States favoring 3 per cent and Great Britain
4 per cent. The Japanese minister said that some provision should
he made for those countries which could not raise loans at such a
low rate of interest as Japan for example had to pay 5 per cent.
He thought this ought to he made up to these countries hy an
additional amount of bonds issued to them."^
On May 25th the German representative stated that his
government would accept the British proposition of fixing the
indemnity at 450,000,000 taels with interest at 4 per cent re-
serving for future consideration the question of the amortization.
Italy also agreed to this proposition, but none of the other
2
ministers had yet received instructions on this point.
On May 28 Mr. Hay instructed Mr. Rockhill to urge ar-
bitration by the Hague or reduction of the amount which was con-
sidered excessive if there remained the slightest possibility of
the suggestion of the United States being considered but if there
was no hope of obtaining this the United States had no wish to
cause indefinite delay.
Any reduction did not appear feasible at this time as
the Emperor had issued an edict accepting the demand of the
powers for 450,000,000 taels with interest although His Majesty's
Government hoped that it would be found possible to slightly re-
duce this amount.^
Several interviews were held with the Chinese pleni-
potentiaries to discuss these matters. They had omitted to pro-
vide for the pajraent of interest in their plans submitted May 11,
^ Rockhill's Report, p. 174. ^ Rockhill' s Report, p. 176.
3 4Rockhill's Report, p. 373. Rockhill's Rep. pp. 179, 185.
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tut when this v/as pointed out to them they were not able to offer
any practical solution of the difficulty. The diplomatic corps
took up the questions of amortization and currency in ^vhich the
indemnity should he paid but no conclusions were reached and on
June 8, Mr. Rockhill in consideration of the fact that only
Great Britain, Germany, Belgium, Holland and Italy had accepted
the limitation of the indemnity to 450,000,000 and it seemed im-
possible to come to an agreement in the matter, formally proposed
the submission of the whole question of indemnity to the Hague.
The question was again taken up June 11th and the
resources to be appropriated for the purpose of the indemnity
were considered. The French minister stated that his governi^ent
believed that the revenue which could be placed under the control
of the Chinese Maritime Customs presented the best guarantee and
therefore favored an increase on the tariff on imports to 10 per
cent. If this could not be the French Government was willing to
accept the revenue derived from the salt gabelle, which had been
offered for this purpose b^^^ the Chinese plenipotentiaries. The
Russian minister had the same instructions but would accept the
salt gabelle on condition that in case the payments on account
of interest on the indemnities 7/ere not regularly m.ade the powers
would consider the eventual increase of customs dues on imports
up to 10 per cent the increase derivable from the source to be
entirely affected to the payments on account of this new debt.
Mr. Rockhill then outlined five conditions on which the United
States would consent to an increase to a 10 per cent duty.
These were: (1) a general revision of the tariff and conversion
Rockhill 's Report, p. 226.
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of ad valorem to specific duties; (2) removal of the prohi'bition
on the exportation of rice; (3) abolition of all liken including
transit dues and all inland taxation of every kind on all for-
eign imports; f4) revision of tariff of liken charges on native
produce destined for exportation, especially tea, raw cotton and
silk and other articles of export trade; (5) participation by the
Chinese Government in improvements of the waterways leading to
Shanghai and Tientsin,
The Japanese minister approved of these suggestions and
submitted the advisability of an international committee being ap-
pointed to carry out the revision of the tariff. The British
minister, however, objected to any partial reduction of the liken
and could only consider its entire abolition with other consider-
ations in compensation for the 10 per cent duty. He contended
that the elevation of the tariff would not be sufficient and con-
sidered the salt revenue as the best fund available.^ In view
of the disinclination of his colleagues to avail themselves of
the opportunity afforded to settle any of the questions affecting
trade by treating them in conjunction with the indemnity Zt,
Rockhill felt compelled to accept the revenue from the salt
gabelle which amounted to 11,000,000 taels per year. This with
the amount placed under the control of the Maritime Customs
would make up a sum of 17,000,000 taels per year.
All the other ministers except Mr. Rockhill wished to
raise the tariff to an effective 5 per cent. The United States
wished the same concessions as for a raise to 10 per cent but Mr.
Rockhill finally agreed to accept it if the first condition with
1 British State Papers, China ITo. 1 (1902) p. 137.
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the international coininittee suggested "by Japan and the fifth
condition were agreed to, together v/ith a provision that the
regulations, then in force, concerning inland navigation by for-
eigners for purposes of trade should be revised so as to open
this trade to all classes of shipping. This revision would be
of great service to Great Britain, Germany, France and Japan and
would tend to improve trade generally. Mr. Hockhill inserted it
to secure the support of his colleagues on the other points rather
than for the benefit it would be to the trade of the United
States. This last condition met with the strongest opposition
from Russia because it tended to reopen discussion at a moment
when it was most desirable to bring matters to a close. Mr.
Rockhill therefore, asked if Russia would accept the other two
commercial compensations of a placing of the customs dues to an
ad valorem basis and the improvement of the waterwa^/s, and a
1
compromise was finally affected on this basis.
At the meeting of the Diplomatic corps June 15th Mr.
Rockhill stated that the United States desired to bring the nego-
tiations to a close accepted the sum of 450,000,000 taels as the
final amount of the indemnity calculated to the 1st of July and
as a further concession would accede to the 4 per cent interest
instead of the 3 per cent advocated. It seem.ed evident that
France and Russia would accept ultimately the 450,000,000 taels
indemnity although the latter' s representative had no definite
instructions on this point. The question of mode of payment
was again raised. All the ministers were in favor of, or would
Rockhill 's Report, pp. 227-229, 255.
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agree to the issuance of "bonds at 4 per cent except the Russian
and Japanese ministers. The Japanese minister said that if
payment were made by "bonds at 4 per cent his government would
suffer loss as Japan's bonds sold at .78 so her claim would have
to be raised if this method were adopted. The Russian minister
also stated that the bonds of his government were below par and
he was not certain that the 4 per cent rate would be acceptable
,
On June 19th Russia and France declared their accept-
ance in principle of the sum of 450,000,000 with 4 per cent in-
terest, Japan accepted with the reservation noted. The Bri-
tish minister surprised the other representatives by the declara-
tion that England would not accept the eventual increase to 10
per cent duty in case of non-payment of interest which the min-
2isters had previously agreed upon at the solicitation of Russia.
This produced a deadlock on the negotiations. Mr. -^^oclrhill
since the 8th had urged the submission of the question to the
Hague but did not meet with any encouragement. In regard to the
currency in which the indemnity should be paid, most of the re-
presentatives had formal instructions to insist that bonds be
given them in the gold currency of their respective countries.
This was impossible as the indemnity was to be asked without
detail or explanation. There was also some discussion in regard
to the payment of private claims, Germany was in favor of
China contracting a special loan for this purpose as she could
Rockhill's Report, pp. 244, 245,
Rockhill's Report, pp, 246, 247.
British State Papers, China ITo. 1 (1902) pp. 180, 181.
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not undertake to negotiate the bonds paid it on account of pri-
vate claims. j^his scheme did not find any support and the
United States minister said that his government would see to the
payment of the claims of its own citizens out of the amount paid
it hy China and the ITrench minister made a similar statement."'"
On July 18th Japan accepted the sum of 450,000,000 taeis
as the indemnity with interest at 4 per cent thus renouncing her
claim for preferential treatment. A plan of amorti^-.ation re-
cently submitted was considered better than any yet examined and
was adopted. The operation of the sinking fund was to begin
in 1902 and both capital and interest were to be paid off by
1940.^
Repeated efforts were made to settle this dispute be-
tv;een England and Riissia v/hich had delayed the conclusion of
the negotiations and the matter was finally compromised July
26th by the consent of Russia to the proposition that in case the
revenue was insufficient the pov/ers would examine and fix the
revenues necessary to supply the deficiency, the import duties
3
not being excluded from the examination.
All of the financial matters were now seemingly settled
and a note was sent to the Chinese plenipotentiaries July 27
embodying these conclusions. It had been agreed that the in-
demnity and interest were to be paid in gold at the rate of ex-
change April 1st, 1901. The United States Treasury rate on that
day was 1 Haikwan tael = $.742 United States gold.
1 Rockhill's Report, p. 256. ^ Rockhill's Report, pp. 277,328 ,379
3 " " pp. 276. 283.
British State Papers, China Ho. 1 fl902) pp. 181. 183, 184, 186,
190. 191 and 192.
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The payment was to be made monthly and a commission com-
posed of bankers at Shanghai on which each power should be re-
presented was to receive the amount of interest and amortization
and divide it among the interested parties. Interest was to run
from July 1st, 1901 but China was to be given the right to pay
off within a term of three years beginning January 1902, the
arrears of the first six months ending December 31, 1901, on
condition that it pay compound interest at the rate of 4 per cent
on the sums, the pajrrnent of which should be deferred. Interest
would be payable semiannually, the first payment being fixed on
July 1st, 1902.^
The final protocol was to have been submitted August
6th but the English minister asked to have it postponed as he
received unexpected instructions in regard to the indemnity.
Great Britain objected to a number of passages in the draft,
imong other things the British Government was opposed to the
international commission for the conversion of ad valorem into
specific duties claiming that the tariff in force at this time
being a British tariff the "most favored nation clause" would
protect all interests and that it could not admit of its tariff
being converted by an international board. This plan had been
unanimously accepted by the conference on June 11th when it was
suggested by the Japanese representative as a condition for his
agreeing to the proposal to convert the import duties into the
specific form and the British attitude was severely criticized.^
Rockhill's Report, pp. 289, 315.
" " p. 298.

126
The Final Protocol was discussed August 12th and agree-
ment reached on every part of it except the ahove provision. The
British minister said that he could not refuse to sign the protocol
if it were embodied in it but he would have to note on the Protocol
the reservation of his government as to this clause.-^ It being
held by the conference that such a course was not desirable and
in the hope of closing definitely the final protocol the repre-
sentatives of the powers while expressing their disapproval of
reopening the question and on condition that no other question be
raised agreed to the English formula. "All duties on imports
levied ad valorem shall be converted into specific duties so far
as it is possible to do so and with least delay". The chief
argument of Great Britain against the commission was that it was
unweildy and as all votes would have to be unanimous it would
take a very long time to complete the work as there were more than
twelve hundred articles. It was the purpose of the British Gov-
ernment to ask the chief commercial powers in China, Japan, Ger-
many and the United States to join the work of conversion of the
tariff conjointly with the Chinese Maritime Customs.^
In the final protocol it was stipulated that "capital
and interest shall be payable in gold or at the rate of exchange
corresponding to the dates at -vhich the different pasrments fall
due." This was subsequently interpreted by China and the United
States as placing the debt upon a silver basis but the other
British State Papers, China IJo. 1 (1902) pp. 206, 207.
Rockhill's Report, d. 300.
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powers held that it was caloulated on a gold "basis and was pay-
able in gold. The question was quite important as there was an
unexpected fall in the price of silver and on January 1, 1903,
the exchange rate of the Haikwan tael to United States Treasury
gold instead of being .742 was .69, so that if the indemnity was
a gold debt it v/ould be increased over 20 per cent with a corres-
ponding increase in the amount due annually for interest and
amortization. The natter remained unsettled for several years
but though the powers were willing to make some concessions to
assist China in her difficulty, they insisted that she acknow-
ledge her liability to make the payment in gold, which she
eventually did.-'- Toward the end of 1908 the United States
who had from the first urged moderation in the indemnity demands,
returned to China her share in the indemnity. The Emperor in
expressing his gratitude for this friendly act, declared that the
money refunded would be used to send Chinese young men to the
United States for their education.
List of Indemnities.
Country Total Claim - Public and Private.
Germany 91,287,043.00 Haikwan taels
Austria - Hungary 3,979,520.00 " "
Belgium 8,607,750.00 " "
Spain 388,055.22 " "
United States 34,072,500.00 " "
France 75,779,250.00 " "
Great Britain 51,664,029.00 " "
1 For. Eel.
,
1901, p. 5.
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Italy 27,113,927.00 Haikwan taels
Japan 35,577,577.00 " "
metherlands 800,000.00 " "
Russia 153 ,516,000.00 " "
Total 462,538,116.22-^ " "
Rockhill's Report, p. 225. These claims were slightly revised
so that the final amount demanded was 450,000,000 taels.
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Chapter VII Precautionary Measures against Future Oufbreaks .
I Fortification of the Legation Quarter at Peking.
As a precautionary measure in case of any similar out-
breaks in the future the joint note provided for the "right for
each power to maintain a permanent guard for its legation and to
put the legation quarters in a defensive condition. Chinese
shall not have the right to reside in this quarter".
In commenting on this provision the Chinese plenipoten-
tiaries asked that a definite plan "be drawn up denoting the
boundaries of the legation quarters, the number of men to be sta-
tioned therein and providing minute regulations for keeping the
guards under control.'^
At the request of the diplomatic corps, a commission of
military officers, composed of one member from each of the mili-
tary forcesconsidered plans for the carrying out of this provi-
sion and it presented, February 16th, an elaborate report laying
out the area, specifying a system of defense, etc. It declared
that it was essential to begin the defense as soon as possible
in order to get the work well advanced before the return of the
Chinese Government and completed before the rainy season. The
diplomatic corps took no immediate action on the report. Mr.
Conger said it provided for a "veritable fortress" in the midst
of the city. He thought the area too large a^id the expense that
would be involved avd the distruction of private property unnec-
essary. In his judgment all that was needed was to keep in view,
^ Rockhill's Report, p. 67.
^ " " pp. 84, 85, 86.
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when locating and enlarging the legations, the possibility of
attack and to place them so as to make defense as easy as possihle
in case the necessity should even arise. As the legations in Pe-
king were not the only foreign interests in China that might he
attacked and as it would he impossible to provide defenses or even
guards for every community he thought the surest way of protecting
all foreigners was to require the most stringent guarantees for
the future and to insist on their being carried out rigidly every-
where. Moreover the work need not be done immediately as some
time would have to elapse before the foreign troops were withdrawn
from the provinces and in the meantime the Chinese Government might
return and show its ability to preserve order when defense would
not be necessary but in any case work need not be begun while the
troops were in the province.'^
On the 24th of February the diplomatic corps decided
upon the boundaries of the area which they deemed necessary for
the diplomatic q\iarter , the Chinese government having agreed
in principle to concede one for that purpose. The demands v/ere
based on the report of the commission. It was felt that they
were subject to some slight modification if they met with too
strenuous objections on the part of the Chinese plenipotentiaries.
Mr. Rockhill who had taken charge of the negotiations for the
United States at this time declared that the area allotted to this
government was in every way inadequate and he would only agree to
demand such an area on the understanding that later on the pro-
positions of the United States to make in Peking an international
concession and put the city on the footing of a treaty port, would
^ Rockhill 's Report, p. 8S-83.
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be considered. Some protest was made against the seizure by some
of the governments of the property of Sir Robert Hart and the
Foreign Maritime Customs. The property could not well be re-
turned but another tract was to be given the customs in lieu
thereof,'^
At the meeting March 2nd the Flatter was discussed and
referred to the various governments for instructions. From a
political standpoint the carrying out of the elaborate plan pro-
vided for by the report seemed to Mr. ^ockhill and some of the
other ministers to be of very doubtful expediency if cordial re-
lations were to be established with the Chinese (Government.
Although by the provision of the Joint Eote the powers had ac-
quired the right to make the diplomatic quarter defensible and
to hold, with military force, the lines of communication with
the sea, he thought the representatives should confine themselves
to letting the Chinese knov/ that these rights would only be ex-
ercised as far as conditions might require and the extent of the
defensive measures must always depend on the spirit animating the
Chinese Goverrjnent and people. Moreover, the plans submitted
were entirely dependent on an assured permanent garrison at
Peking of £,000 men. The British miinister believed this number
to be excessive. Mr. Rockhill informed the diplomatic corps
that the United States would not agree to enter into any scheme
of permanent occupation and in fact could not without legisla-
tive action. He stated that the United States reservedabsolute
liberty of action not only as to the number of the guard she might
1 Rockhill 's Report, pp. 95, 94.
2 British State Papers, China Eo. 1 fl902) p. 21.
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keep there but even to keeping any guard there at all. The gen-
eral sentiment of the conference was that only such measures of
defense should be taken at this time as were unobtrusive"^
The determination of the new legation quarter involved
the question of the titles to the property held. Immediately
after the raising of the seige a number of foreigners at once
began taking possession of and trying to purchase much of the
burned and abandoned property where the future legation quarters
would necessarily be located. Peking v/as not a treaty port where
foreigners could purchase land at will but it was nevertheless
aprarent th:jt if this was not stopped the entire property that
had been burned would be taken and no opportunity left for the
necessary extension of the legations. In order to prevent this
the ministers passed resolutions Hovember 6th, 1900, that "The
diplomatic body agrees that no purchase of ground from the Chinese
since the commencement of the seige in the quarter occupied by
the legations will be of any value, without the consent of the
foreign representatives". This resolution, Mr. Conger said, was
a restriction or qualification of private ownership and the right
of alienation, which during the military occupation the dominant
powers had a right to exercise and no transfers within the time
designated could be valid as against the powers represented there.
The restriction was authorized by public law and was necessary
to prevent the ftcquisition of the property needed by private in-
dividuals for speculative or other purposes. It did not repre-
sent the forcible acquisition of property for legation purposes
^ Rockhill's Report, p. 97.
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but was a precautionary measure against tlie vesting of intermed-
iate rights. It did not therefore conflict with the policy of
the United States to make just compensation for property taken
for public use."'-
A notice was issued February IE, 1901, to the foreign
land owners in Peking that the representatives had decided to or-
ganize the legation quarter so they were requested to make this
representative acquainted with the titles and references relating
to their property in these limits. The only proprietors who
would be considered in legal possession were those who acquired
title before June 20, 1900.^
A pla.n of the area which the representatives had agreed
upon was sent to the Chinese plenipotentiaries on March 1st and
two weeks later they were informed that the representatives had
resolved to ask the Chinese Government to indemnify all the Chin-
ese property owners whose expulsion from the diplomatic quarter
was decided upon. To that end they had named a committee charged
with making an inquiry into the validity of property titles and
the value of ground. The Chinese were asked to designate a dele-
gate to ask with the committee in order that Chinese interests
might be fully guaranteed.^
The Chinese plenipotentiaries remonstrated against the
view that their government should pay the indemnity for the land
taken. They thought this ought to be done by the powers on the
principle "that he who takes land for his own use must pay for
the same and he who calls on others to remove their dwellings must
make good the cost of their removal". Reimbursement should, they
held, be made by the legati ons concerned and they asked for an
1 Rockhill's Rep. p. 97. ^ Ibid! 98, ^ Ibir*238.
i!
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acknowledgement of this principle.-'-
The dean of the diplomatic corps replied that in view
of the recent events the assertion that the pulling down and dis-
truction of the buildings in the diplomatic quarter was unfounded.
It was the work of Boxers and regulars and of "^he Chinese Govern-
ment declared responsihle for these events by the powers and
which recognized itself as liable in accepting their conditions.
It was the duty of the Chinese Government to supply to the diplo-
matic agents the means of defense rendered necessary by her fail-
ure to keep her just obligations. Among these means of defense
of primary importance was the removal of the houses which served
as a place of refuge to those attacking the legations and the
walls of which shielded their attacks from the representatives
of the powers. Therefore, China should pay their irideirnifica-
tion and the diplomatic corps insisted on the demand.^
The matter seemed likely to give a good deal of trouble
but the Chinese finally, March £3rd, agreed in principle to indem-
nify those whose land was taken though they renewed their protest
saying that according to international law "war is an act between
two nations in which the populations were not concerned; that the
victorious government has a right to seize public property but no
the right of seizing private property; that nevertheless the vic-
torious country can occupy for its use private property but natur
ally on the condition to pay the value of it to the former owner"
I.ockhill's Report, p. 238
"
, pp. 238. 239
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Also they declared that "by Article TII of the joint note it was
only stipulated the right for each power to establish a gnard and
to put in a state of defense the diplomatic quarter and it was
not stated that it was possible to extend it at will or that they
could encroach, according to their convenience, on the property
of others. For these reasons other property taken should be paid
for by the powers although as has been noted they reluctantly
agreed to assume the payment.^
Mr.de Cologan, dean of the diplomatic corps, in reply
noted the practical acceptance of the demand made and in regard to
the protest of the Chinese plenipotentiaries he remarked that it
was not by right of conquest that the ministers sei^ied private
property but because it was indispensible for the future defense
and because they were used as refuge by the Boxers in the seige.
As to the distinction between the seizure of public and private
property in case of war he called the attention of the Chinese
representatives to the fact that a state of war never had existed
between China and the powers "What happened was an attempted g-en-
eral massacre of foreigners by Boxers and regulars obeying orders
from the Imperial palace". He repeated the fact that China had
admitted its liability and declared itself ready to grant repara-
tion and guarantee. The protest against meeting this expense
2
was unfounded. The Chinese appointed two representatives to
the committee for adjusting the matter and also instructed sever-
al of the local officials to act with them.^
1 Rockhill's Report, pp. E39 , E40.
2 Rockhill's Report, p. 240.
^ Rockhill's Report, p. 241.
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Toward the end of March the diplomatic corps took up
the discussion of a set of police regulations for the diplomatic
quarter. It contemplated the organization of an international
police and a number of other measures which Mr. Rockhill thought
most impractical under existing conditions and he proposed that
the section of the city which was ceded be called an internation-
al settlement and be organized in some form of municipal govern-
ment. Otherwise he could not agree to such regulations as were
proposed. No action however, was taken on this point.
In a report presented April 6th the Field Marshall Count
von Waldersen enumerated the forces that each power should leave
in Peking. Germany, France, Russia and Japan should furnish 300
men each, c^reat Britain 250, Italy, Austria Hungary, 200, and
the United States 150; making a total of 2000,^ a force which
appeared to the ministers to be very large. The French, Russian
and Austrian ministers expressed the belief that it was not pro-
bable that the Count would return with so large a force in the
city and the general sentiment appeared to be that the number of
guards should be reduced as soon as possible. There was a
strong desire among many of the ministers to present any one
nation having a larger guard than another. The German minister
thought that if one of the powers would withdraw its guard another
should have the right of bringing up the total of the garrison
to the regular number but this view found no support.
^
iRockhill's Report, pp. 112, 113
^Rockhill 's Report, p. 136.
^Rockhill's Report, p. 139.
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The presence of some of the most important of the Chinese
public buildings in the area marked out for the legations raised
some little controversy. In the note sent the Chinese plenipo-
tentiaries March 1st they were requested to see that these build-
ings be removed. The Chinese protested against their removal
as their arrangment had existed for some five hundred years and
after some correspondence and discussion of the matter a compro-
mise was reached and some of the public buildings excluded from
the area.
II Military occupation of Certain Points Between
Peking and the Sea .
By Article IX of the preliminary note, the powers were
given the "right of military occupation of certain points to be
determined by an understanding between the powers for keeping
open communication between the capital and the sea".
In the note submitted to the diplomatic corps by the
Chinese plenipotentiaries they asked for specific information in
regard to the points to be occupied and the number of soldiers
to be stationed at these points. They suggested that "the powers
should fratne up regulations for keeping the troops under control
so that no cause for alarm be afforded to the inhabitants in the
country round about. Such troops shall be sent solely for the
protection of foreign officials and merchants, they will have
nothing whatever to do with Chinese territory or Chinese trav-
ellers". They also said that "the Chinese Government will con-
tinue to take every precaution to insure the protection of for-
eigners, and on no account furnish them with cause to apprehend
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the severing of communications between the capital and the sea.
If after the lapse of a year or so, and a review of the circum-
stances of the case the powers have found that China's protection
has proved effectual, the question of withdrawing the foreign
troops of occupation shall be considered"
The clause was taken up by the diplomatic corps Ilarch
E9th. It was then proposed by the German minister that the mil-
itary commanders at Peking be requested to prepare a joint report
on the measures to be adopted for carrying out this article to-
gether with Article VIII. iline of the representatives had been
instructed by their Governments to favor a conference of the
military representatives of only such powers as were prepared to
take part with their forces in the measures adopted, but the
Russian and Austro-Kungarian ministers together with the American
representative declared that their Governments as signatories of
the Joint Note considered that they had the right to take part
in the discussion of these questions which had an important poli-
tical side and it was therefore decided to invite all the mili-
tary commanders at Peking to bring about such a conference at an
p
early date.^
The British minister considered the matter in some re-
spects much as the Chinese plenipotentiaries viewed it. Saying
in a memorandiim presented to his colleagues April 4th: "It seems
desirable that the local, judicial, civil and police administra-
tion at these points as well as elsewhere should be handed back
to the Chinese authorities notwithstanding the military occupa-
tion which should be limited to the performance of garrison
1 Rockhill's Report, p. 68. ^ Rockhill's Report, p. 120.
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duties" ,1
A meeting of the military officers commanding contin-
gents at Peking was held April 6th to consider the necessary
measures for the execution of the Articles VIII and IX, and re-
ported in regard to the latter article that all the officers were
unanimous in recognizing the necessity of maintaining permanently
a strong garrison at Tientsin and Shanhaikwan-Ghin-vVang-tao the
garrison of the former being fixed at 2,000 and of the latter at
1,500 men. Tientsin would be garrisoned by Germany, France,
Great Britain, Italy and Japan and these same powers with the
exception of Italy, and the addition of Russia, were to provide
troops for Shanhaikwan. Austria-Hungary would only leave small
guards at these points. It was also decided that permanent gar-
risons should be arranged for at various points along the rail-
way, Peking, Taku, Shanhaikwan, to secure free communication
between the capital and the sea. These points were Hwang-tsun,
Lang- fang, Yangtsun, Ghun-liang-cheng, Tongku, Lutsi, Tongshan
and Changli,each to be occupied by 300 men including 50 mounted
men, a few machine guns to be left at each. The distribution
of these garrisons at the various contingents was arranged after
consultation as follows, Italy to occupy Hwan-tsun; Germany,
Lang- fang and Yang-tsun; France, Chung- liang-oheng and Tongku;
Great Britain, Lutai and Tongshan; Japan, Lanchow and Changli.
The Russian general expressed the view that the occupation of
some of these points was unnecessary. The quartering of the
troops in the various garrisons was to be undertaken by the con-
tingent concerned. Each garrison would be responsible for the
1 Rockhill's Report, p. 126.
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railway line to half way to the next garrison on eaoh side of it.
As long as the railway remained under military control the railway
stations would remain occupied by British police guards. Each pow-
er would have the right of leaving small lines of communication de-
tachments at important points such as Tongku.-^
The number of troops at this time occupying these points
was greatly in excess of the numbers outlined for permanent occupa-
tion and it was not thought that the number could be reduced at oncd
particularly at Tientsin where 6,000 men 7/ere to be left for a time
and at Shanhaikwan. These troops were apportioned among the pow-
ers by the commanders of the contingents of the allied troops. The
Russian military agent declared the reservation of his government
of having as Russia's quotia at Shanhaikwan as large a number of
troops as she might "deem necessary to discharge the duties devolv-
ing upon her". The definite allottment of land, forts and build-
ings at the place were made by an international committee who met
June 3 at the order of the Field Marshall, Count von V/aldersee.
The question of jurisdiction of the military posts to be
established along the railway line was considered at a conference
of the commanders-in-chief of the contingents held at Tientsin,
July 16. It was stated that the jurisdiction of the commanders of
posts only crimes or misdemeanors committed by Chinese against the
railway, the telegraphic communications or the persons and goods of
soldiers of the allied troops. It belonged to the contingents to
determine themselves their judicial action for the suppression of
these crimes or misdemeanors by applying their respective mili-
tary laws. The action of the contingents being only of a
purely military object should not be exercised against the Chin-
ese injuring other Chinese as these come exclusively
Rockhill's Report, pp. 135, 136.
Rockhill's Report, pp. 163, 249,
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sively under native ji^ris diet ion.
The conclusions that were reached in regard to the jur-
isdiction to be exercised at these points were stated by Mr. de
Cologan, dean of the diplomatic corps, in a note to the Chinese
plenipotentiaries August 2 as follows:
"So far as Chinese subjects are concerned, the juris-
diction of the conmanders of the military posts situated on the
Peking - Shanhaikwan Railway will be confined to crimes and of-
fences committed by Chinese affecting the railway or the tele-
graphic communications or the persons and property of soldiers of
the allied forces. It will be exercised over the territory along
the line to the extent of 2 miles on either side, and in the case
of persons surprised in the act of committing offenses against
the railway or the telegraph lines or against the persons or pro-
perty of soldiers of the allied forces, pursuit can be continued
beyond those limits wherever necessaiy. But with the exception
of persons surprised in flagrant delicto, the search, pursuit and
arrest of offenders outside the 2 mile limit, and handing them
over to the foreign military authorities will be exercised by the
Chinese authorities".^ At the same time the Chinese were in-
formed of the points which the representatives had decided should
be held in accordance with the report of thekilitary commanders
and an enumeration of them was given in the Final Protocol.^
1 Rockhill's Report, pp. 285, 286, 287.
2 Rockhill's Report, p. 294.
3 Rockhills Report, p. 316.
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III The Dlstructlon of the Taku Forts .
Among the measures embodied in the French plans for set-
tlement of the difficulty proposed October 4, 1900, was the pro-
vision for the dismantling of the forts at Taku.-^ In the subse-
quent preliminary negotiations Mr. Conger was instructed to en-
deavor to have the forts disarmed instead of destroyed but he did
not find it feasible to press the point before the submission of
the Joint Note and it was then stated that "The Taku and other
forts, v^ftiich might impede free communication between Peking and
the sea shall be razed".
At the meeting of the diplomatic corps held March 29, it
was decided to ask the military commanders to hold a conference
to consider the measures vYhich should be adopted for the carrying
out this and the ninth article of the Joint Note. As has been
stated in considering the ninth article of the Joint Rote the
German minister had proposed that this conference be limited to
those powers that were prepared to take a part in these measures
but on the protest of the Russian, Austro-Hungarian ministers
and the American representative it was decided to include all the
2Signatory powers.
The military commanders presented this report April 6,
1901. ^t the conference General Chaffee had declared that the
dismantlement of the fortifications would be a satisfactory com-
pliance with the article to the United States, but, by an error,
the report said that by the "unanimous decision" the razing of
of the following forts was decided upon: fl) the military camp at
1 Rockhill's Report, p. 27.
^ Rockhill's Report, p. 120.
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the south exit from Yangtsun; (2) the military magazine of Silni,
Tientsin; (5) the yellow fort Tientsin; (4) the black fort (cita-
del) Tientsin; (5) the east arsenal Tientsin; (6) the two camps at
Chun- liang- Cheng; (7) the four camps at Hsinho; (8) all the forti-
fications at Taku, viz.: on the right "bank of the Peiho, the coast
battery with the camp attached to it, and the south fort of Taku
with its camp, and on the left bank, the north west and north
forts; (9) all the fortifications at Peitang, viz.: the south fort,
the central and north forts, the two earthworks to the north of
these and the camps between the lines of the forts and the rail-
way; flO) all the camps at Lutai within a distance of 2,000 meters
of the railway embankment; fll) the camps between Tangho and Shan-
haikwan, within a distance of 2,000 meters of the railway.-^
Mr. Rockhill reported that these conclusions met with
the objection of the Japanese minister who thought that the terms
of the note only provided for razing "forts" whereas the com-
mission recommended that a number of other works, camps, arsenals,
etc., be also destroyed. Mr. Rockhill agreed with the Japanese
minister and availed himself of the opportunitj?- to urge the views
of the United States that dismantlement of the forts seemed bet-
ter than the razing of them, in view of the fact that military
occupation by foreign forces of this part of China being only
temporary the Chinese after its cessation would be deprived of
necessary means of defense against an enemy; that as long as the
foreign forces were there, they could either occupy these posi-
tions, or see that they were not occupied by the Chinese.
2
^ Rockhill 's Report, p. 135.
2 Rockhill' s Report, p. 132.
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These views seemed to find little support among the other repre-
sentatives and the Chinese plenipotentiaries were informed July
28th that the destruction of the forts mentioned above was de-
sanded.
1
A conference of the military commanders at Tientsin
held the 16th of April considered plans for the destruction of
these forts and recommended that the work should he done at the
expense of the Chinese Government who should supply and pay the lab-
orers necessary. This work should be carried out without delay
and under the direction of a technical commission composed of of-
ficers designated for that purpose by the commanders of the allied
forces. The work which lay within the territory of the provis-
ional government of Tientsin should be carried out under its di-
rection and supervision. These stipulations were made when the
lists of forts was presented to the Chinese plenipotentiaries and
they were asked to appoint a delegate to serve on the commission
for carrying out the work.
IV Prohibition of the Importation of Arms .
The fact has already been mentioned that when the Chin-
ese Grovernment assumed an anti- foreign tone in 1898 one of the
first things undertaken was the extensive importation and manu-
facture of munitions of war. When the Boxer uprising was at its
height the Great Britain Government by proclamation of August 7
and some of the other powers by similar action, declared that the
exportation of arms and ammunition to China was prohibited.-^
1 Rockhill's Report, p. E93. ^ Rockhill's Rep., pp. 286, 287, 29
^ For. Rel. 1900, p. 352.
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Early in the negotiations, it was suggested that this prohibition
"be maintained and such a provision was embodied in Article V of
the Joint lote as follows: "Maintenance under conditions to be
settled between the powers, of the prohibition of the importation
of arms as well as of materials used exclusively for the manufac-
turing of arms and ammunition". The Chinese plenipotentiaries
protested against this prohibition on the grounds that in the
interior of China local banditti were to be found everywhere car-
rying firearms and weapons mostly clandestinely imported from
abroad. Unless the Chinese soldiers told off to hold them in
check were armed with efficient weapons, it would be difficult to
maintain order; and should these banditti create disturbances and
make trouble, traders and othersChinese or foreign, could hardlj?-
avoid being injured thereby. They suggested that material for
the manufacture of munitions of war consist of many different
kinds and as far as the materials which were indispensible for
governmental use were concerned the Tsungli Yamen ought, on giv-
ing notice in writing, to be permitted to purchase the same as oc-
casion required?" (These were stated by the war department to be
brass, copper, tin, nitre, lead, charcoal, guncotton, sulphur,
alcohol, nitroglycerine, sulphuric acid, nitric acid, picric
acid, mercuric fulminate, raw cotton, steel tubes and hoops forged
and oil tempered.
f
The extreme difficulty of enforcing such a prohibition
was clearly evident and Russia was the only power that seemed an-
xious to carry it out stringently.^ A commission consisting of
1 Rockhill's Report, p. 67. ^ Rockhill's Report, p. 103.
2 Rockhill's Report, p. 365.
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the Russian and British ministers and the Amerioan representative
drew up a report on the suhjeot and suhmitted it to the diplo-
matic corps March 12th. The commissioners believed that as the
carrying out of this article depended more on the powers than on
China, all the powers having treaties with China should reach an
agreement "between themselves to maintaining their domains the
prohibition of the exportation of these articles to China, When
the list of the objects should have been agreed to by common con-
sent by the Governments the representatives of the powers at Pe-
king should take the necessary measures to preclude the possibil-
ity of their fraudulent entry. These measures it was maintained
could only be efficacious if the authorities intrusted with car-
rying them out were given the right of seizure and of confisca-
tion of the contraband articles of the ships taken "flagrante
delicto" on arriving in China with contraband on board or unload-
ing it either in an open port or on the coast. The commission
thought these authorities should be the Maritime Customs, the
consular body and the commanders of ships of war. The report
also stipulated that the countries conterminous with China should
adopt, on their part, the measures necessary for the interdiction
of the importation of arms, ammunition, etc., by land routes,
and that an Imperial edict should be issued prohibiting the
importation of these articles. The term for the maintenance of
this inhibition was recommended to be five years with privilege
of extension.^
This report was referred to the various governments.
1 Rockhill's Report, pp. 130, 131.
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As Mr. Rockhill says it simply embodied the views of the foreign
representatives as to the measures they deemed indispensible to
be taken if the powers should agree to prevent the introduction
of arms into China. That they would come to such an agreement
was not believed probable as the recommendations conflicted with
certain important principles of International law in regard to
the right of search"^ and any agreement between the powers in re-
gard to the matter would have presented the same difficulties as
were experienced in thecase of the African Slave trade.
The report of the commission provided for the enforce-
ment of the prohibition for renewable terms of five years. The
Japanese and Belgium ministers were in favor of a term of two
years, contending that it was possible that within the first
such term conditions might make it unnecessary to longer prohibit
the importation of arms. The Russian minister, on the other
hand, wanted the term fixed at ten years. ^ The matter 7;as taken
up at the meetings held July 18th and 26th and practically all
the powers with the exception of Russia declared in favor of the
shorter term. The British government instructed her minister tha'i
the scheme suggested by the diplomatic corps was considered dif-
ficult of execution and that it was contingent on legislation by
the various powers and that the Chinese Government could prohib-
it all importation of such articles and the maritime customs could
be intrusted with its enforcement. The Russian minister thought
there were grave inconveniences in intrusting the prohibition to
^ Rockhill 's Report, p. 111.
2 Lawrence - International Law, pp. 214-219.
^ Rockhill 's Report, p. 111.
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China herself and did not consider the scheme submitted to the
diplomatic corps by the commission to be too rigorous.-^ Russia
was alone in this position, however, and in view of the impossi-
bility of devising a practical scheme for enforcing this stipula-
tion, it was finally decided to ask the Chinese Government to
take the necessary measures itself to attain the desired end,
and on August 6th a note was sent to the Chinese plenipotentiaries
asking them to solicit the signing of an Imperial edict prohib-
iting for the term of two years the importation of arms a^d ammun-
ition, etc. They were told that in fixing the term at two years
the representatives wished to make it clear that at the expira-
tion of that time new Imperial edicts renewing for like terms the
2
prohibition should be promulgated if the powers requested it.
In accordance with this request an edict was issued
August 26th but parts of it were considered unsatisfactory by the
diplomatic corps and these were struck out and the edict read as
appended to the Final Protocol. "V/e comnand all Tartar gener-
als, governor-generals, and governors of provinces and also the
customs taotais to prohibit in the first place for a period of
two years the importation of arms and materials used exclusively
in their manufacture and brought from abroad",'^
X Imperial Edict declaring the Responsibility of Local Officials *
As a further means of preventing future trouble the pro-
vision was inserted in the Joint Note at the suggestion of Mr.
Conger that an Imperial decree should be issued and published
1 Rockhill's Report, pp. 277, 278, 284.
2 RockhiLL's Report, p. 297. 3 Rockhill's Report, p. 304.
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everywhere in the Empire declaring that all governors-general,
governors and provincial or local officials should he responsible
for order in their respective jurisdictions and that whenever
fresh anti- foreign disturhances or any other treaty infractions
should occur which were not forthwith suppressed and the guilty
persons punie-hed, they, the said officials should he iminediately
removed and forever prohibited from holding any office or honors.
This stipulation was complied with February 1st by the
issuance of such an edict as was outlined."^
YI Imperial Edict Prohibiting Membership in Secret Societies .
In accordance with the demands made by the representa-
tives in the Joint Kote another edict was issued February 1st
and published throughout the Empire prohibiting on pain of death
2
membership in any anti- foreign society.
Rockhill's Report, pp. 332, 333.
Rockhill's Report, pp. 331, 332.
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Chapter YIII Betterment of International Relations wi th China ,
I Diplomatic Relations.
The difficulties which have attended diplomatic rela-
tions with China have been due to a considerable extent to the
organization of the Chinese Foreign office, the Tsungli Yamen
which had been regarded as the lowest of the various governmental
bonds and to the forms of the court ceremonial which did not
recognize the equality of other nations. This opportunity was,
therefore, taken to secure a revision of these and a stipulation
was inserted in the preliminary demands to that effect,
^A"^ RefoJ^ in ^ reign Office .
A report on this subject v/as prepared by Mr. Rockhill
in conjunctionwith the Japanese minister. They recoFimended in
regard to the reform of the Office of Foreign Affairs, that in or-
der to put this bureau in a better condition to promptly and re-
gularly transact its business, there should be placed in it a
small number of personages of high rank and unquestionable influ-
ence with the central government. To them should be intrusted
by the Emperor the exclusive conduct of direct relations v/ith the
foreign representatives. These personages should be directly
responsible to the Emperor for their actions and consequently
be members of the cabinet of the Emperor, or have free access to
him as a result of their high station in the state. The commis-
sion consequently recomrended that at the head of the Office of
Foreign Affairs there should be a Prince with the title President
of the Office of Foreign Affairs. As the Prince President would
probably be unable to devote all his time to the duties of the
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Office of Foreign Affairs there should he under him two minis-
ters members of the cabinet of the Emperor who could take his
place in case of absence, and v;ho would have the necessary author-
ity to transact all current business. These three high officials
only would carry on direct relations with the representatives
of the powers and receive the foreign ministers for that purpose
either singly or collectively.
The United States had repeatedly urged that the minis-
ter of foreign affairs should be required to speak a foreign lan-
guage, but it was found to be impractical to make such a demand
as the officials who were otherwise best fitted for this posi-
tion did not possess this qualification. The commission recom-
mended, however, that there should be in the office of Foreign
Affairs t7/o vice-ministers who from their personal experience
would be able to place the administration of the office in greater
harmony with the methods obtaining abroad. One of them should
knovi^ a foreign language.-^
The report was discussed March 24 and was adopted with-
out importtmt irodification except that all the ministers except
the Japanese minister and Mr. Rockhill wished the name of the
Foreign Office changed.^ These modifications were suggested to
the Chinese plenipotentiaries by the dean of the diplomatic corps
April 22nd. In regard to the name Mr. de Cologen said: "The
name of 'Tsungli Yamen' which recalls such unfortunate remem-
brances and v/hich does not indicate sufficiently the im.portance
and authority of the power to v/hich belongs, under the responsi-
1 Rockhill's Report, pp. 121, 122.
^ Rockhill's Report, p. 120.
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bility and orders of the sovereign, the highest functions of the
State is done away with. It shall be replaced, injvirtue of an
Imperial decree by that of 'Wai-wu-Fu' , f suggested by Li Hung
Chung) ^ and in the official order of precedence the Wai-wu-Pu
p
shall pass before the six Boards or Ministries. "
An Imperial decree embodying these provisions was issued
on the E4th of July.^
^6^0™ 2Jl Court Ceremonial .
The report of the same commission in regard to the mod-
ification of the court ceremonial was also accepted without sub-
stantial change and at the Fieeting of the diplomatic corps of
March 29 and the wishes of that body in the matter were conveyed
to the Chinese plenipotentiaries by a note on the 17th of
April. These were stipulated as follows: "The solemn audi-
ances given by the Emperor to the diplomatic corps shall take
place in the T'ai-ho Tien. Those given to one of the representa-
tives of the powers shall take place in the Chien-ching Kung.
ViThen a diplomatic agent shall present his letters of credence or
a communication from the head of the state by whom he is accred-
ited, the Emperor shall send him an Imperial sedan chair and an
escort of honor, which shall take him at his residence and conduct
him with his suite to the palace, where he shall be received.
He shall be reconducted with the same ceremonial. In going to
these audiances the diplomatic agent shall pass through the cen-
tral doors until he has handed in his letters of credence or his
British State Papers, China No. 1 (1902) pp. 122, 123.
2 Rockhill's Report, p. 273, 3 pockhill's Report, pp. 337, 338
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coiranunication. In going away he shall comply vrith the usage,
already established. The Smperor shall receive directly into
his hands the letters or the comrrunicat ion which the diploniatic
agents shall have to give to him. In going to solemn audiences
the representatives of the powers shall be carried in their chairs
to a place in front of the hall in which they are to be received
by the Emperor. They shall again take their chairs at the spot,
at whi h they previously left them. The Emperor shall be present
in person at the banquets, which he may offer to the diplomatic
corps, as he used to do before the events of last year and these
banquest shall take place in the Chien-ching Kung"
.
In presenting these demands it was declared in a general
way that the court ceremonial relating to the reception of the
Representatives should be in harmony with the usages established
between independent and equal nations and the representatives
asked that the details concerning the settlement of this question
be incorporated in protocol drawn up between them and the Chinese
plenipotentiaries."^
The Chinese plenipotentiaries replied April 29th rais-
ing some objections to some of these stipulations. They declared
it inconvenient to hold audiences granted to foreign representa-
tives in the T'ai-ho Tien as this throne hall was used by the
Emperor on the occasion of great celebrations and the elaborate
ceremony of New Year's day. The etiquette involved in its use
was very strict and it was not adapted to the purpose suggested.
They asked that another hall be designated for the audiences.
Rockhill's Report, p. 1E2.
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They said in regard to sending an Imperial sedan chair for the
representative, who should wish to present hia letters of cre-
dence that it was not convenient to send the chair the Emperor
used. They would prepare a sedan chair such as used by the high
officials of the first rank to be sent for the minister. As to
the question that foreign representatives should be taken to the
steps of the audience hall and should be taken back therefrom
it was pointed out that this was a privilege which had never been
granted to the princes, dukes, ministers of state or even to Prince
Kung the uncle and Prince Chien, father of the Emperor. All
these officials alighted from their chairs before the various
gates on entering the Forbidden City. The representatives should
not insist on this point. They also noted the fact which per-
haps had not been clearly, put in the statement of the demands that
the giving of banquets by the Emperor was a purely optional mat-
ter.
^
The diplomatic corps decided to concede the holding of
solemn audiences in the T'ai-ho Tien and informed the Chinese
plenipotentiaries that all audiences might be satisfactorily held
in the Chien- ching Kung, As to the Imperial sedan chair to be
sent for the representative it was unoerstood that it should be
a sedan chair of the Imperial color similar to those used by the
Emperor, The representatives insisted, however, in their pre-
vious demands as to the place where they should alight from their
chairs where they were to be admitted into Imperial audiences.
^
Rockhill's Report, p. 161.
Rockhill's Report, p. 163.
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The Chinese renewed their objections stating that the Emperor
was the only personage in China using the sedan chair covered
with yellow. The Princes, Dukes, and Ministers of x3tate all
used chairs covered with green cloth and it was held that these
would be suitable for the foreign representatives. They again
gave their views in regard to the place where the foreign repre-
sentatives should alight and take their chairs.
The diplomatic corps at first insisted on the demands
made but finally, July 18th, it was decided to accept the pro-
posals made by the Chinese plenipotentiaries in regard to this
latter point. The final arrangement was that, in going to or
coming from the Imperial audiences the representatives should
be carried in their sedan chairs as far as outside of the Ghing-
yun gate. At this gate they would get out of the sedan chair
in which they had come and would be carried in a little chair
fi chiao) as far as the foot of the steps of the Ch' ien-ch' ing
gate. On arriving here the representatives should get out of
their chairs and proceed on foot into the presence of His Iv'aj-
esty in the Ch'ien-ching Kung hall."^
The Chinese plenipotentiaries expressed their appre-
ciation of this concession and the discussion was thus brought
to an end,
II Commercial Relations .
In as much as the diplomatic relations between the
powers and China have always been almost exclusively concerned
with commercial questions any improvement in the commercial re-
^ Rockhill's Report, pp. 280, 281.
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lations which might "be "brought about in the course of the negotia-
tions would he of great importance.
In a note submitted early in the negotiations the Chin-
ese plenipotentiaries said: "As to future trade and general inter-
national relations, each power should designate how these matters
should be dealt with - whether the old treaties shall continue
or new conventions be made slightly adding to the old treaties or
canceling the old treaties and negotiating new ones. Any of
these plans may be adopted and when China has approved farther
special regulations can be made in each case as required"."^
The United States was anxious that Peking be put on the
footing of a treaty port but though the question was discussed
it was thought best that it should be deferred until after the
presentation of the preliminary demands.^' The eleventh section
of the joint note therefore simply read "The Chinese Goverriment
will undertake to negotiate the amendments to the treaties of
comirerce and navigation, considered useful by the powers and upon
other subjects connected with commercial relations with the object
of facilitating them". In commenting on this demand the Chin-
ese representatives said, "Any amendments which the powers may
consider useful are naturally put forward with a view to promot-
ing their own interests and those of China in equal measure. To
propose such as wouldcurtail China's privileges .injuriously af-
fect the means of livelihood of the traders, or decrease her cus-
toms revenue would certainly not be the desire of the powers.
For. Rel. 1900, p. 213.
Rockhill's Report, p. 48.
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China must naturally therefore, undertake to regulate any amend-
ments with respect to eomnercial or any other matters which will
tend to secure mutual advantages".-^
In reply to an inquiry made by one of the viceroys
as to the commercial privileges desired Mr. ^^ockhill stated that
the United States strongly urged as among the most important meas-
ures for trade, abolition of liken on imports and exports includ-
ing transit pass duty; right of foreigners to reside and do bus-
iness throughout the Empire; revision of inland navigation rules;
creation of a mining bureau and good regulations; strict adher-
ence to principle of equal opportunities to people of every
nationality. Also that Peking be put on the footing of a treaty
port and that measures be agreed to for improving the water
approaches to Shanghai, Tientsin and Eiuchwang.
The United States was almost alone in the view that the
negotiations afforded a good opportunity to gain China's agree-
ment to these measures. As Mr. Rockhill says, throughout the
negotiations the representatives of the powers deemed it advis-
able not to broach commercial questions, reserving their consider-
ation until after the final settlement of the other articles of t
the Joint Kote. The only exception made was the agreement in-
sisted on by Mr. Rockhill during the discussions concerning the
revenues, to be used by China in the payment of interest on the
indemnities, to ask of China, in consideration of the increase of
the tariff on imports to an effective 5 per cent, that the Chin-
ese Government should undertake the improvement of the waterways
1 Rockhill 's Report, p. 68.
2 Rockhill's Report, pp. 170, 171.
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leading to Shanghai and Tientsin and also revise the customs
tariff on imports. In general, however, the ministers were of
the opinion that any negotiations on commercial subjects would
have to be deferred until the next winter at least and many of
them thought that it would be quite impractical for all the pow-
ers to negotiate jointly on these subjects with the Chinese Gov-
ernment, most of them believing that if such a plan were adopted
the negotiations would be greatly protracted and probably no
practical results obtained. Most of the obstacles to trade of
which the foreign merchants complained were so intimately con-
nected with the question of inland taxation that unless some
m.ethod could be devised for either abolishing the inland tax or
regulating it more satisfactorily it seemed improbable that any
great results could be expected from a revision of commercial
treaties. Believing that if these questions were postponed for
future negotiations the same difficulties would be experienced
as had always accompanied the negotiation for comrercial advan-
tages in the past. Mr. Rockhill had advocated the raising the
tariff to 10 per cent with compensating commercial advantages,
but the attitude of the British minister in insisting on the
entire abolition of liken if this were done prevented its dis-
cussion.-^ The other measures which the United States urged
were also regarded as being of doubtful expediency or impracti-
cal. Among these was the throwing open of the whole of China
to foreign residence and trade and the provision that the prin-
ciple commercial powers should have advisory representation in
British State Papers, China IJo. 1 (190E) p. 67.
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the customs administration. The ministers believed, said Mr.
Rockhill, that the extraterritorial rights of foreigners would
create endless difficulties to China and the pov/ers if foreigners
of all classes were given a free run all over the Empire and that
there were difficulties of a political nature. In regard to
advisory representation in the customs administration, which the
United States desired, they held that it would be impossible to
exclude any of the powers from such representation and further
that the result of such an arrangement would be that which the
powers had been seeking to prevent, namely, direct international
interference in the financial administration of the Empire. All
the ministers approved in principle to the suggestion made by
Mr. Hay that the "forming of Chinese revenues should be restricted
if not wholly discontinued and an honest Imperial fiscal system
substitited" , but while they believed that it would be highly
advantageous to China as well as to foreign interests they thought
it must be the gradual outcome of the general reform of the
Empire. Owing to the views held by the ministers on this sub-
ject the ammendments to the treaties of commerce and navigation
which China had agreed to make were reserved for future negotia-
tions save for the enterprises referred to in connection with the
indemnity, that is the improvement of the courses Peiho and
Whangpu.-^
In regard to the Peiho, the works for improvement
which had been commenced in 1898 were resumed in June, 1901, by
an international committee. By the terms of the Final Protocol
1 Rockhill's Report, pp. 252, 253,
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the Chinese Government would he represented on this commission
as soon as the administration of Tientsin should he handed hack
to the Chinese Government. The Government agreed to pay each
year a sum of 60,000 Hailovan taels for maintaining the works.
^
The improvements of the course of the 77angpu as ar-
ranged for was to be under the management and control of a con-
servancy hoard created for that purpose. The hoard was to con-
sist of members representing the interests of the Chinese Govern-
ment and those of foreigners in the shipping trade of Shanghai.
The expenses incurred for the works and the general management
of the undertaking was estimated at the annual sum of 460,000
Haikv/an taels for the first twenty years. This sum was to be
supplied in equal portions by the Chinese Governraent and the
foreign interests concerned. Detailed stipulations concerning
the composition duties and revenues of the conservency board
were drawn up by a committee composed of the German, British and
French ministers and the United States representative and with
some slight modifications they were embodied in an annex to the
Final Protocol.^
A new commercial treaty between Great Britain and China
was entered into September 5, 190E. The most notable provi
sions were in regard to the abolition of liken (a surtax on
British goods being allowed on partial compensation) the opening
of new ports to foreign trade, the registration of trade marks
and the establishment of a uniform coinage throughoiit the Empire.
^ Rockhill's Report, pp. 257, 272, 317.
^ Rockhill's Report, p. 317.
British State Papers, China ^o. If 1902).
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Great Britain was also to aid in a reform of judicial procedure
and guaranteed to yield all extra-territorial rights as soon as
conditions would warrant it, Japan and the United States also
entered into treaties with China molded on and containing simi-
lar provisions to the English treaty. China acceded to the Jap-
anese treaty October 9, 1903, and the ratifications of the
treaty with the United States were exchanged January 13, 1904.-^
1 For. Rel. 1903, pp. 91 - 129.
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Chapter IX Conclusion.
The final treaty with China, as might well be expected
from the complexity of the situation which brought it forth, was
received with some little criticism. It was declared that it
should have secured a thorough reform of the commercial system,
but as the most needed reform - the abolition of the liken dues -
has since been accomplished by the treaty with Great Britain,"^
this criticism loses much of its force. The most serious charge
made against the settlement was that the indemnity was exorbi-
tant and that the military concessions imposed on China were too
severe. This criticism v/as well founded and the United States
by contesting these immoderate demands and in urging that the
future development of China should be first considered was de-
serving of, and received great credit.
The final treaty was signed September 7th, 1901, but
the Court did not make its return to Peking until January 7th,
1902, an event which was attended with great pomp and ceremony.
2
On January 22 the Emperor gave an audiance to the foreign repre-
sentatives which was especially noteworthy in that it was the
first occasion on which the Empress Dowager appeared in an audi-
ance to the ministers of foreign affairs.^
Most of the foreign troops had been withdrawn during
the summer but the evacuation of Tientsin and Shanghai, where
foreign garrisons had been left, was unreasonably delayed by the
powers. The Chinese government repeatedly asked for the with-
1 British State Papers, China Ho. 2. f 1902)
2 For. Relations, 1902, pp. 142-145.
3 t» M Tt „
pp. 205-208.
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drawal of the troops from Tientsin but various excuses were made
for non-compliance with the request, China requested the United
States to use her good offices in the matter^ and on January 29
Mr. Hay stated to the powers concerned the desire of the United
States for a speedy evacuation. ^ Finally on April 12, 1902 the
military representatives of the powers participating in the occu-
pation, namely, Germany, Great Britain, Russia, France, Japan,
Austria and Italy, met and drew up twenty-eight new conditions,
not contained in the treaty of 1901, which they held that China
should accede to before the restoration of the Tientsin govern-
ment could take place. Among these conditions was the stipula-
tion that China should bring no troops except a police guard of
2500 in Tientsin anywhere within a radius of 30 kilometers of the
city but that foreign troops might go and come at will, within
this zone.^ These demands were clearly unjustified and the Rus-
sian government decided to take no part in insisting upon any
4
conditions for the evacuation. The other powers modified the
demands to include only the steps thought necessary to secure the
carrying out of article^III and IX of the final protocol.^
These conditions were accepted by the Chinese government and the
evacuation was accomplished. The troops were not withdrawn from
Shanghai until November, 1902.^
1 For. Rel. 1902, p. 184.
2 For. Rel. 1902, p. 185.
^ For Rel. 1902
,
pp. 191-194,
^ For. Rel. 1902, p. 196.
5 For. Rel. 1902, pp. 198-200.
^ London Times, 1902. pp. 680, 595, 712, 744.
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In Manchuria also the withdrawal of the Russian troops
was not coincident with the signing of the final protocol. Rus-
sia's movements here were guided by her general Oriental policy
and she had no desire to lose the control she had gained OYsr
this province. In August, 1900, as soon as the Amur region had
been quieted the military commander issued a proclamation declar-
ing that it had become a part of Russian territory. Although
published in the Official Gazette, it was afterwards disclaimed
by Russia and all territorial designs disavowed.-^ During the
progress of the general negotiations, however, Russia endeavored
to secure a separate settlement of the Manchurian question and
submitted a convention to China which virtually made Manchuria
a Russian protectorate." The other powers protested*-" against
these separate negotiations, before the final treaty was signed
and strengthened by their attitude China, refused to enter upon
such a convention,^ Later, on March 8th, 1902, a convention
was concluded between Russia and China, which, while it gave
Russia special privileges in Manchuria, provided for the entire
evacuation by Russian troops, to take place gradually, within
eighteen months. This evacuation was not accomplished as the
treaty stipulated dispite the repeated requests that the other
London Times, 1900, pp. 647-8.
2 Ibid, 1901. p. 1E4.
^ Ibid. 1901, p. 150
^ Ibid. 1901, pp. E03-204.
^ For. Rel. 1902, pp. 280-281.
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powers made and the promises made by Russia,^ and it was ul-
timately the cause of the next event in the "drama" of Oriental
politics - the Russo-Japanese war. It is also true that the
Boxer uprising was indirectly connected 77ith the Russo-Japanese
war in that, it was the efficiency shown by Japan at this time
that led Great Britain to form the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which
strengthened Japan for the conflict.
In smnming up the effects of the Boxer uprising upon the
Chinese government the most important result was the further break
ing down of Chinese reserve. In 1900 the Imperial government
had revived the idea as was expressed in some of the edicts, that
have been quoted, that China could cope with the whole world.
The march of the allies to Peking showed how futile such a hope
was and demonstrated to China that if she were to take a place
among the nations of the world the old idea of isolation must be
disgarded and western methods adopted, and the reform movement
that has since been going on in China undoubtedly owes its impe-
tus to a large extent to the contact with other powers gained
in the Boxer uprising.
For. Rel. 1903, pp. 46-77.
British State Papers, China, ITo, 1 fl90E) p. 5.
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